Merge pull request #547 from router-for-me/amp

feat(amp): require API key authentication for management routes

Luis Pater committed 11 months agov6.6.15

Commit f6720f82 parents e19ab3a 8f1dd696 files · +21 −13Browse files

Unified · Split

6 files

config.example.yaml +2 −2
internal/api/modules/amp/amp.go +2 −4
internal/api/modules/amp/fallback_handlers.go +1 −1
internal/api/modules/amp/proxy.go +6 −1
internal/api/modules/amp/routes.go +8 −3
internal/config/config.go +2 −2

config.example.yaml+2−2

@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ ws-auth: false · 135 unmodified lines
136	136	# upstream-url: "https://ampcode.com"
137	137	# # Optional: Override API key for Amp upstream (otherwise uses env or file)
138	138	# upstream-api-key: ""
139		−# # Restrict Amp management routes (/api/auth, /api/user, etc.) to localhost only (recommended)
140		−# restrict-management-to-localhost: true
	139	+# # Restrict Amp management routes (/api/auth, /api/user, etc.) to localhost only (default: false)
	140	+# restrict-management-to-localhost: false
141	141	# # Force model mappings to run before checking local API keys (default: false)
142	142	# force-model-mappings: false
143	143	# # Amp Model Mappings

internal/api/modules/amp/amp.go+2−4

@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ func (m *AmpModule) Register(ctx modules.Context) error { · 136 unmodified lines
137	137	m.registerProviderAliases(ctx.Engine, ctx.BaseHandler, auth)
138	138
139	139	// Register management proxy routes once; middleware will gate access when upstream is unavailable.
140		− m.registerManagementRoutes(ctx.Engine, ctx.BaseHandler)
	140	+ // Pass auth middleware to require valid API key for all management routes.
	141	+ m.registerManagementRoutes(ctx.Engine, ctx.BaseHandler, auth)
141	142
142	143	// If no upstream URL, skip proxy routes but provider aliases are still available
143	144	if upstreamURL == "" {
@@ -187,9 +188,6 @@ func (m AmpModule) OnConfigUpdated(cfg config.Config) error { · 43 unmodified lines
187	188
188	189	if oldSettings != nil && oldSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost != newSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost {
189	190	m.setRestrictToLocalhost(newSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost)
190		− if !newSettings.RestrictManagementToLocalhost {
191		− log.Warnf("amp management routes now accessible from any IP - this is insecure!")
192		− }
193	191	}
194	192
195	193	newUpstreamURL := strings.TrimSpace(newSettings.UpstreamURL)

internal/api/modules/amp/fallback_handlers.go+1−1

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func logAmpRouting(routeType AmpRouteType, requestedModel, resolvedModel, provid · 63 unmodified lines
64	64	fields["cost"] = "amp_credits"
65	65	fields["source"] = "ampcode.com"
66	66	fields["model_id"] = requestedModel // Explicit model_id for easy config reference
67		− log.WithFields(fields).Warnf("forwarding to ampcode.com (uses amp credits) - model_id: %s \| To use local proxy, add to config: amp-model-mappings: [{from: \"%s\", to: \"<your-local-model>\"}]", requestedModel, requestedModel)
	67	+ log.WithFields(fields).Warnf("forwarding to ampcode.com (uses amp credits) - model_id: %s \| To use local provider, add to config: ampcode.model-mappings: [{from: \"%s\", to: \"<your-local-model>\"}]", requestedModel, requestedModel)
68	68
69	69	case RouteTypeNoProvider:
70	70	fields["cost"] = "none"

internal/api/modules/amp/proxy.go+6−1

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ func createReverseProxy(upstreamURL string, secretSource SecretSource) (*httputi · 40 unmodified lines
41	41	originalDirector(req)
42	42	req.Host = parsed.Host
43	43
	44	+ // Remove client's Authorization header - it was only used for CLI Proxy API authentication
	45	+ // We will set our own Authorization using the configured upstream-api-key
	46	+ req.Header.Del("Authorization")
	47	+ req.Header.Del("X-Api-Key")
	48	+
44	49	// Preserve correlation headers for debugging
45	50	if req.Header.Get("X-Request-ID") == "" {
46	51	// Could generate one here if needed
@@ -50,7 +55,7 @@ func createReverseProxy(upstreamURL string, secretSource SecretSource) (*httputi · 3 unmodified lines
50	55	// Users going through ampcode.com proxy are paying for the service and should get all features
51	56	// including 1M context window (context-1m-2025-08-07)
52	57
53		− // Inject API key from secret source (precedence: config > env > file)
	58	+ // Inject API key from secret source (only uses upstream-api-key from config)
54	59	if key, err := secretSource.Get(req.Context()); err == nil && key != "" {
55	60	req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", key)
56	61	req.Header.Set("Authorization", fmt.Sprintf("Bearer %s", key))

internal/api/modules/amp/routes.go+8−3

@@ -98,7 +98,8 @@ func (m *AmpModule) managementAvailabilityMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc { · 97 unmodified lines
98	98	// registerManagementRoutes registers Amp management proxy routes
99	99	// These routes proxy through to the Amp control plane for OAuth, user management, etc.
100	100	// Uses dynamic middleware and proxy getter for hot-reload support.
101		−func (m AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine gin.Engine, baseHandler *handlers.BaseAPIHandler) {
	101	+// The auth middleware validates Authorization header against configured API keys.
	102	+func (m AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine gin.Engine, baseHandler *handlers.BaseAPIHandler, auth gin.HandlerFunc) {
102	103	ampAPI := engine.Group("/api")
103	104
104	105	// Always disable CORS for management routes to prevent browser-based attacks
@@ -107,8 +108,9 @@ func (m AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine gin.Engine, baseHandler *ha · 2 unmodified lines
107	108	// Apply dynamic localhost-only restriction (hot-reloadable via m.IsRestrictedToLocalhost())
108	109	ampAPI.Use(m.localhostOnlyMiddleware())
109	110
110		− if !m.IsRestrictedToLocalhost() {
111		− log.Warn("amp management routes are NOT restricted to localhost - this is insecure!")
	111	+ // Apply authentication middleware - requires valid API key in Authorization header
	112	+ if auth != nil {
	113	+ ampAPI.Use(auth)
112	114	}
113	115
114	116	// Dynamic proxy handler that uses m.getProxy() for hot-reload support
@@ -154,6 +156,9 @@ func (m AmpModule) registerManagementRoutes(engine gin.Engine, baseHandler *ha · 39 unmodified lines
154	156	// Root-level routes that AMP CLI expects without /api prefix
155	157	// These need the same security middleware as the /api/* routes (dynamic for hot-reload)
156	158	rootMiddleware := []gin.HandlerFunc{m.managementAvailabilityMiddleware(), noCORSMiddleware(), m.localhostOnlyMiddleware()}
	159	+ if auth != nil {
	160	+ rootMiddleware = append(rootMiddleware, auth)
	161	+ }
157	162	engine.GET("/threads/*path", append(rootMiddleware, proxyHandler)...)
158	163	engine.GET("/threads.rss", append(rootMiddleware, proxyHandler)...)
159	164	engine.GET("/news.rss", append(rootMiddleware, proxyHandler)...)

internal/config/config.go+2−2

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ type AmpCode struct { · 138 unmodified lines
139	139
140	140	// RestrictManagementToLocalhost restricts Amp management routes (/api/user, /api/threads, etc.)
141	141	// to only accept connections from localhost (127.0.0.1, ::1). When true, prevents drive-by
142		− // browser attacks and remote access to management endpoints. Default: true (recommended).
	142	+ // browser attacks and remote access to management endpoints. Default: false (API key auth is sufficient).
143	143	RestrictManagementToLocalhost bool `yaml:"restrict-management-to-localhost" json:"restrict-management-to-localhost"`
144	144
145	145	// ModelMappings defines model name mappings for Amp CLI requests.
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ func LoadConfigOptional(configFile string, optional bool) (*Config, error) { · 181 unmodified lines
327	327	cfg.LoggingToFile = false
328	328	cfg.UsageStatisticsEnabled = false
329	329	cfg.DisableCooling = false
330		− cfg.AmpCode.RestrictManagementToLocalhost = true // Default to secure: only localhost access
	330	+ cfg.AmpCode.RestrictManagementToLocalhost = false // Default to false: API key auth is sufficient
331	331	if err = yaml.Unmarshal(data, &cfg); err != nil {
332	332	if optional {
333	333	// In cloud deploy mode, if YAML parsing fails, return empty config instead of error.