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fix(cloud): require CSRF state in the WorkOS login callback (#1886)

* fix(cloud): require CSRF state in the WorkOS login callback * Test queue timeout with a controlled clock * Exercise browser binding and replay protection for login state * Capture provider redirect before testing callback state * Wait for key revocation before checking authentication ---------

ra-co88 committed 1 month ago

Commit 5ecb8811 parent 929b2335 files · +273 −13Browse files

Unified · Split

5 files
  1. .changeset/tidy-login-state.md +17 −0
  2. apps/cloud/src/auth/handlers.ts +12 −12
  3. apps/cloud/src/auth/workos-callback-state.node.test.ts +166 −0
  4. e2e/cloud/login-csrf.test.ts +75 −0
  5. e2e/cloud/org-api-keys-console.test.ts +3 −1
.changeset/tidy-login-state.md+17−0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
1+---
2+"@executor-js/cloud": patch
3+---
4+
5+fix: make login CSRF state mandatory in the WorkOS callback
6+
7+The callback previously skipped its CSRF check whenever the redirect carried
8+no `state` value ("some WorkOS-initiated redirects don't include one"). That
9+bypass let an attacker complete their own OAuth round-trip and redirect a
10+victim's browser through the callback with the attacker's `code` and no
11+`state`, silently signing the victim into the attacker's account (login CSRF).
12+
13+The check is now unconditional: a callback without a state matching the
14+`wos-login-state` cookie set on `/login` is rejected with 400. This is a
15+breaking change for any client relying on the undocumented no-state entry
16+path; server-initiated flows that cannot carry state must be redesigned with
17+a signed nonce instead of re-adding the bypass.
apps/cloud/src/auth/handlers.ts+12−12
@@ -189,17 +189,17 @@ export const CloudAuthPublicHandlers = HttpApiBuilder.group( · 188 unmodified lines
189189 const workos = yield* WorkOSClient;
190190 const users = yield* UserStoreService;
191191 const cookieState = request.cookies[STATE_COOKIE] ?? null;
192− // CSRF check is only enforced when the redirect carries a state
193− // value — some WorkOS-initiated redirects don't include one.
194− // When state is present, it MUST match the cookie we set on
195− // /login.
196− if (query.state !== undefined) {
197− if (!cookieState || !timingSafeEqual(cookieState, query.state)) {
198− return deleteResponseCookie(
199− HttpServerResponse.text("Invalid login state", { status: 400 }),
200− STATE_COOKIE,
201− );
202− }
192+ // CSRF is unconditional: every callback must carry a state that
193+ // matches the cookie set on /login. There is no legitimate
194+ // no-state entry path — omitting state previously allowed an
195+ // attacker to complete their own OAuth round-trip and redirect a
196+ // victim's browser through this callback, signing the victim into
197+ // the attacker's account (login CSRF).
198+ if (!cookieState || !timingSafeEqual(cookieState, query.state ?? "")) {
199+ return deleteResponseCookie(
200+ HttpServerResponse.text("Invalid login state", { status: 400 }),
201+ STATE_COOKIE,
202+ );
203203 }
204204
205205 const result = yield* workos.authenticateWithCode(query.code);
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ export const CloudAuthPublicHandlers = HttpApiBuilder.group( · 4 unmodified lines
210210 let sealedSession = result.sealedSession;
211211
212212 // Resume where the SSR gate interrupted them. The state passed the
213− // CSRF check above whenever it's present, but it's still a
213+ // CSRF check above, but it's still a
214214 // round-tripped value, so the returnTo inside it is re-validated like
215215 // any other untrusted path.
216216 const returnTo = safeReturnTo(decodeLoginState(query.state)?.returnTo) ?? "/";
apps/cloud/src/auth/workos-callback-state.node.test.ts+166−0
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
1+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2+// Focused tests — the WorkOS login callback's CSRF gate.
3+//
4+// The callback's CSRF check must be unconditional: no state ⇒ 400 before any
5+// WorkOS call; a replayed (already consumed) state ⇒ 400; a fresh state
6+// matching the cookie ⇒ 302 + session.
7+//
8+// Test seams follow repo conventions: @effect/vitest, Layer.succeed stubs
9+// (see org-selector-auth.node.test.ts), and HttpRouter.toWebHandler for the
10+// HTTP surface (see api.request-scope.node.test.ts).
11+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12+
13+import { afterAll, describe, expect, it } from "@effect/vitest";
14+import { Effect, Layer } from "effect";
15+import { HttpRouter, HttpServer } from "effect/unstable/http";
16+import { HttpApiBuilder } from "effect/unstable/httpapi";
17+import { HttpApi } from "effect/unstable/httpapi";
18+
19+import { CloudAuthPublicHandlers } from "./handlers";
20+import { CloudAuthPublicApi } from "./api";
21+import { UserStoreService } from "./context";
22+import { WorkOSClient, type WorkOSClientService } from "./workos";
23+import { encodeLoginState } from "./login-state";
24+
25+// The route under test serves under the `/api` prefix in the composed app;
26+// toWebHandler mounts the raw group, so paths here are relative to the group.
27+const SESSION_COOKIE = "wos-session";
28+const STATE_COOKIE = "wos-login-state";
29+
30+const STUB_USER_ID = "user_test";
31+const STUB_SESSION = "sealed-session-stub";
32+const STUB_ORG_ID = "org_test";
33+
34+const stubWorkOS = Layer.succeed(
35+ WorkOSClient,
36+ new Proxy({} as WorkOSClientService, {
37+ get: (_t, prop) => {
38+ if (prop === "authenticateWithCode") {
39+ return () =>
40+ Effect.succeed({
41+ user: { id: STUB_USER_ID, email: "u@test" },
42+ organizationId: STUB_ORG_ID,
43+ sealedSession: STUB_SESSION,
44+ });
45+ }
46+ if (prop === "listUserMemberships") {
47+ return () => Effect.succeed({ data: [] });
48+ }
49+ return () => Effect.die(`unexpected WorkOSClient.${String(prop)} call`);
50+ },
51+ }),
52+);
53+
54+const stubUsers = Layer.succeed(UserStoreService)({
55+ use: (_op, fn) =>
56+ Effect.promise(() =>
57+ fn({
58+ ensureAccount: async (id: string) => ({ id, createdAt: new Date() }),
59+ getAccount: async (id: string) => ({ id, createdAt: new Date() }),
60+ upsertOrganization: async (org: { id: string; name: string }) => ({
61+ ...org,
62+ slug: org.id,
63+ createdAt: new Date(),
64+ }),
65+ getOrganization: async (id: string) => ({
66+ id,
67+ name: "Org " + id,
68+ slug: id,
69+ createdAt: new Date(),
70+ }),
71+ getOrganizationBySlug: async (slug: string) => ({
72+ id: slug,
73+ name: slug,
74+ slug,
75+ createdAt: new Date(),
76+ }),
77+ deleteOrganizationCascade: async () => {},
78+ }),
79+ ),
80+});
81+
82+// Only the public group is under test; the session group (and its SessionAuth
83+// middleware, which needs a live DB) is out of scope — the callback route lives
84+// in CloudAuthPublicApi and requires no middleware.
85+const PublicApi = HttpApi.make("cloudWeb").add(CloudAuthPublicApi);
86+
87+const App = HttpApiBuilder.layer(PublicApi).pipe(
88+ Layer.provide(CloudAuthPublicHandlers),
89+ Layer.provide(stubWorkOS),
90+ Layer.provide(stubUsers),
91+ Layer.provide(HttpServer.layerServices),
92+);
93+
94+const app = HttpRouter.toWebHandler(App, { disableLogger: true });
95+afterAll(() => app.dispose());
96+
97+const run = (request: Request) => {
98+ // beta.59: the handler type expects a context argument; this layer stack
99+ // needs none at runtime — pass undefined like the api.request-scope tests.
100+ return app.handler(request, undefined as never);
101+};
102+
103+const callbackUrl = (state?: string, code = "code_1") =>
104+ `https://executor.test/auth/callback${state ? `?state=${encodeURIComponent(state)}` : ""}${state ? "&" : "?"}code=${code}`;
105+
106+describe("workos callback · CSRF state hardening", () => {
107+ it("rejects a callback with NO state (the former bypass) before any WorkOS call", async () => {
108+ const res = await run(new Request(callbackUrl(undefined), { redirect: "manual" }));
109+ expect(res.status).toBe(400);
110+ expect(await res.text()).toContain("Invalid login state");
111+ expect(res.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "").not.toContain(SESSION_COOKIE);
112+ });
113+
114+ it("rejects missing state even when the browser has a login cookie", async () => {
115+ const res = await run(
116+ new Request(callbackUrl(undefined), {
117+ headers: { cookie: `${STATE_COOKIE}=victim-login-state` },
118+ redirect: "manual",
119+ }),
120+ );
121+ expect(res.status).toBe(400);
122+ expect(await res.text()).toBe("Invalid login state");
123+ expect(res.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "").not.toContain(SESSION_COOKIE);
124+ });
125+
126+ it("rejects a state that does not match the login cookie", async () => {
127+ const res = await run(
128+ new Request(callbackUrl("attacker-controlled-state"), {
129+ headers: { cookie: `${STATE_COOKIE}=victim-login-state` },
130+ redirect: "manual",
131+ }),
132+ );
133+ expect(res.status).toBe(400);
134+ expect(await res.text()).toContain("Invalid login state");
135+ });
136+
137+ it("accepts a fresh state matching the cookie and issues a session (302 + cookie)", async () => {
138+ // /login sets the cookie; simulate its value for this callback.
139+ const state = encodeLoginState({ nonce: "nonce-123", returnTo: "/" });
140+ const res = await run(
141+ new Request(callbackUrl(state), {
142+ headers: { cookie: `${STATE_COOKIE}=${state}` },
143+ redirect: "manual",
144+ }),
145+ );
146+ expect(res.status).toBe(302);
147+ expect(res.headers.get("set-cookie") ?? "").toContain(SESSION_COOKIE);
148+ });
149+
150+ it("rejects a replayed state (single-use contract preserved downstream)", async () => {
151+ // Replay of a state whose cookie is gone (already consumed by the login
152+ // round-trip) must fail closed.
153+ const state = encodeLoginState({ nonce: "nonce-replay", returnTo: "/" });
154+ const first = await run(
155+ new Request(callbackUrl(state), {
156+ headers: { cookie: `${STATE_COOKIE}=${state}` },
157+ redirect: "manual",
158+ }),
159+ );
160+ expect(first.status).toBe(302);
161+
162+ // Second callback: same state, no cookie (session-store consumed it).
163+ const replay = await run(new Request(callbackUrl(state), { redirect: "manual" }));
164+ expect(replay.status).toBe(400);
165+ });
166+});
e2e/cloud/login-csrf.test.ts+75−0
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
1+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
2+
3+import { expect } from "@effect/vitest";
4+import { Effect } from "effect";
5+
6+import { scenario } from "../src/scenario";
7+import { Browser, Target } from "../src/services";
8+
9+scenario(
10+ "Login CSRF · state is required, bound to the browser, and consumed after login",
11+ { timeout: 180_000 },
12+ Effect.gen(function* () {
13+ const target = yield* Target;
14+ const browser = yield* Browser;
15+ const email = `csrf-${randomUUID()}@e2e.test`;
16+ yield* browser.session({ label: "anonymous" }, async ({ page, step }) => {
17+ const interceptCallback = async (): Promise<string> => {
18+ let callback: string | undefined;
19+ // Pause the real provider response before its redirect reaches the app.
20+ // Playwright does not route subsequent hops of a redirect chain.
21+ await page.route("**/user_management/authorize/submit", async (route) => {
22+ const response = await route.fetch({ maxRedirects: 0 });
23+ expect(response.status()).toBe(302);
24+ callback = response.headers().location;
25+ await route.fulfill({
26+ status: 200,
27+ contentType: "text/plain",
28+ body: "Authorization ready for callback validation",
29+ });
30+ });
31+ await page.goto(new URL("/api/auth/login", target.baseUrl).toString());
32+ await page.getByPlaceholder("new-user@example.com").fill(email);
33+ await page.getByRole("button", { name: /Continue/ }).click();
34+ await expect.poll(() => callback).toBeDefined();
35+ await page.unroute("**/user_management/authorize/submit");
36+ if (!callback) throw new Error("AuthKit did not return a callback");
37+ return callback;
38+ };
39+ await step("Refuse a valid authorization code with no state", async () => {
40+ const callback = new URL(await interceptCallback());
41+ callback.searchParams.delete("state");
42+ const response = await page.request.get(callback.toString(), { maxRedirects: 0 });
43+ expect(response.status()).toBe(400);
44+ expect(await response.text()).toBe("Invalid login state");
45+ expect(
46+ (await page.context().cookies()).some((cookie) => cookie.name === "wos-session"),
47+ ).toBe(false);
48+ });
49+ await step("Refuse a state from another login", async () => {
50+ const callback = new URL(await interceptCallback());
51+ callback.searchParams.set("state", "another-browser-state");
52+ const response = await page.request.get(callback.toString(), { maxRedirects: 0 });
53+ expect(response.status()).toBe(400);
54+ expect(await response.text()).toBe("Invalid login state");
55+ expect(
56+ (await page.context().cookies()).some((cookie) => cookie.name === "wos-session"),
57+ ).toBe(false);
58+ });
59+ await step("Complete a fresh login, then reject the same callback again", async () => {
60+ const callback = await interceptCallback();
61+ await page.goto(callback);
62+ await page.waitForURL((url) => url.pathname === "/create-org", { timeout: 30_000 });
63+ const cookies = await page.context().cookies();
64+ expect(cookies.some((cookie) => cookie.name === "wos-session")).toBe(true);
65+ expect(cookies.some((cookie) => cookie.name === "wos-login-state")).toBe(false);
66+ const me = await page.request.get(new URL("/api/auth/me", target.baseUrl).toString());
67+ expect(me.status()).toBe(200);
68+ expect(await me.json()).toMatchObject({ user: { email } });
69+ const replay = await page.request.get(callback, { maxRedirects: 0 });
70+ expect(replay.status()).toBe(400);
71+ expect(await replay.text()).toBe("Invalid login state");
72+ });
73+ });
74+ }),
75+);
e2e/cloud/org-api-keys-console.test.ts+3−1
@@ -110,7 +110,9 @@ scenario( · 109 unmodified lines
110110 .getByRole("heading", { name: "Revoke organization key" })
111111 .waitFor({ state: "hidden", timeout: 30_000 });
112112
113− // The revoked value no longer authenticates.
113+ // The dialog closes when revocation starts. Wait for the confirmed
114+ // provider mutation before asserting the key no longer authenticates.
115+ await page.getByText("Revoked e2e backend reader", { exact: true }).waitFor();
114116 const after = await fetch(new URL("/api/admin/users", target.baseUrl), {
115117 headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${mintedValue}` },
116118 });