import { HttpApiBuilder } from "effect/unstable/httpapi"; import { HttpRouter, HttpServer } from "effect/unstable/http"; import { describe, expect, it } from "@effect/vitest"; import { Context, Effect, Layer, type Scope } from "effect"; import { Subject, Tenant, collectTables, createExecutor, type Executor } from "@executor-js/sdk"; import { createSqliteTestFumaDb, type SqliteTestFumaDb } from "@executor-js/sdk/testing"; import { resetSubjectTouchCache, touchSubject } from "@executor-js/sdk/host-internal"; import { AdminUsersHttpApi, AdminUsersForbidden, AdminUsersUnauthorized } from "./api"; import { AdminUsersHandlers } from "./handlers"; import { AdminUsersProvider, type AdminUsersHeaders } from "./service"; import { listUserConnections, listUsers, listUsersWithConnections, platformViewOf } from "./reads"; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // The admin users HTTP surface, over a real SQLite-backed platform view. // // The reads themselves (tenant reach, the bigint `last_seen_at` round-trip, the // field allowlist) are proven in the SDK's `platform-view.test.ts`. What this // file proves is the HTTP EDGE on top of them: // - the public vocabulary + wire shapes the contract promises, // - the authorization outcomes (401 vs 403) a host's provider produces, // - that a tenant's admin plane cannot see another tenant's rows, // - that no credential-bearing field survives the projection. // // The provider seam is stubbed the way each host's real one behaves, so the // authz assertions are about the CONTRACT (which status a refusal renders), // not about WorkOS or Better Auth. // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- const TENANT_A = "org_a"; const TENANT_B = "org_b"; const USER_A1 = "user_a1"; const USER_A2 = "user_a2"; const USER_B1 = "user_b1"; /** Every field that could resolve, or help resolve, a credential. NONE may * appear anywhere in an admin HTTP response — enumerated so a future column * addition has to be argued with this list. Mirrors the SDK's own list. */ const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [ "item_ids", "itemIds", "refresh_item_id", "refreshItemId", "provider", "provider_state", "providerState", "oauth_token_url", "oauthTokenUrl", "template", "client_secret", "clientSecret", "secret", "token", // The internal partition keys: the public vocabulary is users/owners, so // neither the raw column name nor the tenant may leak onto the wire. "subject", "tenant", ] as const; // The bodies below acquire a scoped web handler, so `R` carries `Scope` rather // than being erased; `Effect.scoped` closes it when the body finishes. const withDb = ( body: (db: SqliteTestFumaDb) => Effect.Effect, ): Effect.Effect => Effect.scoped( Effect.acquireUseRelease( Effect.promise(() => createSqliteTestFumaDb({ tables: collectTables() })), body, (db) => Effect.promise(() => db.close()), ), ); const insertConnection = ( db: SqliteTestFumaDb, row: { readonly rowId: string; readonly tenant: string; readonly owner: string; readonly subject: string; readonly integration: string; readonly name: string; readonly oauthScope?: string | null; }, ): Effect.Effect => Effect.promise(async () => { await db.client.execute({ sql: `INSERT INTO connection ( row_id, tenant, owner, subject, integration, name, template, provider, item_ids, refresh_item_id, oauth_scope, last_health, created_at, updated_at ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`, args: [ row.rowId, row.tenant, row.owner, row.subject, row.integration, row.name, "oauth2", "memory", // Deliberately secret-bearing: the assertions below prove these never // reach an HTTP response. JSON.stringify({ token: `SECRET-item-${row.rowId}` }), `SECRET-refresh-${row.rowId}`, row.oauthScope ?? null, JSON.stringify({ status: "healthy", checkedAt: 1_700_000_000_000 }), Date.now(), Date.now(), ], }); }); /** Two users with connections under tenant A, plus a whole separate tenant B * that A's admin plane must never see. */ const seed = (db: SqliteTestFumaDb): Effect.Effect => Effect.gen(function* () { // `touchSubject` keeps a process-local memory of principals it already // filed, so a second seed against a FRESH database would be skipped as a // repeat sighting and leave the table empty. Each seed is a new world. resetSubjectTouchCache(); yield* touchSubject(db.db, { tenant: TENANT_A, externalId: USER_A1 }); yield* touchSubject(db.db, { tenant: TENANT_A, externalId: USER_A2 }); yield* touchSubject(db.db, { tenant: TENANT_B, externalId: USER_B1 }); yield* insertConnection(db, { rowId: "c-a1-gh", tenant: TENANT_A, owner: "user", subject: USER_A1, integration: "github", name: "personal", oauthScope: "repo read:user", }); yield* insertConnection(db, { rowId: "c-a2-linear", tenant: TENANT_A, owner: "user", subject: USER_A2, integration: "linear", name: "work", }); yield* insertConnection(db, { rowId: "c-b1-gh", tenant: TENANT_B, owner: "user", subject: USER_B1, integration: "github", name: "b-secret", oauthScope: "admin:org", }); }); const platformExecutorFor = (db: SqliteTestFumaDb, tenant: string): Effect.Effect => createExecutor({ tenant: Tenant.make(tenant), db: db.db, onElicitation: "accept-all", platformView: true, }).pipe(Effect.orDie); /** A product-view executor: bound to one subject, no platform view at all. */ const productExecutorFor = (db: SqliteTestFumaDb, tenant: string): Effect.Effect => createExecutor({ tenant: Tenant.make(tenant), subject: Subject.make(USER_A1), db: db.db, onElicitation: "accept-all", }).pipe(Effect.orDie); /** * A stub `AdminUsersProvider` shaped like a host's real one: it authorizes off * the request headers, then delegates to the shared reads. `authorize` returns * the tenant an authorized caller may read, or a refusal — exactly the decision * cloud makes from an org key / admin session and self-host from a Better Auth * member. */ const stubProvider = ( executorFor: (tenant: string) => Effect.Effect, authorize: ( headers: AdminUsersHeaders, ) => Effect.Effect, ) => Layer.succeed(AdminUsersProvider)({ listUsers: (headers, options) => authorize(headers).pipe( Effect.flatMap(executorFor), Effect.flatMap((executor) => platformViewOf(executor).pipe(Effect.flatMap((admin) => listUsers(admin, options))), ), ), listUsersWithConnections: (headers, options) => authorize(headers).pipe( Effect.flatMap(executorFor), Effect.flatMap((executor) => platformViewOf(executor).pipe( Effect.flatMap((admin) => listUsersWithConnections(admin, options)), ), ), ), listUserConnections: (headers, externalId) => authorize(headers).pipe( Effect.flatMap(executorFor), Effect.flatMap((executor) => platformViewOf(executor).pipe( Effect.flatMap((admin) => listUserConnections(admin, externalId)), ), ), ), }); /** * The authorization the hosts implement, reduced to its decision table: * an org-scoped key (or admin session) names its tenant; a plain member or a * user-scoped key is forbidden; no credential at all is unauthorized. */ const headerAuthorize = (headers: AdminUsersHeaders) => { const credential = headers["authorization"]; if (!credential) return Effect.fail(new AdminUsersUnauthorized()); if (credential === "Bearer org_a_key") return Effect.succeed(TENANT_A); if (credential === "Bearer org_b_key") return Effect.succeed(TENANT_B); // A valid user-scoped key / plain member session: authentic, but this plane // serves the whole tenant and they name one member. return Effect.fail(new AdminUsersForbidden()); }; // `HttpRouter.provideRequest` (not a plain `Layer.provide`) is what clears the // handlers' per-request `AdminUsersProvider` marker — the same reason the real // hosts mount the provider through a router middleware. const webHandlerFor = (provider: Layer.Layer) => Effect.acquireRelease( Effect.sync(() => HttpRouter.toWebHandler( HttpApiBuilder.layer(AdminUsersHttpApi).pipe( Layer.provide(AdminUsersHandlers), HttpRouter.provideRequest(provider), Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerServices), Layer.provideMerge(Layer.succeed(HttpRouter.RouterConfig)({ maxParamLength: 1000 })), ), { disableLogger: true }, ), ), (web) => Effect.promise(() => web.dispose()), ); const get = ( web: { readonly handler: (request: Request, context: Context.Context) => Promise; }, path: string, credential?: string, ) => Effect.promise(() => web.handler( new Request(`http://localhost${path}`, { headers: credential ? { authorization: credential } : {}, }), Context.empty(), ), ); const jsonOf = (response: Response) => Effect.promise(() => response.json() as Promise); type UsersBody = { readonly users: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly externalId: string }> }; type ConnectionsBody = { readonly connections: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly integration: string; readonly name: string }>; }; type UsersWithConnectionsBody = { readonly users: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly externalId: string; readonly lastSeenAt: number | null; readonly status: string | null; readonly connections: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly integration: string; readonly oauthScope: string | null; readonly lastHealth: { readonly status: string } | null; }>; }>; }; const ORG_A = "Bearer org_a_key"; describe("admin users API", () => { it.effect("lists every user of the tenant for an authorized org caller", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const response = yield* get(web, "/admin/users", ORG_A); expect(response.status).toBe(200); const body = yield* jsonOf(response); expect( body.users.map((user) => user.externalId), "both of the tenant's users are reported", ).toEqual([USER_A1, USER_A2]); }), ), ); it.effect("reports a user's connections with access summary but no credential", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const response = yield* get(web, `/admin/users/${USER_A1}/connections`, ORG_A); expect(response.status).toBe(200); const body = yield* jsonOf(response); expect( body.connections.map((connection) => connection.integration), "the user's own connection is reported", ).toEqual(["github"]); expect(body.connections[0]?.name).toBe("personal"); }), ), ); it.effect("joins users with their connections for the dashboard view", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const response = yield* get(web, "/admin/users/with-connections", ORG_A); expect(response.status).toBe(200); const body = yield* jsonOf(response); expect( body.users.map((user) => [user.externalId, user.connections.map((c) => c.integration)]), "each user carries their own connections", ).toEqual([ [USER_A1, ["github"]], [USER_A2, ["linear"]], ]); // The access summary and health travel; `lastSeenAt` is a number the // dashboard can render (a raw SQL read would hand back a blob). expect(body.users[0]?.connections[0]?.oauthScope).toBe("repo read:user"); expect(body.users[0]?.connections[0]?.lastHealth?.status).toBe("healthy"); expect(typeof body.users[0]?.lastSeenAt).toBe("number"); expect(body.users[0]?.status, "no lifecycle state is recorded yet").toBeNull(); }), ), ); it.effect("never serves credential material on any admin response", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); for (const path of [ "/admin/users", "/admin/users/with-connections", `/admin/users/${USER_A1}/connections`, ]) { const response = yield* get(web, path, ORG_A); const raw = yield* Effect.promise(() => response.text()); for (const field of FORBIDDEN_FIELDS) { expect(raw, `${path} must not expose "${field}"`).not.toContain(`"${field}"`); } // The seeded secrets are the ground truth: nothing derived from a // credential may appear, whatever it is called. expect(raw, `${path} must not leak a stored secret`).not.toContain("SECRET-"); } }), ), ); it.effect("isolates tenants: an org caller sees nothing of another tenant", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const users = yield* jsonOf(yield* get(web, "/admin/users", ORG_A)); expect( users.users.map((user) => user.externalId), "tenant B's user is invisible to tenant A", ).not.toContain(USER_B1); // Naming another tenant's user directly returns nothing rather than // that user's connections — the tenant clause is never relaxed. const crossTenant = yield* jsonOf( yield* get(web, `/admin/users/${USER_B1}/connections`, ORG_A), ); expect(crossTenant.connections, "tenant B's connections stay in tenant B").toEqual([]); // And tenant B's own caller does see them — proving the emptiness above // is isolation, not a broken fixture. const ownView = yield* jsonOf( yield* get(web, `/admin/users/${USER_B1}/connections`, "Bearer org_b_key"), ); expect(ownView.connections.map((c) => c.name)).toEqual(["b-secret"]); }), ), ); it.effect("refuses a caller with no credential and a caller who is only a member", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const anonymous = yield* get(web, "/admin/users"); expect(anonymous.status, "no credential → unauthorized").toBe(401); // A user-scoped API key or plain member session: authentic, but this // plane serves the whole tenant. const member = yield* get(web, "/admin/users", "Bearer user_scoped_key"); expect(member.status, "a non-admin caller → forbidden").toBe(403); const memberJoined = yield* get(web, "/admin/users/with-connections", "Bearer user_key"); expect(memberJoined.status).toBe(403); const memberConnections = yield* get( web, `/admin/users/${USER_A1}/connections`, "Bearer user_key", ); expect(memberConnections.status).toBe(403); }), ), ); // The response schema strips unknown fields on encode, so the HTTP assertions // above would still pass if the projection leaked one. Assert the projection // directly too: it is the layer that is supposed to be an allowlist, and both // layers should hold on their own. it.effect("projects only allowlisted fields, before the schema ever encodes", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const executor = yield* platformExecutorFor(db, TENANT_A); const admin = yield* platformViewOf(executor); const { connections } = yield* listUserConnections(admin, USER_A1); expect( Object.keys(connections[0] ?? {}).sort(), "the connection projection is exactly the allowlist", ).toEqual(["integration", "lastHealth", "name", "oauthScope", "owner"]); const { users } = yield* listUsers(admin, {}); expect( Object.keys(users[0] ?? {}).sort(), "the user projection is exactly the allowlist", ).toEqual(["createdAt", "externalId", "lastSeenAt", "status"]); }), ), ); it.effect("fails loudly when wired to a product-view executor", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); // A host that forgot `platformView: true` must not silently report an // empty tenant — that would read as "this owner has no users". const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => productExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const response = yield* get(web, "/admin/users", ORG_A); expect(response.status, "a missing platform view is a server error").toBe(500); }), ), ); it.effect("pages the user list", () => withDb((db) => Effect.gen(function* () { yield* seed(db); const web = yield* webHandlerFor( stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize), ); const first = yield* jsonOf(yield* get(web, "/admin/users?limit=1", ORG_A)); expect(first.users.map((user) => user.externalId)).toEqual([USER_A1]); const second = yield* jsonOf( yield* get(web, "/admin/users?limit=1&offset=1", ORG_A), ); expect(second.users.map((user) => user.externalId)).toEqual([USER_A2]); }), ), ); });