// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // SSR auth gate — the server-side session check for DOCUMENT requests. // // Before this gate, every signed-out visitor was served the SPA, whose root // AuthGate SSRs the AUTHENTICATED app-shell skeleton until a client-side // `/account/me` round trip 401s — the "bad skeleton on unauthed state" flash. // The sealed `wos-session` cookie can be verified right here in the worker // (unseal + JWT check against cached JWKS — no per-request WorkOS round trip // except token refresh), so signed-out visitors are 302'd to /login before any // app HTML exists, and signed-in visitors proceed knowing the session is real. // // Scope: GET/HEAD requests that are document navigations (sec-fetch-dest / // accept), excluding app-owned paths (/api, /mcp — they answer for themselves // earlier in the middleware chain). Everything else passes through untouched. // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- import { createMiddleware } from "@tanstack/react-start"; import { Effect, Exit, ManagedRuntime } from "effect"; import { AUTH_HINT_COOKIE } from "@executor-js/react/multiplayer/auth-hint"; import { isAppOwnedPath } from "../app-paths"; import { parseCookie } from "./cookies"; import { loginPath, safeReturnTo } from "./return-to"; import { WorkOSClient } from "./workos"; const SESSION_COOKIE = "wos-session"; /** Mirrors the handlers' COOKIE_OPTIONS (path /, HttpOnly, Lax, 7d, Secure). */ const SESSION_COOKIE_ATTRIBUTES = "Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax"; const SESSION_MAX_AGE = 60 * 60 * 24 * 7; const isDocumentRequest = (request: Request): boolean => { if (request.method !== "GET" && request.method !== "HEAD") return false; // Browsers label navigations explicitly; non-browser clients fall back to // content negotiation. Anything that isn't asking for a page (vite module // requests, JSON fetches, health probes) passes through ungated. const dest = request.headers.get("sec-fetch-dest"); if (dest !== null) return dest === "document"; return request.headers.get("accept")?.includes("text/html") ?? false; }; // Lazy for the same reason start.ts instantiates the app handler lazily: this // module reaches workers-only imports (cloudflare:workers via ./workos), which // must stay behind the stripped `.server()` callback so the client bundle // never pulls them in. One runtime per isolate — the WorkOS client holds no // sockets, just config and a JWKS cache, so sharing it across requests is // exactly what the unified app handler already does. let runtime: ManagedRuntime.ManagedRuntime | undefined; const getRuntime = () => (runtime ??= ManagedRuntime.make(WorkOSClient.Default)); type VerifiedSession = { readonly refreshedSession?: string | undefined }; // EVERY failure collapses to "signed out" — WorkOS errors inside the effect // and layer-construction errors like a bad cookie password (runPromiseExit // carries those in its Exit too) — so the login flow surfaces the real // problem instead of 500ing every page. const verifySession = async (sealed: string): Promise => { const exit = await getRuntime().runPromiseExit( Effect.flatMap(WorkOSClient.asEffect(), (workos) => workos.authenticateSealedSession(sealed)), ); return Exit.isSuccess(exit) ? exit.value : null; }; const sessionSetCookie = (sealed: string) => `${SESSION_COOKIE}=${sealed}; ${SESSION_COOKIE_ATTRIBUTES}; Max-Age=${SESSION_MAX_AGE}`; const redirect = ( location: string, options?: { /** Drop the (invalid) session + auth-hint cookies along the way. */ readonly clearSession?: boolean; /** Persist a WorkOS-rotated sealed session (refresh tokens are single-use). */ readonly refreshedSession?: string | undefined; }, ): Response => { const headers = new Headers({ location }); if (options?.clearSession) { headers.append("set-cookie", `${SESSION_COOKIE}=; ${SESSION_COOKIE_ATTRIBUTES}; Max-Age=0`); headers.append("set-cookie", `${AUTH_HINT_COOKIE}=; Path=/; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=0`); } if (options?.refreshedSession) { headers.append("set-cookie", sessionSetCookie(options.refreshedSession)); } return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers }); }; export const authGateMiddleware = createMiddleware({ type: "request" }).server( async ({ pathname, request, next }) => { if (isAppOwnedPath(pathname) || !isDocumentRequest(request)) return next(); const sealed = parseCookie(request.headers.get("cookie"), SESSION_COOKIE); const url = new URL(request.url); // /login is the one page signed-out visitors are FOR; a signed-in visitor // landing here is bounced straight back to where they were headed. if (pathname === "/login") { const session = sealed ? await verifySession(sealed) : null; if (!session) return next(); return redirect(safeReturnTo(url.searchParams.get("returnTo")) ?? "/", { refreshedSession: session.refreshedSession, }); } // Marketing CTAs link to /cloud, which is not a route — it's "open the // app". Send it to the root (the gate below decides app vs login). const returnTo = pathname === "/cloud" ? "/" : `${pathname}${url.search}`; if (!sealed) return redirect(loginPath(returnTo)); const session = await verifySession(sealed); if (!session) { // A cookie that doesn't verify is worse than none: on executor.sh its // mere presence keeps routing / into the app instead of marketing. return redirect(loginPath(returnTo), { clearSession: true }); } if (pathname === "/cloud") { return redirect("/", { refreshedSession: session.refreshedSession }); } const result = await next(); if (session.refreshedSession) { // WorkOS refresh tokens are single-use: the rotated sealed session MUST // reach the browser or the next expiry logs the user out. const response = new Response(result.response.body, result.response); response.headers.append("set-cookie", sessionSetCookie(session.refreshedSession)); return response; } return result; }, );