Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
Showing the changes to security (25 of 72 files). Show all
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| @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" · 237 unmodified lines | ||
| 238 | 238 | source "security/yama/Kconfig" |
| 239 | 239 | source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" |
| 240 | 240 | source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" |
| 241 | +source "security/landlock/Kconfig" | |
| 241 | 242 | |
| 242 | 243 | source "security/integrity/Kconfig" |
| 243 | 244 | |
| @@ -277,11 +278,11 @@ endchoice · 33 unmodified lines | ||
| 277 | 278 | |
| 278 | 279 | config LSM |
| 279 | 280 | string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" |
| 280 | − default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
| 281 | − default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
| 282 | − default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
| 283 | − default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
| 284 | − default "lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" | |
| 281 | + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK | |
| 282 | + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR | |
| 283 | + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO | |
| 284 | + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC | |
| 285 | + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" | |
| 285 | 286 | help |
| 286 | 287 | A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. |
| 287 | 288 | Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be |
| @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin · 12 unmodified lines | ||
| 13 | 13 | subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid |
| 14 | 14 | subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown |
| 15 | 15 | subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf |
| 16 | +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock | |
| 16 | 17 | |
| 17 | 18 | # always enable default capabilities |
| 18 | 19 | obj-y += commoncap.o |
| @@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ · 13 unmodified lines | ||
| 32 | 33 | obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ |
| 33 | 34 | obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o |
| 34 | 35 | obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ |
| 36 | +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ | |
| 35 | 37 | |
| 36 | 38 | # Object integrity file lists |
| 37 | 39 | subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity |
| @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ | ||
| 1 | +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK | |
| 4 | + bool "Landlock support" | |
| 5 | + depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES | |
| 6 | + select SECURITY_PATH | |
| 7 | + help | |
| 8 | + Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict | |
| 9 | + themselves (and their future children) by gradually enforcing | |
| 10 | + tailored access control policies. A Landlock security policy is a | |
| 11 | + set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a | |
| 12 | + directory, etc.) tied to a file hierarchy. Such policy can be | |
| 13 | + configured and enforced by any processes for themselves using the | |
| 14 | + dedicated system calls: landlock_create_ruleset(), | |
| 15 | + landlock_add_rule(), and landlock_restrict_self(). | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | + See Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst for further information. | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. Otherwise, | |
| 20 | + you should also prepend "landlock," to the content of CONFIG_LSM to | |
| 21 | + enable Landlock at boot time. | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ | ||
| 1 | +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o | |
| 2 | + | |
| 3 | +landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ | |
| 4 | + cred.o ptrace.o fs.o | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Common constants and helpers | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#define LANDLOCK_NAME "landlock" | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +#ifdef pr_fmt | |
| 15 | +#undef pr_fmt | |
| 16 | +#endif | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +#define pr_fmt(fmt) LANDLOCK_NAME ": " fmt | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_COMMON_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Credential hooks | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <linux/cred.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include "common.h" | |
| 13 | +#include "cred.h" | |
| 14 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 15 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | +static int hook_cred_prepare(struct cred *const new, | |
| 18 | + const struct cred *const old, const gfp_t gfp) | |
| 19 | +{ | |
| 20 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const old_dom = landlock_cred(old)->domain; | |
| 21 | + | |
| 22 | + if (old_dom) { | |
| 23 | + landlock_get_ruleset(old_dom); | |
| 24 | + landlock_cred(new)->domain = old_dom; | |
| 25 | + } | |
| 26 | + return 0; | |
| 27 | +} | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +static void hook_cred_free(struct cred *const cred) | |
| 30 | +{ | |
| 31 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = landlock_cred(cred)->domain; | |
| 32 | + | |
| 33 | + if (dom) | |
| 34 | + landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(dom); | |
| 35 | +} | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { | |
| 38 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, hook_cred_prepare), | |
| 39 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, hook_cred_free), | |
| 40 | +}; | |
| 41 | + | |
| 42 | +__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void) | |
| 43 | +{ | |
| 44 | + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), | |
| 45 | + LANDLOCK_NAME); | |
| 46 | +} | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Credential hooks | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2019-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/cred.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/init.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 17 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +struct landlock_cred_security { | |
| 20 | + struct landlock_ruleset *domain; | |
| 21 | +}; | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +static inline struct landlock_cred_security *landlock_cred( | |
| 24 | + const struct cred *cred) | |
| 25 | +{ | |
| 26 | + return cred->security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_cred; | |
| 27 | +} | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +static inline const struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_get_current_domain(void) | |
| 30 | +{ | |
| 31 | + return landlock_cred(current_cred())->domain; | |
| 32 | +} | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +/* | |
| 35 | + * The call needs to come from an RCU read-side critical section. | |
| 36 | + */ | |
| 37 | +static inline const struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_get_task_domain( | |
| 38 | + const struct task_struct *const task) | |
| 39 | +{ | |
| 40 | + return landlock_cred(__task_cred(task))->domain; | |
| 41 | +} | |
| 42 | + | |
| 43 | +static inline bool landlocked(const struct task_struct *const task) | |
| 44 | +{ | |
| 45 | + bool has_dom; | |
| 46 | + | |
| 47 | + if (task == current) | |
| 48 | + return !!landlock_get_current_domain(); | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | + rcu_read_lock(); | |
| 51 | + has_dom = !!landlock_get_task_domain(task); | |
| 52 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 53 | + return has_dom; | |
| 54 | +} | |
| 55 | + | |
| 56 | +__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void); | |
| 57 | + | |
| 58 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_CRED_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,692 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <linux/atomic.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/bitops.h> | |
| 11 | +#include <linux/bits.h> | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/compiler_types.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/dcache.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/err.h> | |
| 15 | +#include <linux/fs.h> | |
| 16 | +#include <linux/init.h> | |
| 17 | +#include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| 18 | +#include <linux/limits.h> | |
| 19 | +#include <linux/list.h> | |
| 20 | +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
| 21 | +#include <linux/mount.h> | |
| 22 | +#include <linux/namei.h> | |
| 23 | +#include <linux/path.h> | |
| 24 | +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
| 25 | +#include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
| 26 | +#include <linux/stat.h> | |
| 27 | +#include <linux/types.h> | |
| 28 | +#include <linux/wait_bit.h> | |
| 29 | +#include <linux/workqueue.h> | |
| 30 | +#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h> | |
| 31 | + | |
| 32 | +#include "common.h" | |
| 33 | +#include "cred.h" | |
| 34 | +#include "fs.h" | |
| 35 | +#include "limits.h" | |
| 36 | +#include "object.h" | |
| 37 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 38 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 39 | + | |
| 40 | +/* Underlying object management */ | |
| 41 | + | |
| 42 | +static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object) | |
| 43 | + __releases(object->lock) | |
| 44 | +{ | |
| 45 | + struct inode *const inode = object->underobj; | |
| 46 | + struct super_block *sb; | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | + if (!inode) { | |
| 49 | + spin_unlock(&object->lock); | |
| 50 | + return; | |
| 51 | + } | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | + /* | |
| 54 | + * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference | |
| 55 | + * to the underlying inode. | |
| 56 | + */ | |
| 57 | + object->underobj = NULL; | |
| 58 | + /* | |
| 59 | + * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted, | |
| 60 | + * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput(). | |
| 61 | + */ | |
| 62 | + sb = inode->i_sb; | |
| 63 | + atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); | |
| 64 | + spin_unlock(&object->lock); | |
| 65 | + /* | |
| 66 | + * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and | |
| 67 | + * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset | |
| 68 | + * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. It is therefore | |
| 69 | + * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. | |
| 70 | + */ | |
| 71 | + rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); | |
| 72 | + /* | |
| 73 | + * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object(). | |
| 74 | + */ | |
| 75 | + | |
| 76 | + iput(inode); | |
| 77 | + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)) | |
| 78 | + wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); | |
| 79 | +} | |
| 80 | + | |
| 81 | +static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = { | |
| 82 | + .release = release_inode | |
| 83 | +}; | |
| 84 | + | |
| 85 | +/* Ruleset management */ | |
| 86 | + | |
| 87 | +static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode) | |
| 88 | +{ | |
| 89 | + struct landlock_object *object, *new_object; | |
| 90 | + struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode); | |
| 91 | + | |
| 92 | + rcu_read_lock(); | |
| 93 | +retry: | |
| 94 | + object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object); | |
| 95 | + if (object) { | |
| 96 | + if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) { | |
| 97 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 98 | + return object; | |
| 99 | + } | |
| 100 | + /* | |
| 101 | + * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going | |
| 102 | + * away. Wait for release_inode(), then retry. | |
| 103 | + */ | |
| 104 | + spin_lock(&object->lock); | |
| 105 | + spin_unlock(&object->lock); | |
| 106 | + goto retry; | |
| 107 | + } | |
| 108 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 109 | + | |
| 110 | + /* | |
| 111 | + * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without | |
| 112 | + * holding any locks). | |
| 113 | + */ | |
| 114 | + new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode); | |
| 115 | + if (IS_ERR(new_object)) | |
| 116 | + return new_object; | |
| 117 | + | |
| 118 | + /* | |
| 119 | + * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or | |
| 120 | + * hook_sb_delete(). | |
| 121 | + */ | |
| 122 | + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 123 | + if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) { | |
| 124 | + /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */ | |
| 125 | + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 126 | + kfree(new_object); | |
| 127 | + | |
| 128 | + rcu_read_lock(); | |
| 129 | + goto retry; | |
| 130 | + } | |
| 131 | + | |
| 132 | + /* | |
| 133 | + * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock | |
| 134 | + * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the | |
| 135 | + * related object. | |
| 136 | + */ | |
| 137 | + ihold(inode); | |
| 138 | + rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object); | |
| 139 | + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 140 | + return new_object; | |
| 141 | +} | |
| 142 | + | |
| 143 | +/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */ | |
| 144 | +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ | |
| 145 | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ | |
| 146 | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ | |
| 147 | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) | |
| 148 | + | |
| 149 | +/* | |
| 150 | + * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd(). | |
| 151 | + */ | |
| 152 | +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 153 | + const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights) | |
| 154 | +{ | |
| 155 | + int err; | |
| 156 | + struct landlock_object *object; | |
| 157 | + | |
| 158 | + /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */ | |
| 159 | + if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) != | |
| 160 | + ACCESS_FILE) | |
| 161 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 162 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) | |
| 163 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 164 | + | |
| 165 | + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ | |
| 166 | + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]; | |
| 167 | + object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); | |
| 168 | + if (IS_ERR(object)) | |
| 169 | + return PTR_ERR(object); | |
| 170 | + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); | |
| 171 | + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights); | |
| 172 | + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); | |
| 173 | + /* | |
| 174 | + * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule() | |
| 175 | + * increments the refcount for the new object if needed. | |
| 176 | + */ | |
| 177 | + landlock_put_object(object); | |
| 178 | + return err; | |
| 179 | +} | |
| 180 | + | |
| 181 | +/* Access-control management */ | |
| 182 | + | |
| 183 | +static inline u64 unmask_layers( | |
| 184 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, | |
| 185 | + const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request, | |
| 186 | + u64 layer_mask) | |
| 187 | +{ | |
| 188 | + const struct landlock_rule *rule; | |
| 189 | + const struct inode *inode; | |
| 190 | + size_t i; | |
| 191 | + | |
| 192 | + if (d_is_negative(path->dentry)) | |
| 193 | + /* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */ | |
| 194 | + return layer_mask; | |
| 195 | + inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); | |
| 196 | + rcu_read_lock(); | |
| 197 | + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, | |
| 198 | + rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object)); | |
| 199 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 200 | + if (!rule) | |
| 201 | + return layer_mask; | |
| 202 | + | |
| 203 | + /* | |
| 204 | + * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule | |
| 205 | + * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses, | |
| 206 | + * regardless of their position in the layer stack. We must then check | |
| 207 | + * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to | |
| 208 | + * the last one. | |
| 209 | + */ | |
| 210 | + for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) { | |
| 211 | + const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i]; | |
| 212 | + const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1); | |
| 213 | + | |
| 214 | + /* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */ | |
| 215 | + if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) { | |
| 216 | + layer_mask &= ~layer_level; | |
| 217 | + | |
| 218 | + if (layer_mask == 0) | |
| 219 | + return layer_mask; | |
| 220 | + } | |
| 221 | + } | |
| 222 | + return layer_mask; | |
| 223 | +} | |
| 224 | + | |
| 225 | +static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, | |
| 226 | + const struct path *const path, u32 access_request) | |
| 227 | +{ | |
| 228 | + bool allowed = false; | |
| 229 | + struct path walker_path; | |
| 230 | + u64 layer_mask; | |
| 231 | + size_t i; | |
| 232 | + | |
| 233 | + /* Make sure all layers can be checked. */ | |
| 234 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); | |
| 235 | + | |
| 236 | + if (!access_request) | |
| 237 | + return 0; | |
| 238 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path)) | |
| 239 | + return 0; | |
| 240 | + /* | |
| 241 | + * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable | |
| 242 | + * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through | |
| 243 | + * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> . | |
| 244 | + */ | |
| 245 | + if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || | |
| 246 | + (d_is_positive(path->dentry) && | |
| 247 | + unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))) | |
| 248 | + return 0; | |
| 249 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) | |
| 250 | + return -EACCES; | |
| 251 | + | |
| 252 | + /* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */ | |
| 253 | + layer_mask = 0; | |
| 254 | + for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) { | |
| 255 | + if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request) | |
| 256 | + layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i); | |
| 257 | + } | |
| 258 | + /* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */ | |
| 259 | + if (layer_mask == 0) | |
| 260 | + return 0; | |
| 261 | + | |
| 262 | + walker_path = *path; | |
| 263 | + path_get(&walker_path); | |
| 264 | + /* | |
| 265 | + * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant | |
| 266 | + * restriction. | |
| 267 | + */ | |
| 268 | + while (true) { | |
| 269 | + struct dentry *parent_dentry; | |
| 270 | + | |
| 271 | + layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path, | |
| 272 | + access_request, layer_mask); | |
| 273 | + if (layer_mask == 0) { | |
| 274 | + /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */ | |
| 275 | + allowed = true; | |
| 276 | + break; | |
| 277 | + } | |
| 278 | + | |
| 279 | +jump_up: | |
| 280 | + if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) { | |
| 281 | + if (follow_up(&walker_path)) { | |
| 282 | + /* Ignores hidden mount points. */ | |
| 283 | + goto jump_up; | |
| 284 | + } else { | |
| 285 | + /* | |
| 286 | + * Stops at the real root. Denies access | |
| 287 | + * because not all layers have granted access. | |
| 288 | + */ | |
| 289 | + allowed = false; | |
| 290 | + break; | |
| 291 | + } | |
| 292 | + } | |
| 293 | + if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) { | |
| 294 | + /* | |
| 295 | + * Stops at disconnected root directories. Only allows | |
| 296 | + * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is | |
| 297 | + * reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>). | |
| 298 | + */ | |
| 299 | + allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL); | |
| 300 | + break; | |
| 301 | + } | |
| 302 | + parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry); | |
| 303 | + dput(walker_path.dentry); | |
| 304 | + walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry; | |
| 305 | + } | |
| 306 | + path_put(&walker_path); | |
| 307 | + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; | |
| 308 | +} | |
| 309 | + | |
| 310 | +static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path, | |
| 311 | + const u32 access_request) | |
| 312 | +{ | |
| 313 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = | |
| 314 | + landlock_get_current_domain(); | |
| 315 | + | |
| 316 | + if (!dom) | |
| 317 | + return 0; | |
| 318 | + return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request); | |
| 319 | +} | |
| 320 | + | |
| 321 | +/* Inode hooks */ | |
| 322 | + | |
| 323 | +static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode) | |
| 324 | +{ | |
| 325 | + /* | |
| 326 | + * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by | |
| 327 | + * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete(). | |
| 328 | + */ | |
| 329 | + WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object); | |
| 330 | +} | |
| 331 | + | |
| 332 | +/* Super-block hooks */ | |
| 333 | + | |
| 334 | +/* | |
| 335 | + * Release the inodes used in a security policy. | |
| 336 | + * | |
| 337 | + * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes() | |
| 338 | + */ | |
| 339 | +static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) | |
| 340 | +{ | |
| 341 | + struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL; | |
| 342 | + | |
| 343 | + if (!landlock_initialized) | |
| 344 | + return; | |
| 345 | + | |
| 346 | + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); | |
| 347 | + list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) { | |
| 348 | + struct landlock_object *object; | |
| 349 | + | |
| 350 | + /* Only handles referenced inodes. */ | |
| 351 | + if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) | |
| 352 | + continue; | |
| 353 | + | |
| 354 | + /* | |
| 355 | + * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g. | |
| 356 | + * from get_inode_object()). | |
| 357 | + */ | |
| 358 | + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 359 | + /* | |
| 360 | + * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE to protect against a race | |
| 361 | + * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which | |
| 362 | + * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a | |
| 363 | + * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also | |
| 364 | + * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. | |
| 365 | + */ | |
| 366 | + if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { | |
| 367 | + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 368 | + continue; | |
| 369 | + } | |
| 370 | + | |
| 371 | + rcu_read_lock(); | |
| 372 | + object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object); | |
| 373 | + if (!object) { | |
| 374 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 375 | + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 376 | + continue; | |
| 377 | + } | |
| 378 | + /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */ | |
| 379 | + __iget(inode); | |
| 380 | + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); | |
| 381 | + | |
| 382 | + /* | |
| 383 | + * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we | |
| 384 | + * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we | |
| 385 | + * will just wait for it to finish. | |
| 386 | + */ | |
| 387 | + spin_lock(&object->lock); | |
| 388 | + if (object->underobj == inode) { | |
| 389 | + object->underobj = NULL; | |
| 390 | + spin_unlock(&object->lock); | |
| 391 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 392 | + | |
| 393 | + /* | |
| 394 | + * Because object->underobj was not NULL, | |
| 395 | + * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee | |
| 396 | + * that it is safe to reset | |
| 397 | + * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. | |
| 398 | + * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. | |
| 399 | + */ | |
| 400 | + rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); | |
| 401 | + /* | |
| 402 | + * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was | |
| 403 | + * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the | |
| 404 | + * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop | |
| 405 | + * walk. Therefore the following call to iput() will | |
| 406 | + * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at | |
| 407 | + * least two references to it. | |
| 408 | + */ | |
| 409 | + iput(inode); | |
| 410 | + } else { | |
| 411 | + spin_unlock(&object->lock); | |
| 412 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 413 | + } | |
| 414 | + | |
| 415 | + if (prev_inode) { | |
| 416 | + /* | |
| 417 | + * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference | |
| 418 | + * that we just set in this loop walk. Therefore we | |
| 419 | + * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't | |
| 420 | + * disappear from under us until the next loop walk. | |
| 421 | + */ | |
| 422 | + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); | |
| 423 | + /* | |
| 424 | + * We can now actually put the inode reference from the | |
| 425 | + * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore. | |
| 426 | + */ | |
| 427 | + iput(prev_inode); | |
| 428 | + cond_resched(); | |
| 429 | + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); | |
| 430 | + } | |
| 431 | + prev_inode = inode; | |
| 432 | + } | |
| 433 | + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); | |
| 434 | + | |
| 435 | + /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */ | |
| 436 | + if (prev_inode) | |
| 437 | + iput(prev_inode); | |
| 438 | + /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */ | |
| 439 | + wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read( | |
| 440 | + &landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)); | |
| 441 | +} | |
| 442 | + | |
| 443 | +/* | |
| 444 | + * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem | |
| 445 | + * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files | |
| 446 | + * not previously allowed. | |
| 447 | + * | |
| 448 | + * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked | |
| 449 | + * processes. Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a | |
| 450 | + * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide | |
| 451 | + * access-control security policy. | |
| 452 | + * | |
| 453 | + * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount | |
| 454 | + * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process. Indeed, we could | |
| 455 | + * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into | |
| 456 | + * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point. | |
| 457 | + * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically | |
| 458 | + * inherit these new constraints. Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons, | |
| 459 | + * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag). | |
| 460 | + */ | |
| 461 | +static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name, | |
| 462 | + const struct path *const path, const char *const type, | |
| 463 | + const unsigned long flags, void *const data) | |
| 464 | +{ | |
| 465 | + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) | |
| 466 | + return 0; | |
| 467 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 468 | +} | |
| 469 | + | |
| 470 | +static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path, | |
| 471 | + const struct path *const to_path) | |
| 472 | +{ | |
| 473 | + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) | |
| 474 | + return 0; | |
| 475 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 476 | +} | |
| 477 | + | |
| 478 | +/* | |
| 479 | + * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which | |
| 480 | + * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden. | |
| 481 | + */ | |
| 482 | +static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags) | |
| 483 | +{ | |
| 484 | + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) | |
| 485 | + return 0; | |
| 486 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 487 | +} | |
| 488 | + | |
| 489 | +static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts) | |
| 490 | +{ | |
| 491 | + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) | |
| 492 | + return 0; | |
| 493 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 494 | +} | |
| 495 | + | |
| 496 | +/* | |
| 497 | + * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace. It must | |
| 498 | + * then be forbidden for a landlocked process. | |
| 499 | + * | |
| 500 | + * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root | |
| 501 | + * directory of the current process. Moreover, it can be used to restrict the | |
| 502 | + * view of the filesystem. | |
| 503 | + */ | |
| 504 | +static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path, | |
| 505 | + const struct path *const new_path) | |
| 506 | +{ | |
| 507 | + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) | |
| 508 | + return 0; | |
| 509 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 510 | +} | |
| 511 | + | |
| 512 | +/* Path hooks */ | |
| 513 | + | |
| 514 | +static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) | |
| 515 | +{ | |
| 516 | + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { | |
| 517 | + case S_IFLNK: | |
| 518 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; | |
| 519 | + case 0: | |
| 520 | + /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ | |
| 521 | + case S_IFREG: | |
| 522 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; | |
| 523 | + case S_IFDIR: | |
| 524 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; | |
| 525 | + case S_IFCHR: | |
| 526 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; | |
| 527 | + case S_IFBLK: | |
| 528 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; | |
| 529 | + case S_IFIFO: | |
| 530 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; | |
| 531 | + case S_IFSOCK: | |
| 532 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; | |
| 533 | + default: | |
| 534 | + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); | |
| 535 | + return 0; | |
| 536 | + } | |
| 537 | +} | |
| 538 | + | |
| 539 | +/* | |
| 540 | + * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not | |
| 541 | + * handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more | |
| 542 | + * privileges by being accessible from the destination. This is getting more | |
| 543 | + * complex when dealing with multiple layers. The whole picture can be seen as | |
| 544 | + * a multilayer partial ordering problem. A future version of Landlock will | |
| 545 | + * deal with that. | |
| 546 | + */ | |
| 547 | +static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry, | |
| 548 | + const struct path *const new_dir, | |
| 549 | + struct dentry *const new_dentry) | |
| 550 | +{ | |
| 551 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = | |
| 552 | + landlock_get_current_domain(); | |
| 553 | + | |
| 554 | + if (!dom) | |
| 555 | + return 0; | |
| 556 | + /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ | |
| 557 | + if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry) | |
| 558 | + /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ | |
| 559 | + return -EXDEV; | |
| 560 | + if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) | |
| 561 | + return -ENOENT; | |
| 562 | + return check_access_path(dom, new_dir, | |
| 563 | + get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); | |
| 564 | +} | |
| 565 | + | |
| 566 | +static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) | |
| 567 | +{ | |
| 568 | + if (d_is_negative(dentry)) | |
| 569 | + return 0; | |
| 570 | + return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : | |
| 571 | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; | |
| 572 | +} | |
| 573 | + | |
| 574 | +static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir, | |
| 575 | + struct dentry *const old_dentry, | |
| 576 | + const struct path *const new_dir, | |
| 577 | + struct dentry *const new_dentry) | |
| 578 | +{ | |
| 579 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = | |
| 580 | + landlock_get_current_domain(); | |
| 581 | + | |
| 582 | + if (!dom) | |
| 583 | + return 0; | |
| 584 | + /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ | |
| 585 | + if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry) | |
| 586 | + /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ | |
| 587 | + return -EXDEV; | |
| 588 | + if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) | |
| 589 | + return -ENOENT; | |
| 590 | + /* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */ | |
| 591 | + return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) | | |
| 592 | + maybe_remove(new_dentry) | | |
| 593 | + get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); | |
| 594 | +} | |
| 595 | + | |
| 596 | +static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir, | |
| 597 | + struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode) | |
| 598 | +{ | |
| 599 | + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR); | |
| 600 | +} | |
| 601 | + | |
| 602 | +static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir, | |
| 603 | + struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode, | |
| 604 | + const unsigned int dev) | |
| 605 | +{ | |
| 606 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = | |
| 607 | + landlock_get_current_domain(); | |
| 608 | + | |
| 609 | + if (!dom) | |
| 610 | + return 0; | |
| 611 | + return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode)); | |
| 612 | +} | |
| 613 | + | |
| 614 | +static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir, | |
| 615 | + struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name) | |
| 616 | +{ | |
| 617 | + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM); | |
| 618 | +} | |
| 619 | + | |
| 620 | +static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir, | |
| 621 | + struct dentry *const dentry) | |
| 622 | +{ | |
| 623 | + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE); | |
| 624 | +} | |
| 625 | + | |
| 626 | +static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir, | |
| 627 | + struct dentry *const dentry) | |
| 628 | +{ | |
| 629 | + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR); | |
| 630 | +} | |
| 631 | + | |
| 632 | +/* File hooks */ | |
| 633 | + | |
| 634 | +static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file) | |
| 635 | +{ | |
| 636 | + u32 access = 0; | |
| 637 | + | |
| 638 | + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { | |
| 639 | + /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */ | |
| 640 | + if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) | |
| 641 | + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; | |
| 642 | + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; | |
| 643 | + } | |
| 644 | + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) | |
| 645 | + access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; | |
| 646 | + /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */ | |
| 647 | + if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) | |
| 648 | + access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; | |
| 649 | + return access; | |
| 650 | +} | |
| 651 | + | |
| 652 | +static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file) | |
| 653 | +{ | |
| 654 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = | |
| 655 | + landlock_get_current_domain(); | |
| 656 | + | |
| 657 | + if (!dom) | |
| 658 | + return 0; | |
| 659 | + /* | |
| 660 | + * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may | |
| 661 | + * return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock | |
| 662 | + * evolution. | |
| 663 | + */ | |
| 664 | + return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file)); | |
| 665 | +} | |
| 666 | + | |
| 667 | +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { | |
| 668 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security), | |
| 669 | + | |
| 670 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete), | |
| 671 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount), | |
| 672 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount), | |
| 673 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount), | |
| 674 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount), | |
| 675 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot), | |
| 676 | + | |
| 677 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link), | |
| 678 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename), | |
| 679 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir), | |
| 680 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod), | |
| 681 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink), | |
| 682 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink), | |
| 683 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), | |
| 684 | + | |
| 685 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), | |
| 686 | +}; | |
| 687 | + | |
| 688 | +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void) | |
| 689 | +{ | |
| 690 | + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), | |
| 691 | + LANDLOCK_NAME); | |
| 692 | +} | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/fs.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/init.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 17 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +/** | |
| 20 | + * struct landlock_inode_security - Inode security blob | |
| 21 | + * | |
| 22 | + * Enable to reference a &struct landlock_object tied to an inode (i.e. | |
| 23 | + * underlying object). | |
| 24 | + */ | |
| 25 | +struct landlock_inode_security { | |
| 26 | + /** | |
| 27 | + * @object: Weak pointer to an allocated object. All assignments of a | |
| 28 | + * new object are protected by the underlying inode->i_lock. However, | |
| 29 | + * atomically disassociating @object from the inode is only protected | |
| 30 | + * by @object->lock, from the time @object's usage refcount drops to | |
| 31 | + * zero to the time this pointer is nulled out (cf. release_inode() and | |
| 32 | + * hook_sb_delete()). Indeed, such disassociation doesn't require | |
| 33 | + * inode->i_lock thanks to the careful rcu_access_pointer() check | |
| 34 | + * performed by get_inode_object(). | |
| 35 | + */ | |
| 36 | + struct landlock_object __rcu *object; | |
| 37 | +}; | |
| 38 | + | |
| 39 | +/** | |
| 40 | + * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob | |
| 41 | + * | |
| 42 | + * Enable hook_sb_delete() to wait for concurrent calls to release_inode(). | |
| 43 | + */ | |
| 44 | +struct landlock_superblock_security { | |
| 45 | + /** | |
| 46 | + * @inode_refs: Number of pending inodes (from this superblock) that | |
| 47 | + * are being released by release_inode(). | |
| 48 | + * Cf. struct super_block->s_fsnotify_inode_refs . | |
| 49 | + */ | |
| 50 | + atomic_long_t inode_refs; | |
| 51 | +}; | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +static inline struct landlock_inode_security *landlock_inode( | |
| 54 | + const struct inode *const inode) | |
| 55 | +{ | |
| 56 | + return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; | |
| 57 | +} | |
| 58 | + | |
| 59 | +static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *landlock_superblock( | |
| 60 | + const struct super_block *const superblock) | |
| 61 | +{ | |
| 62 | + return superblock->s_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; | |
| 63 | +} | |
| 64 | + | |
| 65 | +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void); | |
| 66 | + | |
| 67 | +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 68 | + const struct path *const path, u32 access_hierarchy); | |
| 69 | + | |
| 70 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Limits for different components | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/limits.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h> | |
| 14 | + | |
| 15 | +#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 64 | |
| 16 | +#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | |
| 19 | +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) | |
| 20 | + | |
| 21 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Object management | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <linux/bug.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/compiler_types.h> | |
| 11 | +#include <linux/err.h> | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/refcount.h> | |
| 15 | +#include <linux/slab.h> | |
| 16 | +#include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +#include "object.h" | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object( | |
| 21 | + const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops, | |
| 22 | + void *const underobj) | |
| 23 | +{ | |
| 24 | + struct landlock_object *new_object; | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!underops || !underobj)) | |
| 27 | + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); | |
| 28 | + new_object = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_object), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| 29 | + if (!new_object) | |
| 30 | + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
| 31 | + refcount_set(&new_object->usage, 1); | |
| 32 | + spin_lock_init(&new_object->lock); | |
| 33 | + new_object->underops = underops; | |
| 34 | + new_object->underobj = underobj; | |
| 35 | + return new_object; | |
| 36 | +} | |
| 37 | + | |
| 38 | +/* | |
| 39 | + * The caller must own the object (i.e. thanks to object->usage) to safely put | |
| 40 | + * it. | |
| 41 | + */ | |
| 42 | +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object) | |
| 43 | +{ | |
| 44 | + /* | |
| 45 | + * The call to @object->underops->release(object) might sleep, e.g. | |
| 46 | + * because of iput(). | |
| 47 | + */ | |
| 48 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 49 | + if (!object) | |
| 50 | + return; | |
| 51 | + | |
| 52 | + /* | |
| 53 | + * If the @object's refcount cannot drop to zero, we can just decrement | |
| 54 | + * the refcount without holding a lock. Otherwise, the decrement must | |
| 55 | + * happen under @object->lock for synchronization with things like | |
| 56 | + * get_inode_object(). | |
| 57 | + */ | |
| 58 | + if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&object->usage, &object->lock)) { | |
| 59 | + __acquire(&object->lock); | |
| 60 | + /* | |
| 61 | + * With @object->lock initially held, remove the reference from | |
| 62 | + * @object->underobj to @object (if it still exists). | |
| 63 | + */ | |
| 64 | + object->underops->release(object); | |
| 65 | + kfree_rcu(object, rcu_free); | |
| 66 | + } | |
| 67 | +} | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Object management | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/compiler_types.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/refcount.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +struct landlock_object; | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +/** | |
| 19 | + * struct landlock_object_underops - Operations on an underlying object | |
| 20 | + */ | |
| 21 | +struct landlock_object_underops { | |
| 22 | + /** | |
| 23 | + * @release: Releases the underlying object (e.g. iput() for an inode). | |
| 24 | + */ | |
| 25 | + void (*release)(struct landlock_object *const object) | |
| 26 | + __releases(object->lock); | |
| 27 | +}; | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +/** | |
| 30 | + * struct landlock_object - Security blob tied to a kernel object | |
| 31 | + * | |
| 32 | + * The goal of this structure is to enable to tie a set of ephemeral access | |
| 33 | + * rights (pertaining to different domains) to a kernel object (e.g an inode) | |
| 34 | + * in a safe way. This implies to handle concurrent use and modification. | |
| 35 | + * | |
| 36 | + * The lifetime of a &struct landlock_object depends on the rules referring to | |
| 37 | + * it. | |
| 38 | + */ | |
| 39 | +struct landlock_object { | |
| 40 | + /** | |
| 41 | + * @usage: This counter is used to tie an object to the rules matching | |
| 42 | + * it or to keep it alive while adding a new rule. If this counter | |
| 43 | + * reaches zero, this struct must not be modified, but this counter can | |
| 44 | + * still be read from within an RCU read-side critical section. When | |
| 45 | + * adding a new rule to an object with a usage counter of zero, we must | |
| 46 | + * wait until the pointer to this object is set to NULL (or recycled). | |
| 47 | + */ | |
| 48 | + refcount_t usage; | |
| 49 | + /** | |
| 50 | + * @lock: Protects against concurrent modifications. This lock must be | |
| 51 | + * held from the time @usage drops to zero until any weak references | |
| 52 | + * from @underobj to this object have been cleaned up. | |
| 53 | + * | |
| 54 | + * Lock ordering: inode->i_lock nests inside this. | |
| 55 | + */ | |
| 56 | + spinlock_t lock; | |
| 57 | + /** | |
| 58 | + * @underobj: Used when cleaning up an object and to mark an object as | |
| 59 | + * tied to its underlying kernel structure. This pointer is protected | |
| 60 | + * by @lock. Cf. landlock_release_inodes() and release_inode(). | |
| 61 | + */ | |
| 62 | + void *underobj; | |
| 63 | + union { | |
| 64 | + /** | |
| 65 | + * @rcu_free: Enables lockless use of @usage, @lock and | |
| 66 | + * @underobj from within an RCU read-side critical section. | |
| 67 | + * @rcu_free and @underops are only used by | |
| 68 | + * landlock_put_object(). | |
| 69 | + */ | |
| 70 | + struct rcu_head rcu_free; | |
| 71 | + /** | |
| 72 | + * @underops: Enables landlock_put_object() to release the | |
| 73 | + * underlying object (e.g. inode). | |
| 74 | + */ | |
| 75 | + const struct landlock_object_underops *underops; | |
| 76 | + }; | |
| 77 | +}; | |
| 78 | + | |
| 79 | +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object( | |
| 80 | + const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops, | |
| 81 | + void *const underobj); | |
| 82 | + | |
| 83 | +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object); | |
| 84 | + | |
| 85 | +static inline void landlock_get_object(struct landlock_object *const object) | |
| 86 | +{ | |
| 87 | + if (object) | |
| 88 | + refcount_inc(&object->usage); | |
| 89 | +} | |
| 90 | + | |
| 91 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <asm/current.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/cred.h> | |
| 11 | +#include <linux/errno.h> | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> | |
| 15 | +#include <linux/sched.h> | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | +#include "common.h" | |
| 18 | +#include "cred.h" | |
| 19 | +#include "ptrace.h" | |
| 20 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 21 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +/** | |
| 24 | + * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace | |
| 25 | + * | |
| 26 | + * @parent: Parent domain. | |
| 27 | + * @child: Potential child of @parent. | |
| 28 | + * | |
| 29 | + * Checks if the @parent domain is less or equal to (i.e. an ancestor, which | |
| 30 | + * means a subset of) the @child domain. | |
| 31 | + */ | |
| 32 | +static bool domain_scope_le(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, | |
| 33 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const child) | |
| 34 | +{ | |
| 35 | + const struct landlock_hierarchy *walker; | |
| 36 | + | |
| 37 | + if (!parent) | |
| 38 | + return true; | |
| 39 | + if (!child) | |
| 40 | + return false; | |
| 41 | + for (walker = child->hierarchy; walker; walker = walker->parent) { | |
| 42 | + if (walker == parent->hierarchy) | |
| 43 | + /* @parent is in the scoped hierarchy of @child. */ | |
| 44 | + return true; | |
| 45 | + } | |
| 46 | + /* There is no relationship between @parent and @child. */ | |
| 47 | + return false; | |
| 48 | +} | |
| 49 | + | |
| 50 | +static bool task_is_scoped(const struct task_struct *const parent, | |
| 51 | + const struct task_struct *const child) | |
| 52 | +{ | |
| 53 | + bool is_scoped; | |
| 54 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_parent, *dom_child; | |
| 55 | + | |
| 56 | + rcu_read_lock(); | |
| 57 | + dom_parent = landlock_get_task_domain(parent); | |
| 58 | + dom_child = landlock_get_task_domain(child); | |
| 59 | + is_scoped = domain_scope_le(dom_parent, dom_child); | |
| 60 | + rcu_read_unlock(); | |
| 61 | + return is_scoped; | |
| 62 | +} | |
| 63 | + | |
| 64 | +static int task_ptrace(const struct task_struct *const parent, | |
| 65 | + const struct task_struct *const child) | |
| 66 | +{ | |
| 67 | + /* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */ | |
| 68 | + if (!landlocked(parent)) | |
| 69 | + return 0; | |
| 70 | + if (task_is_scoped(parent, child)) | |
| 71 | + return 0; | |
| 72 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 73 | +} | |
| 74 | + | |
| 75 | +/** | |
| 76 | + * hook_ptrace_access_check - Determines whether the current process may access | |
| 77 | + * another | |
| 78 | + * | |
| 79 | + * @child: Process to be accessed. | |
| 80 | + * @mode: Mode of attachment. | |
| 81 | + * | |
| 82 | + * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least | |
| 83 | + * the same rules. Else denied. | |
| 84 | + * | |
| 85 | + * Determines whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission | |
| 86 | + * granted, -errno if denied. | |
| 87 | + */ | |
| 88 | +static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child, | |
| 89 | + const unsigned int mode) | |
| 90 | +{ | |
| 91 | + return task_ptrace(current, child); | |
| 92 | +} | |
| 93 | + | |
| 94 | +/** | |
| 95 | + * hook_ptrace_traceme - Determines whether another process may trace the | |
| 96 | + * current one | |
| 97 | + * | |
| 98 | + * @parent: Task proposed to be the tracer. | |
| 99 | + * | |
| 100 | + * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same | |
| 101 | + * or more rules. Else denied. | |
| 102 | + * | |
| 103 | + * Determines whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current | |
| 104 | + * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied. | |
| 105 | + */ | |
| 106 | +static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent) | |
| 107 | +{ | |
| 108 | + return task_ptrace(parent, current); | |
| 109 | +} | |
| 110 | + | |
| 111 | +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { | |
| 112 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check), | |
| 113 | + LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme), | |
| 114 | +}; | |
| 115 | + | |
| 116 | +__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void) | |
| 117 | +{ | |
| 118 | + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), | |
| 119 | + LANDLOCK_NAME); | |
| 120 | +} | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2017-2019 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2019 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void); | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_PTRACE_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,473 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Ruleset management | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <linux/bits.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/bug.h> | |
| 11 | +#include <linux/compiler_types.h> | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/err.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/errno.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/kernel.h> | |
| 15 | +#include <linux/lockdep.h> | |
| 16 | +#include <linux/overflow.h> | |
| 17 | +#include <linux/rbtree.h> | |
| 18 | +#include <linux/refcount.h> | |
| 19 | +#include <linux/slab.h> | |
| 20 | +#include <linux/spinlock.h> | |
| 21 | +#include <linux/workqueue.h> | |
| 22 | + | |
| 23 | +#include "limits.h" | |
| 24 | +#include "object.h" | |
| 25 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 26 | + | |
| 27 | +static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers) | |
| 28 | +{ | |
| 29 | + struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset; | |
| 30 | + | |
| 31 | + new_ruleset = kzalloc(struct_size(new_ruleset, fs_access_masks, | |
| 32 | + num_layers), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| 33 | + if (!new_ruleset) | |
| 34 | + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
| 35 | + refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1); | |
| 36 | + mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock); | |
| 37 | + new_ruleset->root = RB_ROOT; | |
| 38 | + new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers; | |
| 39 | + /* | |
| 40 | + * hierarchy = NULL | |
| 41 | + * num_rules = 0 | |
| 42 | + * fs_access_masks[] = 0 | |
| 43 | + */ | |
| 44 | + return new_ruleset; | |
| 45 | +} | |
| 46 | + | |
| 47 | +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_create_ruleset(const u32 fs_access_mask) | |
| 48 | +{ | |
| 49 | + struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset; | |
| 50 | + | |
| 51 | + /* Informs about useless ruleset. */ | |
| 52 | + if (!fs_access_mask) | |
| 53 | + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG); | |
| 54 | + new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1); | |
| 55 | + if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset)) | |
| 56 | + new_ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] = fs_access_mask; | |
| 57 | + return new_ruleset; | |
| 58 | +} | |
| 59 | + | |
| 60 | +static void build_check_rule(void) | |
| 61 | +{ | |
| 62 | + const struct landlock_rule rule = { | |
| 63 | + .num_layers = ~0, | |
| 64 | + }; | |
| 65 | + | |
| 66 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(rule.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); | |
| 67 | +} | |
| 68 | + | |
| 69 | +static struct landlock_rule *create_rule( | |
| 70 | + struct landlock_object *const object, | |
| 71 | + const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[], | |
| 72 | + const u32 num_layers, | |
| 73 | + const struct landlock_layer *const new_layer) | |
| 74 | +{ | |
| 75 | + struct landlock_rule *new_rule; | |
| 76 | + u32 new_num_layers; | |
| 77 | + | |
| 78 | + build_check_rule(); | |
| 79 | + if (new_layer) { | |
| 80 | + /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset(). */ | |
| 81 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS)) | |
| 82 | + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); | |
| 83 | + new_num_layers = num_layers + 1; | |
| 84 | + } else { | |
| 85 | + new_num_layers = num_layers; | |
| 86 | + } | |
| 87 | + new_rule = kzalloc(struct_size(new_rule, layers, new_num_layers), | |
| 88 | + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| 89 | + if (!new_rule) | |
| 90 | + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | |
| 91 | + RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node); | |
| 92 | + landlock_get_object(object); | |
| 93 | + new_rule->object = object; | |
| 94 | + new_rule->num_layers = new_num_layers; | |
| 95 | + /* Copies the original layer stack. */ | |
| 96 | + memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers, | |
| 97 | + flex_array_size(new_rule, layers, num_layers)); | |
| 98 | + if (new_layer) | |
| 99 | + /* Adds a copy of @new_layer on the layer stack. */ | |
| 100 | + new_rule->layers[new_rule->num_layers - 1] = *new_layer; | |
| 101 | + return new_rule; | |
| 102 | +} | |
| 103 | + | |
| 104 | +static void free_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule) | |
| 105 | +{ | |
| 106 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 107 | + if (!rule) | |
| 108 | + return; | |
| 109 | + landlock_put_object(rule->object); | |
| 110 | + kfree(rule); | |
| 111 | +} | |
| 112 | + | |
| 113 | +static void build_check_ruleset(void) | |
| 114 | +{ | |
| 115 | + const struct landlock_ruleset ruleset = { | |
| 116 | + .num_rules = ~0, | |
| 117 | + .num_layers = ~0, | |
| 118 | + }; | |
| 119 | + typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0; | |
| 120 | + | |
| 121 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES); | |
| 122 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); | |
| 123 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); | |
| 124 | +} | |
| 125 | + | |
| 126 | +/** | |
| 127 | + * insert_rule - Create and insert a rule in a ruleset | |
| 128 | + * | |
| 129 | + * @ruleset: The ruleset to be updated. | |
| 130 | + * @object: The object to build the new rule with. The underlying kernel | |
| 131 | + * object must be held by the caller. | |
| 132 | + * @layers: One or multiple layers to be copied into the new rule. | |
| 133 | + * @num_layers: The number of @layers entries. | |
| 134 | + * | |
| 135 | + * When user space requests to add a new rule to a ruleset, @layers only | |
| 136 | + * contains one entry and this entry is not assigned to any level. In this | |
| 137 | + * case, the new rule will extend @ruleset, similarly to a boolean OR between | |
| 138 | + * access rights. | |
| 139 | + * | |
| 140 | + * When merging a ruleset in a domain, or copying a domain, @layers will be | |
| 141 | + * added to @ruleset as new constraints, similarly to a boolean AND between | |
| 142 | + * access rights. | |
| 143 | + */ | |
| 144 | +static int insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 145 | + struct landlock_object *const object, | |
| 146 | + const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[], | |
| 147 | + size_t num_layers) | |
| 148 | +{ | |
| 149 | + struct rb_node **walker_node; | |
| 150 | + struct rb_node *parent_node = NULL; | |
| 151 | + struct landlock_rule *new_rule; | |
| 152 | + | |
| 153 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 154 | + lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock); | |
| 155 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!object || !layers)) | |
| 156 | + return -ENOENT; | |
| 157 | + walker_node = &(ruleset->root.rb_node); | |
| 158 | + while (*walker_node) { | |
| 159 | + struct landlock_rule *const this = rb_entry(*walker_node, | |
| 160 | + struct landlock_rule, node); | |
| 161 | + | |
| 162 | + if (this->object != object) { | |
| 163 | + parent_node = *walker_node; | |
| 164 | + if (this->object < object) | |
| 165 | + walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_right); | |
| 166 | + else | |
| 167 | + walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_left); | |
| 168 | + continue; | |
| 169 | + } | |
| 170 | + | |
| 171 | + /* Only a single-level layer should match an existing rule. */ | |
| 172 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(num_layers != 1)) | |
| 173 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 174 | + | |
| 175 | + /* If there is a matching rule, updates it. */ | |
| 176 | + if ((*layers)[0].level == 0) { | |
| 177 | + /* | |
| 178 | + * Extends access rights when the request comes from | |
| 179 | + * landlock_add_rule(2), i.e. @ruleset is not a domain. | |
| 180 | + */ | |
| 181 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->num_layers != 1)) | |
| 182 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 183 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level != 0)) | |
| 184 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 185 | + this->layers[0].access |= (*layers)[0].access; | |
| 186 | + return 0; | |
| 187 | + } | |
| 188 | + | |
| 189 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(this->layers[0].level == 0)) | |
| 190 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 191 | + | |
| 192 | + /* | |
| 193 | + * Intersects access rights when it is a merge between a | |
| 194 | + * ruleset and a domain. | |
| 195 | + */ | |
| 196 | + new_rule = create_rule(object, &this->layers, this->num_layers, | |
| 197 | + &(*layers)[0]); | |
| 198 | + if (IS_ERR(new_rule)) | |
| 199 | + return PTR_ERR(new_rule); | |
| 200 | + rb_replace_node(&this->node, &new_rule->node, &ruleset->root); | |
| 201 | + free_rule(this); | |
| 202 | + return 0; | |
| 203 | + } | |
| 204 | + | |
| 205 | + /* There is no match for @object. */ | |
| 206 | + build_check_ruleset(); | |
| 207 | + if (ruleset->num_rules >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES) | |
| 208 | + return -E2BIG; | |
| 209 | + new_rule = create_rule(object, layers, num_layers, NULL); | |
| 210 | + if (IS_ERR(new_rule)) | |
| 211 | + return PTR_ERR(new_rule); | |
| 212 | + rb_link_node(&new_rule->node, parent_node, walker_node); | |
| 213 | + rb_insert_color(&new_rule->node, &ruleset->root); | |
| 214 | + ruleset->num_rules++; | |
| 215 | + return 0; | |
| 216 | +} | |
| 217 | + | |
| 218 | +static void build_check_layer(void) | |
| 219 | +{ | |
| 220 | + const struct landlock_layer layer = { | |
| 221 | + .level = ~0, | |
| 222 | + .access = ~0, | |
| 223 | + }; | |
| 224 | + | |
| 225 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); | |
| 226 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); | |
| 227 | +} | |
| 228 | + | |
| 229 | +/* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */ | |
| 230 | +int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 231 | + struct landlock_object *const object, const u32 access) | |
| 232 | +{ | |
| 233 | + struct landlock_layer layers[] = {{ | |
| 234 | + .access = access, | |
| 235 | + /* When @level is zero, insert_rule() extends @ruleset. */ | |
| 236 | + .level = 0, | |
| 237 | + }}; | |
| 238 | + | |
| 239 | + build_check_layer(); | |
| 240 | + return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers)); | |
| 241 | +} | |
| 242 | + | |
| 243 | +static inline void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy) | |
| 244 | +{ | |
| 245 | + if (hierarchy) | |
| 246 | + refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage); | |
| 247 | +} | |
| 248 | + | |
| 249 | +static void put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy) | |
| 250 | +{ | |
| 251 | + while (hierarchy && refcount_dec_and_test(&hierarchy->usage)) { | |
| 252 | + const struct landlock_hierarchy *const freeme = hierarchy; | |
| 253 | + | |
| 254 | + hierarchy = hierarchy->parent; | |
| 255 | + kfree(freeme); | |
| 256 | + } | |
| 257 | +} | |
| 258 | + | |
| 259 | +static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst, | |
| 260 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const src) | |
| 261 | +{ | |
| 262 | + struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule; | |
| 263 | + int err = 0; | |
| 264 | + | |
| 265 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 266 | + /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */ | |
| 267 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src)) | |
| 268 | + return 0; | |
| 269 | + /* Only merge into a domain. */ | |
| 270 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy)) | |
| 271 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 272 | + | |
| 273 | + /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */ | |
| 274 | + mutex_lock(&dst->lock); | |
| 275 | + mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); | |
| 276 | + | |
| 277 | + /* Stacks the new layer. */ | |
| 278 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) { | |
| 279 | + err = -EINVAL; | |
| 280 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 281 | + } | |
| 282 | + dst->fs_access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->fs_access_masks[0]; | |
| 283 | + | |
| 284 | + /* Merges the @src tree. */ | |
| 285 | + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, | |
| 286 | + &src->root, node) { | |
| 287 | + struct landlock_layer layers[] = {{ | |
| 288 | + .level = dst->num_layers, | |
| 289 | + }}; | |
| 290 | + | |
| 291 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) { | |
| 292 | + err = -EINVAL; | |
| 293 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 294 | + } | |
| 295 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) { | |
| 296 | + err = -EINVAL; | |
| 297 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 298 | + } | |
| 299 | + layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access; | |
| 300 | + err = insert_rule(dst, walker_rule->object, &layers, | |
| 301 | + ARRAY_SIZE(layers)); | |
| 302 | + if (err) | |
| 303 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 304 | + } | |
| 305 | + | |
| 306 | +out_unlock: | |
| 307 | + mutex_unlock(&src->lock); | |
| 308 | + mutex_unlock(&dst->lock); | |
| 309 | + return err; | |
| 310 | +} | |
| 311 | + | |
| 312 | +static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, | |
| 313 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const child) | |
| 314 | +{ | |
| 315 | + struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule; | |
| 316 | + int err = 0; | |
| 317 | + | |
| 318 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 319 | + if (!parent) | |
| 320 | + return 0; | |
| 321 | + | |
| 322 | + /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */ | |
| 323 | + mutex_lock(&child->lock); | |
| 324 | + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); | |
| 325 | + | |
| 326 | + /* Copies the @parent tree. */ | |
| 327 | + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, | |
| 328 | + &parent->root, node) { | |
| 329 | + err = insert_rule(child, walker_rule->object, | |
| 330 | + &walker_rule->layers, walker_rule->num_layers); | |
| 331 | + if (err) | |
| 332 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 333 | + } | |
| 334 | + | |
| 335 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) { | |
| 336 | + err = -EINVAL; | |
| 337 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 338 | + } | |
| 339 | + /* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */ | |
| 340 | + memcpy(child->fs_access_masks, parent->fs_access_masks, | |
| 341 | + flex_array_size(parent, fs_access_masks, parent->num_layers)); | |
| 342 | + | |
| 343 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!parent->hierarchy)) { | |
| 344 | + err = -EINVAL; | |
| 345 | + goto out_unlock; | |
| 346 | + } | |
| 347 | + get_hierarchy(parent->hierarchy); | |
| 348 | + child->hierarchy->parent = parent->hierarchy; | |
| 349 | + | |
| 350 | +out_unlock: | |
| 351 | + mutex_unlock(&parent->lock); | |
| 352 | + mutex_unlock(&child->lock); | |
| 353 | + return err; | |
| 354 | +} | |
| 355 | + | |
| 356 | +static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) | |
| 357 | +{ | |
| 358 | + struct landlock_rule *freeme, *next; | |
| 359 | + | |
| 360 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 361 | + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root, | |
| 362 | + node) | |
| 363 | + free_rule(freeme); | |
| 364 | + put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy); | |
| 365 | + kfree(ruleset); | |
| 366 | +} | |
| 367 | + | |
| 368 | +void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) | |
| 369 | +{ | |
| 370 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 371 | + if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) | |
| 372 | + free_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 373 | +} | |
| 374 | + | |
| 375 | +static void free_ruleset_work(struct work_struct *const work) | |
| 376 | +{ | |
| 377 | + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; | |
| 378 | + | |
| 379 | + ruleset = container_of(work, struct landlock_ruleset, work_free); | |
| 380 | + free_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 381 | +} | |
| 382 | + | |
| 383 | +void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) | |
| 384 | +{ | |
| 385 | + if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) { | |
| 386 | + INIT_WORK(&ruleset->work_free, free_ruleset_work); | |
| 387 | + schedule_work(&ruleset->work_free); | |
| 388 | + } | |
| 389 | +} | |
| 390 | + | |
| 391 | +/** | |
| 392 | + * landlock_merge_ruleset - Merge a ruleset with a domain | |
| 393 | + * | |
| 394 | + * @parent: Parent domain. | |
| 395 | + * @ruleset: New ruleset to be merged. | |
| 396 | + * | |
| 397 | + * Returns the intersection of @parent and @ruleset, or returns @parent if | |
| 398 | + * @ruleset is empty, or returns a duplicate of @ruleset if @parent is empty. | |
| 399 | + */ | |
| 400 | +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_merge_ruleset( | |
| 401 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, | |
| 402 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) | |
| 403 | +{ | |
| 404 | + struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom; | |
| 405 | + u32 num_layers; | |
| 406 | + int err; | |
| 407 | + | |
| 408 | + might_sleep(); | |
| 409 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!ruleset || parent == ruleset)) | |
| 410 | + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | |
| 411 | + | |
| 412 | + if (parent) { | |
| 413 | + if (parent->num_layers >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS) | |
| 414 | + return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); | |
| 415 | + num_layers = parent->num_layers + 1; | |
| 416 | + } else { | |
| 417 | + num_layers = 1; | |
| 418 | + } | |
| 419 | + | |
| 420 | + /* Creates a new domain... */ | |
| 421 | + new_dom = create_ruleset(num_layers); | |
| 422 | + if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) | |
| 423 | + return new_dom; | |
| 424 | + new_dom->hierarchy = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_dom->hierarchy), | |
| 425 | + GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); | |
| 426 | + if (!new_dom->hierarchy) { | |
| 427 | + err = -ENOMEM; | |
| 428 | + goto out_put_dom; | |
| 429 | + } | |
| 430 | + refcount_set(&new_dom->hierarchy->usage, 1); | |
| 431 | + | |
| 432 | + /* ...as a child of @parent... */ | |
| 433 | + err = inherit_ruleset(parent, new_dom); | |
| 434 | + if (err) | |
| 435 | + goto out_put_dom; | |
| 436 | + | |
| 437 | + /* ...and including @ruleset. */ | |
| 438 | + err = merge_ruleset(new_dom, ruleset); | |
| 439 | + if (err) | |
| 440 | + goto out_put_dom; | |
| 441 | + | |
| 442 | + return new_dom; | |
| 443 | + | |
| 444 | +out_put_dom: | |
| 445 | + landlock_put_ruleset(new_dom); | |
| 446 | + return ERR_PTR(err); | |
| 447 | +} | |
| 448 | + | |
| 449 | +/* | |
| 450 | + * The returned access has the same lifetime as @ruleset. | |
| 451 | + */ | |
| 452 | +const struct landlock_rule *landlock_find_rule( | |
| 453 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 454 | + const struct landlock_object *const object) | |
| 455 | +{ | |
| 456 | + const struct rb_node *node; | |
| 457 | + | |
| 458 | + if (!object) | |
| 459 | + return NULL; | |
| 460 | + node = ruleset->root.rb_node; | |
| 461 | + while (node) { | |
| 462 | + struct landlock_rule *this = rb_entry(node, | |
| 463 | + struct landlock_rule, node); | |
| 464 | + | |
| 465 | + if (this->object == object) | |
| 466 | + return this; | |
| 467 | + if (this->object < object) | |
| 468 | + node = node->rb_right; | |
| 469 | + else | |
| 470 | + node = node->rb_left; | |
| 471 | + } | |
| 472 | + return NULL; | |
| 473 | +} | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Ruleset management | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/mutex.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/rbtree.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/refcount.h> | |
| 15 | +#include <linux/workqueue.h> | |
| 16 | + | |
| 17 | +#include "object.h" | |
| 18 | + | |
| 19 | +/** | |
| 20 | + * struct landlock_layer - Access rights for a given layer | |
| 21 | + */ | |
| 22 | +struct landlock_layer { | |
| 23 | + /** | |
| 24 | + * @level: Position of this layer in the layer stack. | |
| 25 | + */ | |
| 26 | + u16 level; | |
| 27 | + /** | |
| 28 | + * @access: Bitfield of allowed actions on the kernel object. They are | |
| 29 | + * relative to the object type (e.g. %LANDLOCK_ACTION_FS_READ). | |
| 30 | + */ | |
| 31 | + u16 access; | |
| 32 | +}; | |
| 33 | + | |
| 34 | +/** | |
| 35 | + * struct landlock_rule - Access rights tied to an object | |
| 36 | + */ | |
| 37 | +struct landlock_rule { | |
| 38 | + /** | |
| 39 | + * @node: Node in the ruleset's red-black tree. | |
| 40 | + */ | |
| 41 | + struct rb_node node; | |
| 42 | + /** | |
| 43 | + * @object: Pointer to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). This | |
| 44 | + * is used as a key for this ruleset element. This pointer is set once | |
| 45 | + * and never modified. It always points to an allocated object because | |
| 46 | + * each rule increments the refcount of its object. | |
| 47 | + */ | |
| 48 | + struct landlock_object *object; | |
| 49 | + /** | |
| 50 | + * @num_layers: Number of entries in @layers. | |
| 51 | + */ | |
| 52 | + u32 num_layers; | |
| 53 | + /** | |
| 54 | + * @layers: Stack of layers, from the latest to the newest, implemented | |
| 55 | + * as a flexible array member (FAM). | |
| 56 | + */ | |
| 57 | + struct landlock_layer layers[]; | |
| 58 | +}; | |
| 59 | + | |
| 60 | +/** | |
| 61 | + * struct landlock_hierarchy - Node in a ruleset hierarchy | |
| 62 | + */ | |
| 63 | +struct landlock_hierarchy { | |
| 64 | + /** | |
| 65 | + * @parent: Pointer to the parent node, or NULL if it is a root | |
| 66 | + * Landlock domain. | |
| 67 | + */ | |
| 68 | + struct landlock_hierarchy *parent; | |
| 69 | + /** | |
| 70 | + * @usage: Number of potential children domains plus their parent | |
| 71 | + * domain. | |
| 72 | + */ | |
| 73 | + refcount_t usage; | |
| 74 | +}; | |
| 75 | + | |
| 76 | +/** | |
| 77 | + * struct landlock_ruleset - Landlock ruleset | |
| 78 | + * | |
| 79 | + * This data structure must contain unique entries, be updatable, and quick to | |
| 80 | + * match an object. | |
| 81 | + */ | |
| 82 | +struct landlock_ruleset { | |
| 83 | + /** | |
| 84 | + * @root: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct landlock_rule | |
| 85 | + * nodes. Once a ruleset is tied to a process (i.e. as a domain), this | |
| 86 | + * tree is immutable until @usage reaches zero. | |
| 87 | + */ | |
| 88 | + struct rb_root root; | |
| 89 | + /** | |
| 90 | + * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent | |
| 91 | + * domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection. | |
| 92 | + */ | |
| 93 | + struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy; | |
| 94 | + union { | |
| 95 | + /** | |
| 96 | + * @work_free: Enables to free a ruleset within a lockless | |
| 97 | + * section. This is only used by | |
| 98 | + * landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() when @usage reaches zero. | |
| 99 | + * The fields @lock, @usage, @num_rules, @num_layers and | |
| 100 | + * @fs_access_masks are then unused. | |
| 101 | + */ | |
| 102 | + struct work_struct work_free; | |
| 103 | + struct { | |
| 104 | + /** | |
| 105 | + * @lock: Protects against concurrent modifications of | |
| 106 | + * @root, if @usage is greater than zero. | |
| 107 | + */ | |
| 108 | + struct mutex lock; | |
| 109 | + /** | |
| 110 | + * @usage: Number of processes (i.e. domains) or file | |
| 111 | + * descriptors referencing this ruleset. | |
| 112 | + */ | |
| 113 | + refcount_t usage; | |
| 114 | + /** | |
| 115 | + * @num_rules: Number of non-overlapping (i.e. not for | |
| 116 | + * the same object) rules in this ruleset. | |
| 117 | + */ | |
| 118 | + u32 num_rules; | |
| 119 | + /** | |
| 120 | + * @num_layers: Number of layers that are used in this | |
| 121 | + * ruleset. This enables to check that all the layers | |
| 122 | + * allow an access request. A value of 0 identifies a | |
| 123 | + * non-merged ruleset (i.e. not a domain). | |
| 124 | + */ | |
| 125 | + u32 num_layers; | |
| 126 | + /** | |
| 127 | + * @fs_access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem | |
| 128 | + * actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain | |
| 129 | + * saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack | |
| 130 | + * (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last | |
| 131 | + * one. These layers are used when merging rulesets, | |
| 132 | + * for user space backward compatibility (i.e. | |
| 133 | + * future-proof), and to properly handle merged | |
| 134 | + * rulesets without overlapping access rights. These | |
| 135 | + * layers are set once and never changed for the | |
| 136 | + * lifetime of the ruleset. | |
| 137 | + */ | |
| 138 | + u16 fs_access_masks[]; | |
| 139 | + }; | |
| 140 | + }; | |
| 141 | +}; | |
| 142 | + | |
| 143 | +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_create_ruleset(const u32 fs_access_mask); | |
| 144 | + | |
| 145 | +void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); | |
| 146 | +void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); | |
| 147 | + | |
| 148 | +int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 149 | + struct landlock_object *const object, const u32 access); | |
| 150 | + | |
| 151 | +struct landlock_ruleset *landlock_merge_ruleset( | |
| 152 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, | |
| 153 | + struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); | |
| 154 | + | |
| 155 | +const struct landlock_rule *landlock_find_rule( | |
| 156 | + const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, | |
| 157 | + const struct landlock_object *const object); | |
| 158 | + | |
| 159 | +static inline void landlock_get_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) | |
| 160 | +{ | |
| 161 | + if (ruleset) | |
| 162 | + refcount_inc(&ruleset->usage); | |
| 163 | +} | |
| 164 | + | |
| 165 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <linux/init.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include "common.h" | |
| 13 | +#include "cred.h" | |
| 14 | +#include "fs.h" | |
| 15 | +#include "ptrace.h" | |
| 16 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { | |
| 21 | + .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security), | |
| 22 | + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security), | |
| 23 | + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security), | |
| 24 | +}; | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +static int __init landlock_init(void) | |
| 27 | +{ | |
| 28 | + landlock_add_cred_hooks(); | |
| 29 | + landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); | |
| 30 | + landlock_add_fs_hooks(); | |
| 31 | + landlock_initialized = true; | |
| 32 | + pr_info("Up and running.\n"); | |
| 33 | + return 0; | |
| 34 | +} | |
| 35 | + | |
| 36 | +DEFINE_LSM(LANDLOCK_NAME) = { | |
| 37 | + .name = LANDLOCK_NAME, | |
| 38 | + .init = landlock_init, | |
| 39 | + .blobs = &landlock_blob_sizes, | |
| 40 | +}; | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ | ||
| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - Security framework setup | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H | |
| 10 | +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H | |
| 11 | + | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +extern bool landlock_initialized; | |
| 15 | + | |
| 16 | +extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes; | |
| 17 | + | |
| 18 | +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */ | |
| @@ -0,0 +1,451 @@ | ||
| 1 | +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only | |
| 2 | +/* | |
| 3 | + * Landlock LSM - System call implementations and user space interfaces | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> | |
| 6 | + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI | |
| 7 | + */ | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +#include <asm/current.h> | |
| 10 | +#include <linux/anon_inodes.h> | |
| 11 | +#include <linux/build_bug.h> | |
| 12 | +#include <linux/capability.h> | |
| 13 | +#include <linux/compiler_types.h> | |
| 14 | +#include <linux/dcache.h> | |
| 15 | +#include <linux/err.h> | |
| 16 | +#include <linux/errno.h> | |
| 17 | +#include <linux/fs.h> | |
| 18 | +#include <linux/limits.h> | |
| 19 | +#include <linux/mount.h> | |
| 20 | +#include <linux/path.h> | |
| 21 | +#include <linux/sched.h> | |
| 22 | +#include <linux/security.h> | |
| 23 | +#include <linux/stddef.h> | |
| 24 | +#include <linux/syscalls.h> | |
| 25 | +#include <linux/types.h> | |
| 26 | +#include <linux/uaccess.h> | |
| 27 | +#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h> | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +#include "cred.h" | |
| 30 | +#include "fs.h" | |
| 31 | +#include "limits.h" | |
| 32 | +#include "ruleset.h" | |
| 33 | +#include "setup.h" | |
| 34 | + | |
| 35 | +/** | |
| 36 | + * copy_min_struct_from_user - Safe future-proof argument copying | |
| 37 | + * | |
| 38 | + * Extend copy_struct_from_user() to check for consistent user buffer. | |
| 39 | + * | |
| 40 | + * @dst: Kernel space pointer or NULL. | |
| 41 | + * @ksize: Actual size of the data pointed to by @dst. | |
| 42 | + * @ksize_min: Minimal required size to be copied. | |
| 43 | + * @src: User space pointer or NULL. | |
| 44 | + * @usize: (Alleged) size of the data pointed to by @src. | |
| 45 | + */ | |
| 46 | +static __always_inline int copy_min_struct_from_user(void *const dst, | |
| 47 | + const size_t ksize, const size_t ksize_min, | |
| 48 | + const void __user *const src, const size_t usize) | |
| 49 | +{ | |
| 50 | + /* Checks buffer inconsistencies. */ | |
| 51 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(!dst); | |
| 52 | + if (!src) | |
| 53 | + return -EFAULT; | |
| 54 | + | |
| 55 | + /* Checks size ranges. */ | |
| 56 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize <= 0); | |
| 57 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(ksize < ksize_min); | |
| 58 | + if (usize < ksize_min) | |
| 59 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 60 | + if (usize > PAGE_SIZE) | |
| 61 | + return -E2BIG; | |
| 62 | + | |
| 63 | + /* Copies user buffer and fills with zeros. */ | |
| 64 | + return copy_struct_from_user(dst, ksize, src, usize); | |
| 65 | +} | |
| 66 | + | |
| 67 | +/* | |
| 68 | + * This function only contains arithmetic operations with constants, leading to | |
| 69 | + * BUILD_BUG_ON(). The related code is evaluated and checked at build time, | |
| 70 | + * but it is then ignored thanks to compiler optimizations. | |
| 71 | + */ | |
| 72 | +static void build_check_abi(void) | |
| 73 | +{ | |
| 74 | + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; | |
| 75 | + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; | |
| 76 | + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; | |
| 77 | + | |
| 78 | + /* | |
| 79 | + * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no | |
| 80 | + * hole in them, then checks that all architectures have the same | |
| 81 | + * struct size. | |
| 82 | + */ | |
| 83 | + ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs); | |
| 84 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size); | |
| 85 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8); | |
| 86 | + | |
| 87 | + path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); | |
| 88 | + path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); | |
| 89 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); | |
| 90 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); | |
| 91 | +} | |
| 92 | + | |
| 93 | +/* Ruleset handling */ | |
| 94 | + | |
| 95 | +static int fop_ruleset_release(struct inode *const inode, | |
| 96 | + struct file *const filp) | |
| 97 | +{ | |
| 98 | + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset = filp->private_data; | |
| 99 | + | |
| 100 | + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 101 | + return 0; | |
| 102 | +} | |
| 103 | + | |
| 104 | +static ssize_t fop_dummy_read(struct file *const filp, char __user *const buf, | |
| 105 | + const size_t size, loff_t *const ppos) | |
| 106 | +{ | |
| 107 | + /* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_READ. */ | |
| 108 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 109 | +} | |
| 110 | + | |
| 111 | +static ssize_t fop_dummy_write(struct file *const filp, | |
| 112 | + const char __user *const buf, const size_t size, | |
| 113 | + loff_t *const ppos) | |
| 114 | +{ | |
| 115 | + /* Dummy handler to enable FMODE_CAN_WRITE. */ | |
| 116 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 117 | +} | |
| 118 | + | |
| 119 | +/* | |
| 120 | + * A ruleset file descriptor enables to build a ruleset by adding (i.e. | |
| 121 | + * writing) rule after rule, without relying on the task's context. This | |
| 122 | + * reentrant design is also used in a read way to enforce the ruleset on the | |
| 123 | + * current task. | |
| 124 | + */ | |
| 125 | +static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { | |
| 126 | + .release = fop_ruleset_release, | |
| 127 | + .read = fop_dummy_read, | |
| 128 | + .write = fop_dummy_write, | |
| 129 | +}; | |
| 130 | + | |
| 131 | +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 1 | |
| 132 | + | |
| 133 | +/** | |
| 134 | + * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset | |
| 135 | + * | |
| 136 | + * @attr: Pointer to a &struct landlock_ruleset_attr identifying the scope of | |
| 137 | + * the new ruleset. | |
| 138 | + * @size: Size of the pointed &struct landlock_ruleset_attr (needed for | |
| 139 | + * backward and forward compatibility). | |
| 140 | + * @flags: Supported value: %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION. | |
| 141 | + * | |
| 142 | + * This system call enables to create a new Landlock ruleset, and returns the | |
| 143 | + * related file descriptor on success. | |
| 144 | + * | |
| 145 | + * If @flags is %LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION and @attr is NULL and @size is | |
| 146 | + * 0, then the returned value is the highest supported Landlock ABI version | |
| 147 | + * (starting at 1). | |
| 148 | + * | |
| 149 | + * Possible returned errors are: | |
| 150 | + * | |
| 151 | + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; | |
| 152 | + * - EINVAL: unknown @flags, or unknown access, or too small @size; | |
| 153 | + * - E2BIG or EFAULT: @attr or @size inconsistencies; | |
| 154 | + * - ENOMSG: empty &landlock_ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs. | |
| 155 | + */ | |
| 156 | +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset, | |
| 157 | + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr __user *const, attr, | |
| 158 | + const size_t, size, const __u32, flags) | |
| 159 | +{ | |
| 160 | + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; | |
| 161 | + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; | |
| 162 | + int err, ruleset_fd; | |
| 163 | + | |
| 164 | + /* Build-time checks. */ | |
| 165 | + build_check_abi(); | |
| 166 | + | |
| 167 | + if (!landlock_initialized) | |
| 168 | + return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| 169 | + | |
| 170 | + if (flags) { | |
| 171 | + if ((flags == LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION) | |
| 172 | + && !attr && !size) | |
| 173 | + return LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION; | |
| 174 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 175 | + } | |
| 176 | + | |
| 177 | + /* Copies raw user space buffer. */ | |
| 178 | + err = copy_min_struct_from_user(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), | |
| 179 | + offsetofend(typeof(ruleset_attr), handled_access_fs), | |
| 180 | + attr, size); | |
| 181 | + if (err) | |
| 182 | + return err; | |
| 183 | + | |
| 184 | + /* Checks content (and 32-bits cast). */ | |
| 185 | + if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) != | |
| 186 | + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) | |
| 187 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 188 | + | |
| 189 | + /* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */ | |
| 190 | + ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs); | |
| 191 | + if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) | |
| 192 | + return PTR_ERR(ruleset); | |
| 193 | + | |
| 194 | + /* Creates anonymous FD referring to the ruleset. */ | |
| 195 | + ruleset_fd = anon_inode_getfd("landlock-ruleset", &ruleset_fops, | |
| 196 | + ruleset, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); | |
| 197 | + if (ruleset_fd < 0) | |
| 198 | + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 199 | + return ruleset_fd; | |
| 200 | +} | |
| 201 | + | |
| 202 | +/* | |
| 203 | + * Returns an owned ruleset from a FD. It is thus needed to call | |
| 204 | + * landlock_put_ruleset() on the return value. | |
| 205 | + */ | |
| 206 | +static struct landlock_ruleset *get_ruleset_from_fd(const int fd, | |
| 207 | + const fmode_t mode) | |
| 208 | +{ | |
| 209 | + struct fd ruleset_f; | |
| 210 | + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; | |
| 211 | + | |
| 212 | + ruleset_f = fdget(fd); | |
| 213 | + if (!ruleset_f.file) | |
| 214 | + return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); | |
| 215 | + | |
| 216 | + /* Checks FD type and access right. */ | |
| 217 | + if (ruleset_f.file->f_op != &ruleset_fops) { | |
| 218 | + ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EBADFD); | |
| 219 | + goto out_fdput; | |
| 220 | + } | |
| 221 | + if (!(ruleset_f.file->f_mode & mode)) { | |
| 222 | + ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); | |
| 223 | + goto out_fdput; | |
| 224 | + } | |
| 225 | + ruleset = ruleset_f.file->private_data; | |
| 226 | + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) { | |
| 227 | + ruleset = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | |
| 228 | + goto out_fdput; | |
| 229 | + } | |
| 230 | + landlock_get_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 231 | + | |
| 232 | +out_fdput: | |
| 233 | + fdput(ruleset_f); | |
| 234 | + return ruleset; | |
| 235 | +} | |
| 236 | + | |
| 237 | +/* Path handling */ | |
| 238 | + | |
| 239 | +/* | |
| 240 | + * @path: Must call put_path(@path) after the call if it succeeded. | |
| 241 | + */ | |
| 242 | +static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path) | |
| 243 | +{ | |
| 244 | + struct fd f; | |
| 245 | + int err = 0; | |
| 246 | + | |
| 247 | + BUILD_BUG_ON(!__same_type(fd, | |
| 248 | + ((struct landlock_path_beneath_attr *)NULL)->parent_fd)); | |
| 249 | + | |
| 250 | + /* Handles O_PATH. */ | |
| 251 | + f = fdget_raw(fd); | |
| 252 | + if (!f.file) | |
| 253 | + return -EBADF; | |
| 254 | + /* | |
| 255 | + * Forbids ruleset FDs, internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs), including | |
| 256 | + * pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g. sockfs, | |
| 257 | + * pipefs). | |
| 258 | + */ | |
| 259 | + if ((f.file->f_op == &ruleset_fops) || | |
| 260 | + (f.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL) || | |
| 261 | + (f.file->f_path.dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || | |
| 262 | + d_is_negative(f.file->f_path.dentry) || | |
| 263 | + IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(f.file->f_path.dentry))) { | |
| 264 | + err = -EBADFD; | |
| 265 | + goto out_fdput; | |
| 266 | + } | |
| 267 | + *path = f.file->f_path; | |
| 268 | + path_get(path); | |
| 269 | + | |
| 270 | +out_fdput: | |
| 271 | + fdput(f); | |
| 272 | + return err; | |
| 273 | +} | |
| 274 | + | |
| 275 | +/** | |
| 276 | + * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset | |
| 277 | + * | |
| 278 | + * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended | |
| 279 | + * with the new rule. | |
| 280 | + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only | |
| 281 | + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). | |
| 282 | + * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct | |
| 283 | + * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). | |
| 284 | + * @flags: Must be 0. | |
| 285 | + * | |
| 286 | + * This system call enables to define a new rule and add it to an existing | |
| 287 | + * ruleset. | |
| 288 | + * | |
| 289 | + * Possible returned errors are: | |
| 290 | + * | |
| 291 | + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; | |
| 292 | + * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. | |
| 293 | + * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's | |
| 294 | + * accesses); | |
| 295 | + * - ENOMSG: Empty accesses (e.g. &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); | |
| 296 | + * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread, or a | |
| 297 | + * member of @rule_attr is not a file descriptor as expected; | |
| 298 | + * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor, or a member of | |
| 299 | + * @rule_attr is not the expected file descriptor type (e.g. file open | |
| 300 | + * without O_PATH); | |
| 301 | + * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no write access to the underlying ruleset; | |
| 302 | + * - EFAULT: @rule_attr inconsistency. | |
| 303 | + */ | |
| 304 | +SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, | |
| 305 | + const int, ruleset_fd, const enum landlock_rule_type, rule_type, | |
| 306 | + const void __user *const, rule_attr, const __u32, flags) | |
| 307 | +{ | |
| 308 | + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; | |
| 309 | + struct path path; | |
| 310 | + struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset; | |
| 311 | + int res, err; | |
| 312 | + | |
| 313 | + if (!landlock_initialized) | |
| 314 | + return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| 315 | + | |
| 316 | + /* No flag for now. */ | |
| 317 | + if (flags) | |
| 318 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 319 | + | |
| 320 | + if (rule_type != LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH) | |
| 321 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 322 | + | |
| 323 | + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ | |
| 324 | + res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr, | |
| 325 | + sizeof(path_beneath_attr)); | |
| 326 | + if (res) | |
| 327 | + return -EFAULT; | |
| 328 | + | |
| 329 | + /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */ | |
| 330 | + ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_WRITE); | |
| 331 | + if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) | |
| 332 | + return PTR_ERR(ruleset); | |
| 333 | + | |
| 334 | + /* | |
| 335 | + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) | |
| 336 | + * are ignored in path walks. | |
| 337 | + */ | |
| 338 | + if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) { | |
| 339 | + err = -ENOMSG; | |
| 340 | + goto out_put_ruleset; | |
| 341 | + } | |
| 342 | + /* | |
| 343 | + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints | |
| 344 | + * (ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). | |
| 345 | + */ | |
| 346 | + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) != | |
| 347 | + ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) { | |
| 348 | + err = -EINVAL; | |
| 349 | + goto out_put_ruleset; | |
| 350 | + } | |
| 351 | + | |
| 352 | + /* Gets and checks the new rule. */ | |
| 353 | + err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path); | |
| 354 | + if (err) | |
| 355 | + goto out_put_ruleset; | |
| 356 | + | |
| 357 | + /* Imports the new rule. */ | |
| 358 | + err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path, | |
| 359 | + path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); | |
| 360 | + path_put(&path); | |
| 361 | + | |
| 362 | +out_put_ruleset: | |
| 363 | + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 364 | + return err; | |
| 365 | +} | |
| 366 | + | |
| 367 | +/* Enforcement */ | |
| 368 | + | |
| 369 | +/** | |
| 370 | + * sys_landlock_restrict_self - Enforce a ruleset on the calling thread | |
| 371 | + * | |
| 372 | + * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset to merge with the target. | |
| 373 | + * @flags: Must be 0. | |
| 374 | + * | |
| 375 | + * This system call enables to enforce a Landlock ruleset on the current | |
| 376 | + * thread. Enforcing a ruleset requires that the task has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its | |
| 377 | + * namespace or is running with no_new_privs. This avoids scenarios where | |
| 378 | + * unprivileged tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children. | |
| 379 | + * | |
| 380 | + * Possible returned errors are: | |
| 381 | + * | |
| 382 | + * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; | |
| 383 | + * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0. | |
| 384 | + * - EBADF: @ruleset_fd is not a file descriptor for the current thread; | |
| 385 | + * - EBADFD: @ruleset_fd is not a ruleset file descriptor; | |
| 386 | + * - EPERM: @ruleset_fd has no read access to the underlying ruleset, or the | |
| 387 | + * current thread is not running with no_new_privs, or it doesn't have | |
| 388 | + * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace. | |
| 389 | + * - E2BIG: The maximum number of stacked rulesets is reached for the current | |
| 390 | + * thread. | |
| 391 | + */ | |
| 392 | +SYSCALL_DEFINE2(landlock_restrict_self, | |
| 393 | + const int, ruleset_fd, const __u32, flags) | |
| 394 | +{ | |
| 395 | + struct landlock_ruleset *new_dom, *ruleset; | |
| 396 | + struct cred *new_cred; | |
| 397 | + struct landlock_cred_security *new_llcred; | |
| 398 | + int err; | |
| 399 | + | |
| 400 | + if (!landlock_initialized) | |
| 401 | + return -EOPNOTSUPP; | |
| 402 | + | |
| 403 | + /* No flag for now. */ | |
| 404 | + if (flags) | |
| 405 | + return -EINVAL; | |
| 406 | + | |
| 407 | + /* | |
| 408 | + * Similar checks as for seccomp(2), except that an -EPERM may be | |
| 409 | + * returned. | |
| 410 | + */ | |
| 411 | + if (!task_no_new_privs(current) && | |
| 412 | + !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) | |
| 413 | + return -EPERM; | |
| 414 | + | |
| 415 | + /* Gets and checks the ruleset. */ | |
| 416 | + ruleset = get_ruleset_from_fd(ruleset_fd, FMODE_CAN_READ); | |
| 417 | + if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) | |
| 418 | + return PTR_ERR(ruleset); | |
| 419 | + | |
| 420 | + /* Prepares new credentials. */ | |
| 421 | + new_cred = prepare_creds(); | |
| 422 | + if (!new_cred) { | |
| 423 | + err = -ENOMEM; | |
| 424 | + goto out_put_ruleset; | |
| 425 | + } | |
| 426 | + new_llcred = landlock_cred(new_cred); | |
| 427 | + | |
| 428 | + /* | |
| 429 | + * There is no possible race condition while copying and manipulating | |
| 430 | + * the current credentials because they are dedicated per thread. | |
| 431 | + */ | |
| 432 | + new_dom = landlock_merge_ruleset(new_llcred->domain, ruleset); | |
| 433 | + if (IS_ERR(new_dom)) { | |
| 434 | + err = PTR_ERR(new_dom); | |
| 435 | + goto out_put_creds; | |
| 436 | + } | |
| 437 | + | |
| 438 | + /* Replaces the old (prepared) domain. */ | |
| 439 | + landlock_put_ruleset(new_llcred->domain); | |
| 440 | + new_llcred->domain = new_dom; | |
| 441 | + | |
| 442 | + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 443 | + return commit_creds(new_cred); | |
| 444 | + | |
| 445 | +out_put_creds: | |
| 446 | + abort_creds(new_cred); | |
| 447 | + | |
| 448 | +out_put_ruleset: | |
| 449 | + landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset); | |
| 450 | + return err; | |
| 451 | +} | |
| @@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) · 202 unmodified lines | ||
| 203 | 203 | lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode); |
| 204 | 204 | lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); |
| 205 | 205 | lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); |
| 206 | + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_superblock, &blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); | |
| 206 | 207 | lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); |
| 207 | 208 | } |
| 208 | 209 | |
| @@ -333,12 +334,13 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) · 124 unmodified lines | ||
| 333 | 334 | for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) |
| 334 | 335 | prepare_lsm(*lsm); |
| 335 | 336 | |
| 336 | − init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); | |
| 337 | − init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); | |
| 338 | − init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); | |
| 339 | − init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); | |
| 340 | − init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); | |
| 341 | − init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); | |
| 337 | + init_debug("cred blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_cred); | |
| 338 | + init_debug("file blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_file); | |
| 339 | + init_debug("inode blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_inode); | |
| 340 | + init_debug("ipc blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_ipc); | |
| 341 | + init_debug("msg_msg blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); | |
| 342 | + init_debug("superblock blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_superblock); | |
| 343 | + init_debug("task blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_task); | |
| 342 | 344 | |
| 343 | 345 | /* |
| 344 | 346 | * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs |
| @@ -670,6 +672,27 @@ static void __init lsm_early_task(struct task_struct *task) · 325 unmodified lines | ||
| 670 | 672 | panic("%s: Early task alloc failed.\n", __func__); |
| 671 | 673 | } |
| 672 | 674 | |
| 675 | +/** | |
| 676 | + * lsm_superblock_alloc - allocate a composite superblock blob | |
| 677 | + * @sb: the superblock that needs a blob | |
| 678 | + * | |
| 679 | + * Allocate the superblock blob for all the modules | |
| 680 | + * | |
| 681 | + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. | |
| 682 | + */ | |
| 683 | +static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) | |
| 684 | +{ | |
| 685 | + if (blob_sizes.lbs_superblock == 0) { | |
| 686 | + sb->s_security = NULL; | |
| 687 | + return 0; | |
| 688 | + } | |
| 689 | + | |
| 690 | + sb->s_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_superblock, GFP_KERNEL); | |
| 691 | + if (sb->s_security == NULL) | |
| 692 | + return -ENOMEM; | |
| 693 | + return 0; | |
| 694 | +} | |
| 695 | + | |
| 673 | 696 | /* |
| 674 | 697 | * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and |
| 675 | 698 | * can be accessed with: |
| @@ -867,12 +890,26 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter * · 191 unmodified lines | ||
| 867 | 890 | |
| 868 | 891 | int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) |
| 869 | 892 | { |
| 870 | − return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); | |
| 893 | + int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); | |
| 894 | + | |
| 895 | + if (unlikely(rc)) | |
| 896 | + return rc; | |
| 897 | + rc = call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb); | |
| 898 | + if (unlikely(rc)) | |
| 899 | + security_sb_free(sb); | |
| 900 | + return rc; | |
| 901 | +} | |
| 902 | + | |
| 903 | +void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) | |
| 904 | +{ | |
| 905 | + call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); | |
| 871 | 906 | } |
| 872 | 907 | |
| 873 | 908 | void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) |
| 874 | 909 | { |
| 875 | 910 | call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); |
| 911 | + kfree(sb->s_security); | |
| 912 | + sb->s_security = NULL; | |
| 876 | 913 | } |
| 877 | 914 | |
| 878 | 915 | void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) |
| @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) · 357 unmodified lines | ||
| 358 | 358 | |
| 359 | 359 | if (!isec) |
| 360 | 360 | return; |
| 361 | − sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 361 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb); | |
| 362 | 362 | /* |
| 363 | 363 | * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for |
| 364 | 364 | * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste |
| @@ -376,13 +376,6 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) · 11 unmodified lines | ||
| 376 | 376 | } |
| 377 | 377 | } |
| 378 | 378 | |
| 379 | −static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
| 380 | −{ | |
| 381 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 382 | − sb->s_security = NULL; | |
| 383 | − kfree(sbsec); | |
| 384 | −} | |
| 385 | − | |
| 386 | 379 | struct selinux_mnt_opts { |
| 387 | 380 | const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; |
| 388 | 381 | }; |
| @@ -494,7 +487,7 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) · 105 unmodified lines | ||
| 494 | 487 | |
| 495 | 488 | static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) |
| 496 | 489 | { |
| 497 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 490 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 498 | 491 | |
| 499 | 492 | /* |
| 500 | 493 | * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new |
| @@ -571,7 +564,7 @@ fallback: · 70 unmodified lines | ||
| 571 | 564 | |
| 572 | 565 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) |
| 573 | 566 | { |
| 574 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 567 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 575 | 568 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
| 576 | 569 | struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); |
| 577 | 570 | int rc = 0; |
| @@ -662,7 +655,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, · 84 unmodified lines | ||
| 662 | 655 | unsigned long *set_kern_flags) |
| 663 | 656 | { |
| 664 | 657 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 665 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 658 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 666 | 659 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
| 667 | 660 | struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; |
| 668 | 661 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; |
| @@ -900,8 +893,8 @@ out_double_mount: · 231 unmodified lines | ||
| 900 | 893 | static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, |
| 901 | 894 | const struct super_block *newsb) |
| 902 | 895 | { |
| 903 | − struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; | |
| 904 | − struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; | |
| 896 | + struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb); | |
| 897 | + struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb); | |
| 905 | 898 | char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
| 906 | 899 | char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
| 907 | 900 | |
| @@ -933,8 +926,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, · 25 unmodified lines | ||
| 933 | 926 | unsigned long *set_kern_flags) |
| 934 | 927 | { |
| 935 | 928 | int rc = 0; |
| 936 | − const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; | |
| 937 | − struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; | |
| 929 | + const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = | |
| 930 | + selinux_superblock(oldsb); | |
| 931 | + struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb); | |
| 938 | 932 | |
| 939 | 933 | int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); |
| 940 | 934 | int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); |
| @@ -1113,7 +1107,7 @@ static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid) · 172 unmodified lines | ||
| 1113 | 1107 | |
| 1114 | 1108 | static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) |
| 1115 | 1109 | { |
| 1116 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 1110 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 1117 | 1111 | int rc; |
| 1118 | 1112 | |
| 1119 | 1113 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
| @@ -1464,7 +1458,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent · 344 unmodified lines | ||
| 1464 | 1458 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) |
| 1465 | 1459 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 1466 | 1460 | |
| 1467 | − sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 1461 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb); | |
| 1468 | 1462 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { |
| 1469 | 1463 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
| 1470 | 1464 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
| @@ -1815,7 +1809,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, · 344 unmodified lines | ||
| 1815 | 1809 | const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass, |
| 1816 | 1810 | u32 *_new_isid) |
| 1817 | 1811 | { |
| 1818 | − const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 1812 | + const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = | |
| 1813 | + selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb); | |
| 1819 | 1814 | |
| 1820 | 1815 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && |
| 1821 | 1816 | (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) { |
| @@ -1846,7 +1841,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, · 24 unmodified lines | ||
| 1846 | 1841 | int rc; |
| 1847 | 1842 | |
| 1848 | 1843 | dsec = inode_security(dir); |
| 1849 | − sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 1844 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb); | |
| 1850 | 1845 | |
| 1851 | 1846 | sid = tsec->sid; |
| 1852 | 1847 | |
| @@ -1995,7 +1990,7 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, · 142 unmodified lines | ||
| 1995 | 1990 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 1996 | 1991 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 1997 | 1992 | |
| 1998 | − sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 1993 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 1999 | 1994 | return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, |
| 2000 | 1995 | sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); |
| 2001 | 1996 | } |
| @@ -2617,11 +2612,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) · 615 unmodified lines | ||
| 2617 | 2612 | |
| 2618 | 2613 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
| 2619 | 2614 | { |
| 2620 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
| 2621 | − | |
| 2622 | − sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); | |
| 2623 | − if (!sbsec) | |
| 2624 | − return -ENOMEM; | |
| 2615 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 2625 | 2616 | |
| 2626 | 2617 | mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); |
| 2627 | 2618 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); |
| @@ -2629,16 +2620,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) · 1 unmodified line | ||
| 2629 | 2620 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 2630 | 2621 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; |
| 2631 | 2622 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 2632 | − sb->s_security = sbsec; | |
| 2633 | 2623 | |
| 2634 | 2624 | return 0; |
| 2635 | 2625 | } |
| 2636 | 2626 | |
| 2637 | −static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
| 2638 | −{ | |
| 2639 | − superblock_free_security(sb); | |
| 2640 | −} | |
| 2641 | − | |
| 2642 | 2627 | static inline int opt_len(const char *s) |
| 2643 | 2628 | { |
| 2644 | 2629 | bool open_quote = false; |
| @@ -2772,7 +2757,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) · 127 unmodified lines | ||
| 2772 | 2757 | static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) |
| 2773 | 2758 | { |
| 2774 | 2759 | struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; |
| 2775 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 2760 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 2776 | 2761 | u32 sid; |
| 2777 | 2762 | int rc; |
| 2778 | 2763 | |
| @@ -3010,7 +2995,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, · 231 unmodified lines | ||
| 3010 | 2995 | int rc; |
| 3011 | 2996 | char *context; |
| 3012 | 2997 | |
| 3013 | − sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 2998 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb); | |
| 3014 | 2999 | |
| 3015 | 3000 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
| 3016 | 3001 | |
| @@ -3312,7 +3297,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, · 295 unmodified lines | ||
| 3312 | 3297 | if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) |
| 3313 | 3298 | return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); |
| 3314 | 3299 | |
| 3315 | − sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 3300 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb); | |
| 3316 | 3301 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) |
| 3317 | 3302 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 3318 | 3303 | |
| @@ -3557,13 +3542,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, · 238 unmodified lines | ||
| 3557 | 3542 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
| 3558 | 3543 | { |
| 3559 | 3544 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode); |
| 3560 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 3545 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; | |
| 3561 | 3546 | u32 newsid; |
| 3562 | 3547 | int rc; |
| 3563 | 3548 | |
| 3564 | 3549 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
| 3565 | 3550 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 3566 | 3551 | |
| 3552 | + sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb); | |
| 3567 | 3553 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) |
| 3568 | 3554 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 3569 | 3555 | |
| @@ -7065,6 +7051,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { · 3495 unmodified lines | ||
| 7065 | 7051 | .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), |
| 7066 | 7052 | .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), |
| 7067 | 7053 | .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), |
| 7054 | + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), | |
| 7068 | 7055 | }; |
| 7069 | 7056 | |
| 7070 | 7057 | #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS |
| @@ -7165,7 +7152,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { · 94 unmodified lines | ||
| 7165 | 7152 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), |
| 7166 | 7153 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), |
| 7167 | 7154 | |
| 7168 | − LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), | |
| 7169 | 7155 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts), |
| 7170 | 7156 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat), |
| 7171 | 7157 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), |
| @@ -188,4 +188,10 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void) · 187 unmodified lines | ||
| 188 | 188 | return tsec->sid; |
| 189 | 189 | } |
| 190 | 190 | |
| 191 | +static inline struct superblock_security_struct *selinux_superblock( | |
| 192 | + const struct super_block *superblock) | |
| 193 | +{ | |
| 194 | + return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; | |
| 195 | +} | |
| 196 | + | |
| 191 | 197 | #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ |
| @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ · 46 unmodified lines | ||
| 47 | 47 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
| 48 | 48 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
| 49 | 49 | #include <linux/vmalloc.h> |
| 50 | +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> | |
| 50 | 51 | #include <net/netlabel.h> |
| 51 | 52 | |
| 52 | 53 | #include "flask.h" |
| @@ -2955,7 +2956,7 @@ int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb) · 2902 unmodified lines | ||
| 2955 | 2956 | struct sidtab *sidtab; |
| 2956 | 2957 | int rc; |
| 2957 | 2958 | struct ocontext *c; |
| 2958 | − struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; | |
| 2959 | + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); | |
| 2959 | 2960 | const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name; |
| 2960 | 2961 | |
| 2961 | 2962 | if (!selinux_initialized(state)) { |
| @@ -357,6 +357,12 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc) · 356 unmodified lines | ||
| 357 | 357 | return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; |
| 358 | 358 | } |
| 359 | 359 | |
| 360 | +static inline struct superblock_smack *smack_superblock( | |
| 361 | + const struct super_block *superblock) | |
| 362 | +{ | |
| 363 | + return superblock->s_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; | |
| 364 | +} | |
| 365 | + | |
| 360 | 366 | /* |
| 361 | 367 | * Is the directory transmuting? |
| 362 | 368 | */ |
| @@ -535,12 +535,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) · 534 unmodified lines | ||
| 535 | 535 | */ |
| 536 | 536 | static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
| 537 | 537 | { |
| 538 | − struct superblock_smack *sbsp; | |
| 539 | − | |
| 540 | − sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL); | |
| 541 | − | |
| 542 | − if (sbsp == NULL) | |
| 543 | − return -ENOMEM; | |
| 538 | + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb); | |
| 544 | 539 | |
| 545 | 540 | sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor; |
| 546 | 541 | sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor; |
| @@ -549,22 +544,10 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) · 2 unmodified lines | ||
| 549 | 544 | /* |
| 550 | 545 | * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc. |
| 551 | 546 | */ |
| 552 | − sb->s_security = sbsp; | |
| 553 | 547 | |
| 554 | 548 | return 0; |
| 555 | 549 | } |
| 556 | 550 | |
| 557 | −/** | |
| 558 | − * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob | |
| 559 | − * @sb: the superblock getting the blob | |
| 560 | − * | |
| 561 | − */ | |
| 562 | −static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) | |
| 563 | −{ | |
| 564 | − kfree(sb->s_security); | |
| 565 | − sb->s_security = NULL; | |
| 566 | −} | |
| 567 | − | |
| 568 | 551 | struct smack_mnt_opts { |
| 569 | 552 | const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute; |
| 570 | 553 | }; |
| @@ -772,7 +755,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, · 201 unmodified lines | ||
| 772 | 755 | { |
| 773 | 756 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
| 774 | 757 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root); |
| 775 | − struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security; | |
| 758 | + struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb); | |
| 776 | 759 | struct inode_smack *isp; |
| 777 | 760 | struct smack_known *skp; |
| 778 | 761 | struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; |
| @@ -871,7 +854,7 @@ static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, · 92 unmodified lines | ||
| 871 | 854 | */ |
| 872 | 855 | static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) |
| 873 | 856 | { |
| 874 | − struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security; | |
| 857 | + struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb); | |
| 875 | 858 | int rc; |
| 876 | 859 | struct smk_audit_info ad; |
| 877 | 860 | |
| @@ -905,7 +888,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) · 27 unmodified lines | ||
| 905 | 888 | if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task) |
| 906 | 889 | return 0; |
| 907 | 890 | |
| 908 | − sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 891 | + sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb); | |
| 909 | 892 | if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) && |
| 910 | 893 | isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root) |
| 911 | 894 | return 0; |
| @@ -1157,7 +1140,7 @@ static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, · 245 unmodified lines | ||
| 1157 | 1140 | */ |
| 1158 | 1141 | static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) |
| 1159 | 1142 | { |
| 1160 | − struct superblock_smack *sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 1143 | + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb); | |
| 1161 | 1144 | struct smk_audit_info ad; |
| 1162 | 1145 | int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; |
| 1163 | 1146 | int rc; |
| @@ -1400,7 +1383,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, · 236 unmodified lines | ||
| 1400 | 1383 | */ |
| 1401 | 1384 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) { |
| 1402 | 1385 | struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb; |
| 1403 | − struct superblock_smack *sbsp = sbp->s_security; | |
| 1386 | + struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp); | |
| 1404 | 1387 | |
| 1405 | 1388 | isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default; |
| 1406 | 1389 | } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) |
| @@ -1670,7 +1653,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, · 263 unmodified lines | ||
| 1670 | 1653 | isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file)); |
| 1671 | 1654 | if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL) |
| 1672 | 1655 | return 0; |
| 1673 | − sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security; | |
| 1656 | + sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb); | |
| 1674 | 1657 | if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED && |
| 1675 | 1658 | isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root) |
| 1676 | 1659 | return -EACCES; |
| @@ -3299,7 +3282,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) · 1622 unmodified lines | ||
| 3299 | 3282 | return; |
| 3300 | 3283 | |
| 3301 | 3284 | sbp = inode->i_sb; |
| 3302 | − sbsp = sbp->s_security; | |
| 3285 | + sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp); | |
| 3303 | 3286 | /* |
| 3304 | 3287 | * We're going to use the superblock default label |
| 3305 | 3288 | * if there's no label on the file. |
| @@ -4714,6 +4697,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { · 1408 unmodified lines | ||
| 4714 | 4697 | .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack), |
| 4715 | 4698 | .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *), |
| 4716 | 4699 | .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *), |
| 4700 | + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack), | |
| 4717 | 4701 | }; |
| 4718 | 4702 | |
| 4719 | 4703 | static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { |
| @@ -4725,7 +4709,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { · 5 unmodified lines | ||
| 4725 | 4709 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param), |
| 4726 | 4710 | |
| 4727 | 4711 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security), |
| 4728 | − LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security), | |
| 4729 | 4712 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts), |
| 4730 | 4713 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts), |
| 4731 | 4714 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs), |