Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR. No conflicts (or adjacent changes of note).
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| 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ | ||
| 2 | #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H | ||
| 3 | #define _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H | ||
| 4 | |||
| 5 | #include <linux/compiler.h> | ||
| 6 | #include <linux/types.h> | ||
| 7 | |||
| 8 | |||
| 9 | /* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */ | ||
| 10 | #define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED 0 /* seccomp is not in use. */ | ||
| 11 | #define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */ | ||
| 12 | #define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */ | ||
| 13 | |||
| 14 | /* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */ | ||
| 15 | #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0 | ||
| 16 | #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1 | ||
| 17 | #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2 | ||
| 18 | #define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3 | ||
| 19 | |||
| 20 | /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */ | ||
| 21 | #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0) | ||
| 22 | #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1) | ||
| 23 | #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2) | ||
| 24 | #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3) | ||
| 25 | #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH (1UL << 4) | ||
| 26 | /* Received notifications wait in killable state (only respond to fatal signals) */ | ||
| 27 | #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV (1UL << 5) | ||
| 28 | |||
| 29 | /* | ||
| 30 | * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value. | ||
| 31 | * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data. | ||
| 32 | * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most, | ||
| 33 | * as a signed value (so 0x8000000 is negative). | ||
| 34 | * | ||
| 35 | * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always | ||
| 36 | * selects the least permissive choice. | ||
| 37 | */ | ||
| 38 | #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U /* kill the process */ | ||
| 39 | #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD 0x00000000U /* kill the thread */ | ||
| 40 | #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD | ||
| 41 | #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */ | ||
| 42 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */ | ||
| 43 | #define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */ | ||
| 44 | #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */ | ||
| 45 | #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */ | ||
| 46 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */ | ||
| 47 | |||
| 48 | /* Masks for the return value sections. */ | ||
| 49 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL 0xffff0000U | ||
| 50 | #define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION 0x7fff0000U | ||
| 51 | #define SECCOMP_RET_DATA 0x0000ffffU | ||
| 52 | |||
| 53 | /** | ||
| 54 | * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over. | ||
| 55 | * @nr: the system call number | ||
| 56 | * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value | ||
| 57 | * as defined in <linux/audit.h>. | ||
| 58 | * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call. | ||
| 59 | * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values | ||
| 60 | * regardless of the architecture. | ||
| 61 | */ | ||
| 62 | struct seccomp_data { | ||
| 63 | int nr; | ||
| 64 | __u32 arch; | ||
| 65 | __u64 instruction_pointer; | ||
| 66 | __u64 args[6]; | ||
| 67 | }; | ||
| 68 | |||
| 69 | struct seccomp_notif_sizes { | ||
| 70 | __u16 seccomp_notif; | ||
| 71 | __u16 seccomp_notif_resp; | ||
| 72 | __u16 seccomp_data; | ||
| 73 | }; | ||
| 74 | |||
| 75 | struct seccomp_notif { | ||
| 76 | __u64 id; | ||
| 77 | __u32 pid; | ||
| 78 | __u32 flags; | ||
| 79 | struct seccomp_data data; | ||
| 80 | }; | ||
| 81 | |||
| 82 | /* | ||
| 83 | * Valid flags for struct seccomp_notif_resp | ||
| 84 | * | ||
| 85 | * Note, the SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE flag must be used with caution! | ||
| 86 | * If set by the process supervising the syscalls of another process the | ||
| 87 | * syscall will continue. This is problematic because of an inherent TOCTOU. | ||
| 88 | * An attacker can exploit the time while the supervised process is waiting on | ||
| 89 | * a response from the supervising process to rewrite syscall arguments which | ||
| 90 | * are passed as pointers of the intercepted syscall. | ||
| 91 | * It should be absolutely clear that this means that the seccomp notifier | ||
| 92 | * _cannot_ be used to implement a security policy! It should only ever be used | ||
| 93 | * in scenarios where a more privileged process supervises the syscalls of a | ||
| 94 | * lesser privileged process to get around kernel-enforced security | ||
| 95 | * restrictions when the privileged process deems this safe. In other words, | ||
| 96 | * in order to continue a syscall the supervising process should be sure that | ||
| 97 | * another security mechanism or the kernel itself will sufficiently block | ||
| 98 | * syscalls if arguments are rewritten to something unsafe. | ||
| 99 | * | ||
| 100 | * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF | ||
| 101 | * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the | ||
| 102 | * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means | ||
| 103 | * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any | ||
| 104 | * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all | ||
| 105 | * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response | ||
| 106 | * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally | ||
| 107 | * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. | ||
| 108 | */ | ||
| 109 | #define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE (1UL << 0) | ||
| 110 | |||
| 111 | struct seccomp_notif_resp { | ||
| 112 | __u64 id; | ||
| 113 | __s64 val; | ||
| 114 | __s32 error; | ||
| 115 | __u32 flags; | ||
| 116 | }; | ||
| 117 | |||
| 118 | #define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FD_SYNC_WAKE_UP (1UL << 0) | ||
| 119 | |||
| 120 | /* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */ | ||
| 121 | #define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD (1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */ | ||
| 122 | #define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND (1UL << 1) /* Addfd and return it, atomically */ | ||
| 123 | |||
| 124 | /** | ||
| 125 | * struct seccomp_notif_addfd | ||
| 126 | * @id: The ID of the seccomp notification | ||
| 127 | * @flags: SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_* | ||
| 128 | * @srcfd: The local fd number | ||
| 129 | * @newfd: Optional remote FD number if SETFD option is set, otherwise 0. | ||
| 130 | * @newfd_flags: The O_* flags the remote FD should have applied | ||
| 131 | */ | ||
| 132 | struct seccomp_notif_addfd { | ||
| 133 | __u64 id; | ||
| 134 | __u32 flags; | ||
| 135 | __u32 srcfd; | ||
| 136 | __u32 newfd; | ||
| 137 | __u32 newfd_flags; | ||
| 138 | }; | ||
| 139 | |||
| 140 | #define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!' | ||
| 141 | #define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr) | ||
| 142 | #define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) | ||
| 143 | #define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) | ||
| 144 | #define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) | ||
| 145 | |||
| 146 | /* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */ | ||
| 147 | #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif) | ||
| 148 | #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \ | ||
| 149 | struct seccomp_notif_resp) | ||
| 150 | #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOW(2, __u64) | ||
| 151 | /* On success, the return value is the remote process's added fd number */ | ||
| 152 | #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD SECCOMP_IOW(3, \ | ||
| 153 | struct seccomp_notif_addfd) | ||
| 154 | |||
| 155 | #define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SET_FLAGS SECCOMP_IOW(4, __u64) | ||
| 156 | |||
| 157 | #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ | ||