Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR. No conflicts (or adjacent changes of note).
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| 1 | +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ | |
| 2 | +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H | |
| 3 | +#define _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H | |
| 4 | + | |
| 5 | +#include <linux/compiler.h> | |
| 6 | +#include <linux/types.h> | |
| 7 | + | |
| 8 | + | |
| 9 | +/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */ | |
| 10 | +#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED 0 /* seccomp is not in use. */ | |
| 11 | +#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */ | |
| 12 | +#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */ | |
| 13 | + | |
| 14 | +/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */ | |
| 15 | +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0 | |
| 16 | +#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1 | |
| 17 | +#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2 | |
| 18 | +#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3 | |
| 19 | + | |
| 20 | +/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */ | |
| 21 | +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0) | |
| 22 | +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (1UL << 1) | |
| 23 | +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (1UL << 2) | |
| 24 | +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (1UL << 3) | |
| 25 | +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH (1UL << 4) | |
| 26 | +/* Received notifications wait in killable state (only respond to fatal signals) */ | |
| 27 | +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV (1UL << 5) | |
| 28 | + | |
| 29 | +/* | |
| 30 | + * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value. | |
| 31 | + * The bottom 16-bits are for optional return data. | |
| 32 | + * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most, | |
| 33 | + * as a signed value (so 0x8000000 is negative). | |
| 34 | + * | |
| 35 | + * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always | |
| 36 | + * selects the least permissive choice. | |
| 37 | + */ | |
| 38 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS 0x80000000U /* kill the process */ | |
| 39 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD 0x00000000U /* kill the thread */ | |
| 40 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD | |
| 41 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */ | |
| 42 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */ | |
| 43 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */ | |
| 44 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */ | |
| 45 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */ | |
| 46 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW 0x7fff0000U /* allow */ | |
| 47 | + | |
| 48 | +/* Masks for the return value sections. */ | |
| 49 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL 0xffff0000U | |
| 50 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION 0x7fff0000U | |
| 51 | +#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA 0x0000ffffU | |
| 52 | + | |
| 53 | +/** | |
| 54 | + * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over. | |
| 55 | + * @nr: the system call number | |
| 56 | + * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value | |
| 57 | + * as defined in <linux/audit.h>. | |
| 58 | + * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call. | |
| 59 | + * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values | |
| 60 | + * regardless of the architecture. | |
| 61 | + */ | |
| 62 | +struct seccomp_data { | |
| 63 | + int nr; | |
| 64 | + __u32 arch; | |
| 65 | + __u64 instruction_pointer; | |
| 66 | + __u64 args[6]; | |
| 67 | +}; | |
| 68 | + | |
| 69 | +struct seccomp_notif_sizes { | |
| 70 | + __u16 seccomp_notif; | |
| 71 | + __u16 seccomp_notif_resp; | |
| 72 | + __u16 seccomp_data; | |
| 73 | +}; | |
| 74 | + | |
| 75 | +struct seccomp_notif { | |
| 76 | + __u64 id; | |
| 77 | + __u32 pid; | |
| 78 | + __u32 flags; | |
| 79 | + struct seccomp_data data; | |
| 80 | +}; | |
| 81 | + | |
| 82 | +/* | |
| 83 | + * Valid flags for struct seccomp_notif_resp | |
| 84 | + * | |
| 85 | + * Note, the SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE flag must be used with caution! | |
| 86 | + * If set by the process supervising the syscalls of another process the | |
| 87 | + * syscall will continue. This is problematic because of an inherent TOCTOU. | |
| 88 | + * An attacker can exploit the time while the supervised process is waiting on | |
| 89 | + * a response from the supervising process to rewrite syscall arguments which | |
| 90 | + * are passed as pointers of the intercepted syscall. | |
| 91 | + * It should be absolutely clear that this means that the seccomp notifier | |
| 92 | + * _cannot_ be used to implement a security policy! It should only ever be used | |
| 93 | + * in scenarios where a more privileged process supervises the syscalls of a | |
| 94 | + * lesser privileged process to get around kernel-enforced security | |
| 95 | + * restrictions when the privileged process deems this safe. In other words, | |
| 96 | + * in order to continue a syscall the supervising process should be sure that | |
| 97 | + * another security mechanism or the kernel itself will sufficiently block | |
| 98 | + * syscalls if arguments are rewritten to something unsafe. | |
| 99 | + * | |
| 100 | + * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF | |
| 101 | + * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the | |
| 102 | + * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means | |
| 103 | + * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any | |
| 104 | + * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all | |
| 105 | + * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response | |
| 106 | + * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally | |
| 107 | + * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. | |
| 108 | + */ | |
| 109 | +#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE (1UL << 0) | |
| 110 | + | |
| 111 | +struct seccomp_notif_resp { | |
| 112 | + __u64 id; | |
| 113 | + __s64 val; | |
| 114 | + __s32 error; | |
| 115 | + __u32 flags; | |
| 116 | +}; | |
| 117 | + | |
| 118 | +#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FD_SYNC_WAKE_UP (1UL << 0) | |
| 119 | + | |
| 120 | +/* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */ | |
| 121 | +#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD (1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */ | |
| 122 | +#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND (1UL << 1) /* Addfd and return it, atomically */ | |
| 123 | + | |
| 124 | +/** | |
| 125 | + * struct seccomp_notif_addfd | |
| 126 | + * @id: The ID of the seccomp notification | |
| 127 | + * @flags: SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_* | |
| 128 | + * @srcfd: The local fd number | |
| 129 | + * @newfd: Optional remote FD number if SETFD option is set, otherwise 0. | |
| 130 | + * @newfd_flags: The O_* flags the remote FD should have applied | |
| 131 | + */ | |
| 132 | +struct seccomp_notif_addfd { | |
| 133 | + __u64 id; | |
| 134 | + __u32 flags; | |
| 135 | + __u32 srcfd; | |
| 136 | + __u32 newfd; | |
| 137 | + __u32 newfd_flags; | |
| 138 | +}; | |
| 139 | + | |
| 140 | +#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC '!' | |
| 141 | +#define SECCOMP_IO(nr) _IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr) | |
| 142 | +#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type) _IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) | |
| 143 | +#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type) _IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) | |
| 144 | +#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type) _IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type) | |
| 145 | + | |
| 146 | +/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */ | |
| 147 | +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif) | |
| 148 | +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND SECCOMP_IOWR(1, \ | |
| 149 | + struct seccomp_notif_resp) | |
| 150 | +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID SECCOMP_IOW(2, __u64) | |
| 151 | +/* On success, the return value is the remote process's added fd number */ | |
| 152 | +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD SECCOMP_IOW(3, \ | |
| 153 | + struct seccomp_notif_addfd) | |
| 154 | + | |
| 155 | +#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SET_FLAGS SECCOMP_IOW(4, __u64) | |
| 156 | + | |
| 157 | +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */ | |