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selftests/bpf: Add test for stale pkt range after scalar arithmetic

Extend the verifier_direct_packet_access BPF selftests to exercise the verifier code paths which ensure that the pkt range is cleared after add/sub alu with a known scalar. The tests reject the invalid access. # LDLIBS=-static PKG_CONFIG='pkg-config --static' ./vmtest.sh -- ./test_progs -t verifier_direct [...] #592/35 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after sub with known scalar:OK #592/36 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after add with known scalar:OK #592/37 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test3:OK #592/38 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test3 @unpriv:OK #592/39 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test34 (non-linear, cgroup_skb/ingress, too short eth):OK #592/40 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test35 (non-linear, cgroup_skb/ingress, too short 1):OK #592/41 verifier_direct_packet_access/direct packet access: test36 (non-linear, cgroup_skb/ingress, long enough):OK #592 verifier_direct_packet_access:OK [...] Summary: 2/47 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Daniel Borkmann committed 7 months ago

Commit 8697bdd1 parent 9f118091 file · +61 −0Browse files

Unified · Split

tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_direct_packet_access.c+61−0
@@ -859,4 +859,65 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 1; \ · 858 unmodified lines
859859 : __clobber_all);
860860 }
861861
862+SEC("tc")
863+__description("direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after sub with known scalar")
864+__failure __msg("invalid access to packet")
865+__naked void pkt_range_clear_after_sub(void)
866+{
867+ asm volatile (" \
868+ r9 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data]); \
869+ r8 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data_end]); \
870+ r9 += 256; \
871+ if r9 >= r8 goto l0_%=; \
872+ r0 = 0; \
873+ exit; \
874+l0_%=: /* r9 has AT_PKT_END (pkt + 256 >= pkt_end) */ \
875+ r9 -= 256; \
876+ /* \
877+ * AT_PKT_END must not survive the arithmetic. \
878+ * is_pkt_ptr_branch_taken must validate both \
879+ * branches when visiting the next condition. \
880+ */ \
881+ if r9 < r8 goto l1_%=; \
882+ r0 = 0; \
883+ exit; \
884+l1_%=: r0 = *(u8*)(r9 + 0); \
885+ r0 = 0; \
886+ exit; \
887+" :
888+ : __imm_const(__sk_buff_data, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
889+ __imm_const(__sk_buff_data_end, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end))
890+ : __clobber_all);
891+}
892+
893+SEC("tc")
894+__description("direct packet access: pkt_range cleared after add with known scalar")
895+__failure __msg("invalid access to packet")
896+__naked void pkt_range_clear_after_add(void)
897+{
898+ asm volatile (" \
899+ r9 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data]); \
900+ r8 = *(u32*)(r1 + %[__sk_buff_data_end]); \
901+ r9 += 256; \
902+ if r9 >= r8 goto l0_%=; \
903+ r0 = 0; \
904+ exit; \
905+l0_%=: /* r9 has AT_PKT_END (pkt + 256 >= pkt_end) */ \
906+ r9 += -256; \
907+ /* \
908+ * Same as sub, but goes through BPF_ADD path. \
909+ * AT_PKT_END must not survive the arithmetic. \
910+ */ \
911+ if r9 < r8 goto l1_%=; \
912+ r0 = 0; \
913+ exit; \
914+l1_%=: r0 = *(u8*)(r9 + 0); \
915+ r0 = 0; \
916+ exit; \
917+" :
918+ : __imm_const(__sk_buff_data, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data)),
919+ __imm_const(__sk_buff_data_end, offsetof(struct __sk_buff, data_end))
920+ : __clobber_all);
921+}
922+
862923 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";