Nothing is using it yet, but this will allow us to delay the open-time checks to use time, without breaking the normal UNIX permission semantics where permissions are determined by the opener (and the file descriptor can then be passed to a different process, or the process can drop capabilities).
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| @@ -392,6 +392,30 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) · 391 unmodified lines | |||
| 392 | } | 392 | } |
| 393 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); | 393 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); |
| 394 | 394 | ||
| 395 | /** | ||
| 396 | * file_ns_capable - Determine if the file's opener had a capability in effect | ||
| 397 | * @file: The file we want to check | ||
| 398 | * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in | ||
| 399 | * @cap: The capability to be tested for | ||
| 400 | * | ||
| 401 | * Return true if task that opened the file had a capability in effect | ||
| 402 | * when the file was opened. | ||
| 403 | * | ||
| 404 | * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not | ||
| 405 | * actually be privileged. | ||
| 406 | */ | ||
| 407 | bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) | ||
| 408 | { | ||
| 409 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cap_valid(cap))) | ||
| 410 | return false; | ||
| 411 | |||
| 412 | if (security_capable(file->f_cred, ns, cap) == 0) | ||
| 413 | return true; | ||
| 414 | |||
| 415 | return false; | ||
| 416 | } | ||
| 417 | EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_ns_capable); | ||
| 418 | |||
| 395 | /** | 419 | /** |
| 396 | * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect | 420 | * capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect |
| 397 | * @cap: The capability to be tested for | 421 | * @cap: The capability to be tested for |