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net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data

On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released.

Daniel Borkmann committed 13 years ago

Commit b5c37fe1 parent 6ba542a1 file · +5 −0Browse files

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net/sctp/endpointola.c+5−0
@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) · 248 unmodified lines
249249 /* Final destructor for endpoint. */
250250 static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
251251 {
252+ int i;
253+
252254 SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
253255
254256 /* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) · 16 unmodified lines
271273 sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
272274 sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
273275
276+ for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
277+ memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
278+
274279 /* Remove and free the port */
275280 if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
276281 sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);

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