import { readHashParams } from "./remote.ts"; const CONNECT_AUTH_STATE_PARAM = "state"; const CONNECT_AUTH_CHALLENGE_PARAM = "challenge"; const CONNECT_AUTH_PORT_PARAM = "port"; const CONNECT_AUTH_CODE_SEPARATOR = "."; const CONNECT_LOOPBACK_CALLBACK_PATH = "/callback"; const CONNECT_AUTHORIZE_PATH = "/connect"; const CONNECT_CALLBACK_PATH = "/connect/callback"; /** * The CLI prints URLs against this origin and the web bundle uses it to * decide whether it is the hosted deployment — the two must agree, so the * default lives here. */ export const DEFAULT_HOSTED_APP_URL = "https://app.t3.codes"; /** * Requested at authorize time by the hosted page and honored by the CLI's * token exchange; keep both sides on this single definition. */ export const CONNECT_OAUTH_SCOPES = ["openid", "profile", "email"] as const; export interface ConnectAuthorizeRequest { readonly state: string; readonly challenge: string; /** * Present when a loopback CLI initiated the request: the hosted /connect * page then asks Clerk to redirect the authorization code straight to * `http://127.0.0.1:/callback` instead of the hosted callback page. */ readonly loopbackPort?: number; } /** * The URL the CLI prints for the user to open in a browser. `state` and * `code_challenge` ride the fragment so they never reach the hosted app's * server or CDN logs; neither is a secret. * * Both CLI flows route through the hosted /connect page rather than hitting * Clerk's /oauth/authorize directly: a signed-out browser sent straight to * /oauth/authorize goes through Clerk's sign-in redirect, which does not * reliably preserve the authorize query parameters (state, response_type, * code_challenge). The hosted page waits for a Clerk session first, then * forwards the request with the parameters intact. */ export function buildConnectAuthorizeRequestUrl(input: { readonly hostedAppUrl: string; readonly state: string; readonly challenge: string; readonly loopbackPort?: number; }): string { const url = new URL(CONNECT_AUTHORIZE_PATH, input.hostedAppUrl); url.hash = new URLSearchParams([ [CONNECT_AUTH_STATE_PARAM, input.state], [CONNECT_AUTH_CHALLENGE_PARAM, input.challenge], ...(input.loopbackPort === undefined ? [] : [[CONNECT_AUTH_PORT_PARAM, String(input.loopbackPort)] as [string, string]]), ]).toString(); return url.toString(); } export function readConnectAuthorizeRequest(url: URL): ConnectAuthorizeRequest | null { const params = readHashParams(url); const state = params.get(CONNECT_AUTH_STATE_PARAM)?.trim() ?? ""; const challenge = params.get(CONNECT_AUTH_CHALLENGE_PARAM)?.trim() ?? ""; if (!state || !challenge) { return null; } const port = params.get(CONNECT_AUTH_PORT_PARAM); if (port === null) { return { state, challenge }; } // A present-but-invalid port means the link was corrupted; reject the whole // request rather than silently downgrading a loopback flow to the // out-of-band one, which would strand the waiting CLI. const loopbackPort = parseLoopbackPort(port.trim()); if (loopbackPort === null) { return null; } return { state, challenge, loopbackPort }; } function parseLoopbackPort(value: string): number | null { if (!/^\d{1,5}$/.test(value)) { return null; } const port = Number(value); return port >= 1 && port <= 65535 ? port : null; } /** * Redirect URI for the CLI's local callback listener. Must stay in sync with * the redirect URI registered on the Clerk CLI OAuth application. */ export function connectLoopbackRedirectUri(port: number): string { return `http://127.0.0.1:${port}${CONNECT_LOOPBACK_CALLBACK_PATH}`; } export function connectCallbackUrl(hostedAppUrl: string): string { return new URL(CONNECT_CALLBACK_PATH, hostedAppUrl).toString(); } export function buildConnectClerkAuthorizeUrl(input: { readonly authorizationEndpoint: string; readonly clientId: string; readonly redirectUri: string; readonly scopes: ReadonlyArray; readonly state: string; readonly challenge: string; }): string { const url = new URL(input.authorizationEndpoint); url.searchParams.set("client_id", input.clientId); url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", input.redirectUri); url.searchParams.set("response_type", "code"); url.searchParams.set("scope", input.scopes.join(" ")); url.searchParams.set("state", input.state); url.searchParams.set("code_challenge", input.challenge); url.searchParams.set("code_challenge_method", "S256"); return url.toString(); } export interface ConnectAuthCode { readonly code: string; readonly state: string; } /** * The single blob the hosted callback page displays and the CLI accepts. * Bundling `state` with the authorization code lets the CLI keep the loopback * flow's CSRF check without any backend: it verifies the returned state * matches the one it generated. Clerk authorization codes and the CLI's * base64url states never contain ".". */ export function encodeConnectAuthCode(input: ConnectAuthCode): string { return `${input.code}${CONNECT_AUTH_CODE_SEPARATOR}${input.state}`; } /** * Validates an out-of-band authorization code against the state of the request this process * generated. Returns the parsed code or a user-facing error message; both * the prompt's live validation and the authoritative post-prompt check go * through here so they cannot drift. */ export function checkConnectAuthCode( blob: string, expectedState: string, ): ConnectAuthCode | string { const parsed = parseConnectAuthCode(blob); if (parsed === null) { return "That does not look like a T3 Connect code. Copy the full code."; } if (parsed.state !== expectedState) { return "That code belongs to a different connect request. Open the URL above and try again."; } return parsed; } export function parseConnectAuthCode(blob: string): ConnectAuthCode | null { const trimmed = blob.trim(); const separatorIndex = trimmed.lastIndexOf(CONNECT_AUTH_CODE_SEPARATOR); if (separatorIndex <= 0 || separatorIndex === trimmed.length - 1) { return null; } const code = trimmed.slice(0, separatorIndex); const state = trimmed.slice(separatorIndex + 1); return { code, state }; }