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| 1 | /* | ||
| 2 | * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. | ||
| 3 | * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | ||
| 6 | * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as | ||
| 7 | * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this | ||
| 8 | * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided | ||
| 9 | * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. | ||
| 10 | * | ||
| 11 | * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT | ||
| 12 | * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or | ||
| 13 | * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License | ||
| 14 | * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that | ||
| 15 | * accompanied this code). | ||
| 16 | * | ||
| 17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version | ||
| 18 | * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, | ||
| 19 | * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. | ||
| 20 | * | ||
| 21 | * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA | ||
| 22 | * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any | ||
| 23 | * questions. | ||
| 24 | */ | ||
| 25 | |||
| 26 | package com.sun.script.javascript; | ||
| 27 | |||
| 28 | import java.lang.reflect.*; | ||
| 29 | import static sun.security.util.SecurityConstants.*; | ||
| 30 | import sun.org.mozilla.javascript.internal.*; | ||
| 31 | |||
| 32 | /** | ||
| 33 | * This wrap factory is used for security reasons. JSR 223 script | ||
| 34 | * engine interface and JavaScript engine classes are run as bootstrap | ||
| 35 | * classes. For example, java.lang.Class.forName method (when called without | ||
| 36 | * class loader) uses caller's class loader. This may be exploited by script | ||
| 37 | * authors to access classes otherwise not accessible. For example, | ||
| 38 | * classes in sun.* namespace are normally not accessible to untrusted | ||
| 39 | * code and hence should not be accessible to JavaScript run from | ||
| 40 | * untrusted code. | ||
| 41 | * | ||
| 42 | * @author A. Sundararajan | ||
| 43 | * @since 1.6 | ||
| 44 | */ | ||
| 45 | final class RhinoWrapFactory extends WrapFactory { | ||
| 46 | private RhinoWrapFactory() {} | ||
| 47 | private static RhinoWrapFactory theInstance; | ||
| 48 | |||
| 49 | static synchronized WrapFactory getInstance() { | ||
| 50 | if (theInstance == null) { | ||
| 51 | theInstance = new RhinoWrapFactory(); | ||
| 52 | } | ||
| 53 | return theInstance; | ||
| 54 | } | ||
| 55 | |||
| 56 | // We use instance of this class to wrap security sensitive | ||
| 57 | // Java object. Please refer below. | ||
| 58 | private static class RhinoJavaObject extends NativeJavaObject { | ||
| 59 | RhinoJavaObject(Scriptable scope, Object obj, Class type) { | ||
| 60 | // we pass 'null' to object. NativeJavaObject uses | ||
| 61 | // passed 'type' to reflect fields and methods when | ||
| 62 | // object is null. | ||
| 63 | super(scope, null, type); | ||
| 64 | |||
| 65 | // Now, we set actual object. 'javaObject' is protected | ||
| 66 | // field of NativeJavaObject. | ||
| 67 | javaObject = obj; | ||
| 68 | } | ||
| 69 | } | ||
| 70 | |||
| 71 | public Scriptable wrapAsJavaObject(Context cx, Scriptable scope, | ||
| 72 | Object javaObject, Class staticType) { | ||
| 73 | SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager(); | ||
| 74 | ClassShutter classShutter = RhinoClassShutter.getInstance(); | ||
| 75 | if (javaObject instanceof ClassLoader) { | ||
| 76 | // Check with Security Manager whether we can expose a | ||
| 77 | // ClassLoader... | ||
| 78 | if (sm != null) { | ||
| 79 | sm.checkPermission(GET_CLASSLOADER_PERMISSION); | ||
| 80 | } | ||
| 81 | // if we fall through here, check permission succeeded. | ||
| 82 | return super.wrapAsJavaObject(cx, scope, javaObject, staticType); | ||
| 83 | } else { | ||
| 84 | String name = null; | ||
| 85 | if (javaObject instanceof Class) { | ||
| 86 | name = ((Class)javaObject).getName(); | ||
| 87 | } else if (javaObject instanceof Member) { | ||
| 88 | Member member = (Member) javaObject; | ||
| 89 | // Check member access. Don't allow reflective access to | ||
| 90 | // non-public members. Note that we can't call checkMemberAccess | ||
| 91 | // because that expects exact stack depth! | ||
| 92 | if (sm != null && !Modifier.isPublic(member.getModifiers())) { | ||
| 93 | return null; | ||
| 94 | } | ||
| 95 | name = member.getDeclaringClass().getName(); | ||
| 96 | } | ||
| 97 | // Now, make sure that no ClassShutter prevented Class or Member | ||
| 98 | // of it is accessed reflectively. Note that ClassShutter may | ||
| 99 | // prevent access to a class, even though SecurityManager permit. | ||
| 100 | if (name != null) { | ||
| 101 | if (!classShutter.visibleToScripts(name)) { | ||
| 102 | return null; | ||
| 103 | } else { | ||
| 104 | return super.wrapAsJavaObject(cx, scope, javaObject, staticType); | ||
| 105 | } | ||
| 106 | } | ||
| 107 | } | ||
| 108 | |||
| 109 | // we have got some non-reflective object. | ||
| 110 | Class dynamicType = javaObject.getClass(); | ||
| 111 | String name = dynamicType.getName(); | ||
| 112 | if (!classShutter.visibleToScripts(name)) { | ||
| 113 | // Object of some sensitive class (such as sun.net.www.* | ||
| 114 | // objects returned from public method of java.net.URL class. | ||
| 115 | // We expose this object as though it is an object of some | ||
| 116 | // super class that is safe for access. | ||
| 117 | |||
| 118 | Class type = null; | ||
| 119 | |||
| 120 | // Whenever a Java Object is wrapped, we are passed with a | ||
| 121 | // staticType which is the type found from environment. For | ||
| 122 | // example, method return type known from signature. The dynamic | ||
| 123 | // type would be the actual Class of the actual returned object. | ||
| 124 | // If the staticType is an interface, we just use that type. | ||
| 125 | if (staticType != null && staticType.isInterface()) { | ||
| 126 | type = staticType; | ||
| 127 | } else { | ||
| 128 | // dynamicType is always a class type and never an interface. | ||
| 129 | // find an accessible super class of the dynamic type. | ||
| 130 | while (dynamicType != null) { | ||
| 131 | dynamicType = dynamicType.getSuperclass(); | ||
| 132 | name = dynamicType.getName(); | ||
| 133 | if (classShutter.visibleToScripts(name)) { | ||
| 134 | type = dynamicType; break; | ||
| 135 | } | ||
| 136 | } | ||
| 137 | // atleast java.lang.Object has to be accessible. So, when | ||
| 138 | // we reach here, type variable should not be null. | ||
| 139 | assert type != null: | ||
| 140 | "even java.lang.Object is not accessible?"; | ||
| 141 | } | ||
| 142 | // create custom wrapper with the 'safe' type. | ||
| 143 | return new RhinoJavaObject(scope, javaObject, type); | ||
| 144 | } else { | ||
| 145 | return super.wrapAsJavaObject(cx, scope, javaObject, staticType); | ||
| 146 | } | ||
| 147 | } | ||
| 148 | } | ||