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| 1 | /* | ||
| 2 | * Copyright (c) 1996, 2011, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. | ||
| 3 | * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | ||
| 6 | * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as | ||
| 7 | * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this | ||
| 8 | * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided | ||
| 9 | * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. | ||
| 10 | * | ||
| 11 | * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT | ||
| 12 | * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or | ||
| 13 | * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License | ||
| 14 | * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that | ||
| 15 | * accompanied this code). | ||
| 16 | * | ||
| 17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version | ||
| 18 | * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, | ||
| 19 | * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. | ||
| 20 | * | ||
| 21 | * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA | ||
| 22 | * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any | ||
| 23 | * questions. | ||
| 24 | */ | ||
| 25 | |||
| 26 | |||
| 27 | package sun.security.ssl; | ||
| 28 | |||
| 29 | import java.io.*; | ||
| 30 | import java.util.*; | ||
| 31 | import java.security.*; | ||
| 32 | import java.security.cert.*; | ||
| 33 | import java.security.interfaces.*; | ||
| 34 | import java.security.spec.ECParameterSpec; | ||
| 35 | |||
| 36 | import javax.crypto.SecretKey; | ||
| 37 | import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec; | ||
| 38 | |||
| 39 | import javax.net.ssl.*; | ||
| 40 | |||
| 41 | import javax.security.auth.Subject; | ||
| 42 | |||
| 43 | import sun.security.ssl.HandshakeMessage.*; | ||
| 44 | import sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.*; | ||
| 45 | import sun.security.ssl.SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.*; | ||
| 46 | import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.*; | ||
| 47 | import static sun.security.ssl.CipherSuite.KeyExchange.*; | ||
| 48 | |||
| 49 | /** | ||
| 50 | * ServerHandshaker does the protocol handshaking from the point | ||
| 51 | * of view of a server. It is driven asychronously by handshake messages | ||
| 52 | * as delivered by the parent Handshaker class, and also uses | ||
| 53 | * common functionality (e.g. key generation) that is provided there. | ||
| 54 | * | ||
| 55 | * @author David Brownell | ||
| 56 | */ | ||
| 57 | final class ServerHandshaker extends Handshaker { | ||
| 58 | |||
| 59 | // is the server going to require the client to authenticate? | ||
| 60 | private byte doClientAuth; | ||
| 61 | |||
| 62 | // our authentication info | ||
| 63 | private X509Certificate[] certs; | ||
| 64 | private PrivateKey privateKey; | ||
| 65 | |||
| 66 | private SecretKey[] kerberosKeys; | ||
| 67 | |||
| 68 | // flag to check for clientCertificateVerify message | ||
| 69 | private boolean needClientVerify = false; | ||
| 70 | |||
| 71 | /* | ||
| 72 | * For exportable ciphersuites using non-exportable key sizes, we use | ||
| 73 | * ephemeral RSA keys. We could also do anonymous RSA in the same way | ||
| 74 | * but there are no such ciphersuites currently defined. | ||
| 75 | */ | ||
| 76 | private PrivateKey tempPrivateKey; | ||
| 77 | private PublicKey tempPublicKey; | ||
| 78 | |||
| 79 | /* | ||
| 80 | * For anonymous and ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange, we use | ||
| 81 | * ephemeral Diffie-Hellman keys. | ||
| 82 | */ | ||
| 83 | private DHCrypt dh; | ||
| 84 | |||
| 85 | // Helper for ECDH based key exchanges | ||
| 86 | private ECDHCrypt ecdh; | ||
| 87 | |||
| 88 | // version request by the client in its ClientHello | ||
| 89 | // we remember it for the RSA premaster secret version check | ||
| 90 | private ProtocolVersion clientRequestedVersion; | ||
| 91 | |||
| 92 | private SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension supportedCurves; | ||
| 93 | |||
| 94 | // the preferable signature algorithm used by ServerKeyExchange message | ||
| 95 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm preferableSignatureAlgorithm; | ||
| 96 | |||
| 97 | /* | ||
| 98 | * Constructor ... use the keys found in the auth context. | ||
| 99 | */ | ||
| 100 | ServerHandshaker(SSLSocketImpl socket, SSLContextImpl context, | ||
| 101 | ProtocolList enabledProtocols, byte clientAuth, | ||
| 102 | ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion, boolean isInitialHandshake, | ||
| 103 | boolean secureRenegotiation, | ||
| 104 | byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) { | ||
| 105 | |||
| 106 | super(socket, context, enabledProtocols, | ||
| 107 | (clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false, | ||
| 108 | activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation, | ||
| 109 | clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData); | ||
| 110 | doClientAuth = clientAuth; | ||
| 111 | } | ||
| 112 | |||
| 113 | /* | ||
| 114 | * Constructor ... use the keys found in the auth context. | ||
| 115 | */ | ||
| 116 | ServerHandshaker(SSLEngineImpl engine, SSLContextImpl context, | ||
| 117 | ProtocolList enabledProtocols, byte clientAuth, | ||
| 118 | ProtocolVersion activeProtocolVersion, | ||
| 119 | boolean isInitialHandshake, boolean secureRenegotiation, | ||
| 120 | byte[] clientVerifyData, byte[] serverVerifyData) { | ||
| 121 | |||
| 122 | super(engine, context, enabledProtocols, | ||
| 123 | (clientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none), false, | ||
| 124 | activeProtocolVersion, isInitialHandshake, secureRenegotiation, | ||
| 125 | clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData); | ||
| 126 | doClientAuth = clientAuth; | ||
| 127 | } | ||
| 128 | |||
| 129 | /* | ||
| 130 | * As long as handshaking has not started, we can change | ||
| 131 | * whether client authentication is required. Otherwise, | ||
| 132 | * we will need to wait for the next handshake. | ||
| 133 | */ | ||
| 134 | void setClientAuth(byte clientAuth) { | ||
| 135 | doClientAuth = clientAuth; | ||
| 136 | } | ||
| 137 | |||
| 138 | /* | ||
| 139 | * This routine handles all the server side handshake messages, one at | ||
| 140 | * a time. Given the message type (and in some cases the pending cipher | ||
| 141 | * spec) it parses the type-specific message. Then it calls a function | ||
| 142 | * that handles that specific message. | ||
| 143 | * | ||
| 144 | * It updates the state machine as each message is processed, and writes | ||
| 145 | * responses as needed using the connection in the constructor. | ||
| 146 | */ | ||
| 147 | void processMessage(byte type, int message_len) | ||
| 148 | throws IOException { | ||
| 149 | // | ||
| 150 | // In SSLv3 and TLS, messages follow strictly increasing | ||
| 151 | // numerical order _except_ for one annoying special case. | ||
| 152 | // | ||
| 153 | if ((state > type) | ||
| 154 | && (state != HandshakeMessage.ht_client_key_exchange | ||
| 155 | && type != HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_verify)) { | ||
| 156 | throw new SSLProtocolException( | ||
| 157 | "Handshake message sequence violation, state = " + state | ||
| 158 | + ", type = " + type); | ||
| 159 | } | ||
| 160 | |||
| 161 | switch (type) { | ||
| 162 | case HandshakeMessage.ht_client_hello: | ||
| 163 | ClientHello ch = new ClientHello(input, message_len); | ||
| 164 | /* | ||
| 165 | * send it off for processing. | ||
| 166 | */ | ||
| 167 | this.clientHello(ch); | ||
| 168 | break; | ||
| 169 | |||
| 170 | case HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate: | ||
| 171 | if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none) { | ||
| 172 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message, | ||
| 173 | "client sent unsolicited cert chain"); | ||
| 174 | // NOTREACHED | ||
| 175 | } | ||
| 176 | this.clientCertificate(new CertificateMsg(input)); | ||
| 177 | break; | ||
| 178 | |||
| 179 | case HandshakeMessage.ht_client_key_exchange: | ||
| 180 | SecretKey preMasterSecret; | ||
| 181 | switch (keyExchange) { | ||
| 182 | case K_RSA: | ||
| 183 | case K_RSA_EXPORT: | ||
| 184 | /* | ||
| 185 | * The client's pre-master secret is decrypted using | ||
| 186 | * either the server's normal private RSA key, or the | ||
| 187 | * temporary one used for non-export or signing-only | ||
| 188 | * certificates/keys. | ||
| 189 | */ | ||
| 190 | RSAClientKeyExchange pms = new RSAClientKeyExchange( | ||
| 191 | protocolVersion, clientRequestedVersion, | ||
| 192 | sslContext.getSecureRandom(), input, | ||
| 193 | message_len, privateKey); | ||
| 194 | preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange(pms); | ||
| 195 | break; | ||
| 196 | case K_KRB5: | ||
| 197 | case K_KRB5_EXPORT: | ||
| 198 | preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange( | ||
| 199 | new KerberosClientKeyExchange(protocolVersion, | ||
| 200 | clientRequestedVersion, | ||
| 201 | sslContext.getSecureRandom(), | ||
| 202 | input, | ||
| 203 | kerberosKeys)); | ||
| 204 | break; | ||
| 205 | case K_DHE_RSA: | ||
| 206 | case K_DHE_DSS: | ||
| 207 | case K_DH_ANON: | ||
| 208 | /* | ||
| 209 | * The pre-master secret is derived using the normal | ||
| 210 | * Diffie-Hellman calculation. Note that the main | ||
| 211 | * protocol difference in these five flavors is in how | ||
| 212 | * the ServerKeyExchange message was constructed! | ||
| 213 | */ | ||
| 214 | preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange( | ||
| 215 | new DHClientKeyExchange(input)); | ||
| 216 | break; | ||
| 217 | case K_ECDH_RSA: | ||
| 218 | case K_ECDH_ECDSA: | ||
| 219 | case K_ECDHE_RSA: | ||
| 220 | case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: | ||
| 221 | case K_ECDH_ANON: | ||
| 222 | preMasterSecret = this.clientKeyExchange | ||
| 223 | (new ECDHClientKeyExchange(input)); | ||
| 224 | break; | ||
| 225 | default: | ||
| 226 | throw new SSLProtocolException | ||
| 227 | ("Unrecognized key exchange: " + keyExchange); | ||
| 228 | } | ||
| 229 | |||
| 230 | // | ||
| 231 | // All keys are calculated from the premaster secret | ||
| 232 | // and the exchanged nonces in the same way. | ||
| 233 | // | ||
| 234 | calculateKeys(preMasterSecret, clientRequestedVersion); | ||
| 235 | break; | ||
| 236 | |||
| 237 | case HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_verify: | ||
| 238 | this.clientCertificateVerify(new CertificateVerify(input, | ||
| 239 | localSupportedSignAlgs, protocolVersion)); | ||
| 240 | break; | ||
| 241 | |||
| 242 | case HandshakeMessage.ht_finished: | ||
| 243 | this.clientFinished( | ||
| 244 | new Finished(protocolVersion, input, cipherSuite)); | ||
| 245 | break; | ||
| 246 | |||
| 247 | default: | ||
| 248 | throw new SSLProtocolException( | ||
| 249 | "Illegal server handshake msg, " + type); | ||
| 250 | } | ||
| 251 | |||
| 252 | // | ||
| 253 | // Move the state machine forward except for that annoying | ||
| 254 | // special case. This means that clients could send extra | ||
| 255 | // cert verify messages; not a problem so long as all of | ||
| 256 | // them actually check out. | ||
| 257 | // | ||
| 258 | if (state < type && type != HandshakeMessage.ht_certificate_verify) { | ||
| 259 | state = type; | ||
| 260 | } | ||
| 261 | } | ||
| 262 | |||
| 263 | |||
| 264 | /* | ||
| 265 | * ClientHello presents the server with a bunch of options, to which the | ||
| 266 | * server replies with a ServerHello listing the ones which this session | ||
| 267 | * will use. If needed, it also writes its Certificate plus in some cases | ||
| 268 | * a ServerKeyExchange message. It may also write a CertificateRequest, | ||
| 269 | * to elicit a client certificate. | ||
| 270 | * | ||
| 271 | * All these messages are terminated by a ServerHelloDone message. In | ||
| 272 | * most cases, all this can be sent in a single Record. | ||
| 273 | */ | ||
| 274 | private void clientHello(ClientHello mesg) throws IOException { | ||
| 275 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 276 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 277 | } | ||
| 278 | |||
| 279 | // Does the message include security renegotiation indication? | ||
| 280 | boolean renegotiationIndicated = false; | ||
| 281 | |||
| 282 | // check the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV | ||
| 283 | CipherSuiteList cipherSuites = mesg.getCipherSuites(); | ||
| 284 | if (cipherSuites.contains(CipherSuite.C_SCSV)) { | ||
| 285 | renegotiationIndicated = true; | ||
| 286 | if (isInitialHandshake) { | ||
| 287 | secureRenegotiation = true; | ||
| 288 | } else { | ||
| 289 | // abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert | ||
| 290 | if (secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 291 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 292 | "The SCSV is present in a secure renegotiation"); | ||
| 293 | } else { | ||
| 294 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 295 | "The SCSV is present in a insecure renegotiation"); | ||
| 296 | } | ||
| 297 | } | ||
| 298 | } | ||
| 299 | |||
| 300 | // check the "renegotiation_info" extension | ||
| 301 | RenegotiationInfoExtension clientHelloRI = (RenegotiationInfoExtension) | ||
| 302 | mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO); | ||
| 303 | if (clientHelloRI != null) { | ||
| 304 | renegotiationIndicated = true; | ||
| 305 | if (isInitialHandshake) { | ||
| 306 | // verify the length of the "renegotiated_connection" field | ||
| 307 | if (!clientHelloRI.isEmpty()) { | ||
| 308 | // abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert | ||
| 309 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 310 | "The renegotiation_info field is not empty"); | ||
| 311 | } | ||
| 312 | |||
| 313 | secureRenegotiation = true; | ||
| 314 | } else { | ||
| 315 | if (!secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 316 | // unexpected RI extension for insecure renegotiation, | ||
| 317 | // abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert | ||
| 318 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 319 | "The renegotiation_info is present in a insecure " + | ||
| 320 | "renegotiation"); | ||
| 321 | } | ||
| 322 | |||
| 323 | // verify the client_verify_data value | ||
| 324 | if (!Arrays.equals(clientVerifyData, | ||
| 325 | clientHelloRI.getRenegotiatedConnection())) { | ||
| 326 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 327 | "Incorrect verify data in ClientHello " + | ||
| 328 | "renegotiation_info message"); | ||
| 329 | } | ||
| 330 | } | ||
| 331 | } else if (!isInitialHandshake && secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 332 | // if the connection's "secure_renegotiation" flag is set to TRUE | ||
| 333 | // and the "renegotiation_info" extension is not present, abort | ||
| 334 | // the handshake. | ||
| 335 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 336 | "Inconsistent secure renegotiation indication"); | ||
| 337 | } | ||
| 338 | |||
| 339 | // if there is no security renegotiation indication or the previous | ||
| 340 | // handshake is insecure. | ||
| 341 | if (!renegotiationIndicated || !secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 342 | if (isInitialHandshake) { | ||
| 343 | if (!allowLegacyHelloMessages) { | ||
| 344 | // abort the handshake with a fatal handshake_failure alert | ||
| 345 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 346 | "Failed to negotiate the use of secure renegotiation"); | ||
| 347 | } | ||
| 348 | |||
| 349 | // continue with legacy ClientHello | ||
| 350 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 351 | System.out.println("Warning: No renegotiation " + | ||
| 352 | "indication in ClientHello, allow legacy ClientHello"); | ||
| 353 | } | ||
| 354 | } else if (!allowUnsafeRenegotiation) { | ||
| 355 | // abort the handshake | ||
| 356 | if (activeProtocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS10.v) { | ||
| 357 | // response with a no_renegotiation warning, | ||
| 358 | warningSE(Alerts.alert_no_renegotiation); | ||
| 359 | |||
| 360 | // invalidate the handshake so that the caller can | ||
| 361 | // dispose this object. | ||
| 362 | invalidated = true; | ||
| 363 | |||
| 364 | // If there is still unread block in the handshake | ||
| 365 | // input stream, it would be truncated with the disposal | ||
| 366 | // and the next handshake message will become incomplete. | ||
| 367 | // | ||
| 368 | // However, according to SSL/TLS specifications, no more | ||
| 369 | // handshake message could immediately follow ClientHello | ||
| 370 | // or HelloRequest. But in case of any improper messages, | ||
| 371 | // we'd better check to ensure there is no remaining bytes | ||
| 372 | // in the handshake input stream. | ||
| 373 | if (input.available() > 0) { | ||
| 374 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_unexpected_message, | ||
| 375 | "ClientHello followed by an unexpected " + | ||
| 376 | "handshake message"); | ||
| 377 | } | ||
| 378 | |||
| 379 | return; | ||
| 380 | } else { | ||
| 381 | // For SSLv3, send the handshake_failure fatal error. | ||
| 382 | // Note that SSLv3 does not define a no_renegotiation | ||
| 383 | // alert like TLSv1. However we cannot ignore the message | ||
| 384 | // simply, otherwise the other side was waiting for a | ||
| 385 | // response that would never come. | ||
| 386 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 387 | "Renegotiation is not allowed"); | ||
| 388 | } | ||
| 389 | } else { // !isInitialHandshake && allowUnsafeRenegotiation | ||
| 390 | // continue with unsafe renegotiation. | ||
| 391 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 392 | System.out.println( | ||
| 393 | "Warning: continue with insecure renegotiation"); | ||
| 394 | } | ||
| 395 | } | ||
| 396 | } | ||
| 397 | |||
| 398 | /* | ||
| 399 | * Always make sure this entire record has been digested before we | ||
| 400 | * start emitting output, to ensure correct digesting order. | ||
| 401 | */ | ||
| 402 | input.digestNow(); | ||
| 403 | |||
| 404 | /* | ||
| 405 | * FIRST, construct the ServerHello using the options and priorities | ||
| 406 | * from the ClientHello. Update the (pending) cipher spec as we do | ||
| 407 | * so, and save the client's version to protect against rollback | ||
| 408 | * attacks. | ||
| 409 | * | ||
| 410 | * There are a bunch of minor tasks here, and one major one: deciding | ||
| 411 | * if the short or the full handshake sequence will be used. | ||
| 412 | */ | ||
| 413 | ServerHello m1 = new ServerHello(); | ||
| 414 | |||
| 415 | clientRequestedVersion = mesg.protocolVersion; | ||
| 416 | |||
| 417 | // select a proper protocol version. | ||
| 418 | ProtocolVersion selectedVersion = | ||
| 419 | selectProtocolVersion(clientRequestedVersion); | ||
| 420 | if (selectedVersion == null || | ||
| 421 | selectedVersion.v == ProtocolVersion.SSL20Hello.v) { | ||
| 422 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 423 | "Client requested protocol " + clientRequestedVersion + | ||
| 424 | " not enabled or not supported"); | ||
| 425 | } | ||
| 426 | |||
| 427 | handshakeHash.protocolDetermined(selectedVersion); | ||
| 428 | setVersion(selectedVersion); | ||
| 429 | |||
| 430 | m1.protocolVersion = protocolVersion; | ||
| 431 | |||
| 432 | // | ||
| 433 | // random ... save client and server values for later use | ||
| 434 | // in computing the master secret (from pre-master secret) | ||
| 435 | // and thence the other crypto keys. | ||
| 436 | // | ||
| 437 | // NOTE: this use of three inputs to generating _each_ set | ||
| 438 | // of ciphers slows things down, but it does increase the | ||
| 439 | // security since each connection in the session can hold | ||
| 440 | // its own authenticated (and strong) keys. One could make | ||
| 441 | // creation of a session a rare thing... | ||
| 442 | // | ||
| 443 | clnt_random = mesg.clnt_random; | ||
| 444 | svr_random = new RandomCookie(sslContext.getSecureRandom()); | ||
| 445 | m1.svr_random = svr_random; | ||
| 446 | |||
| 447 | session = null; // forget about the current session | ||
| 448 | // | ||
| 449 | // Here we go down either of two paths: (a) the fast one, where | ||
| 450 | // the client's asked to rejoin an existing session, and the server | ||
| 451 | // permits this; (b) the other one, where a new session is created. | ||
| 452 | // | ||
| 453 | if (mesg.sessionId.length() != 0) { | ||
| 454 | // client is trying to resume a session, let's see... | ||
| 455 | |||
| 456 | SSLSessionImpl previous = ((SSLSessionContextImpl)sslContext | ||
| 457 | .engineGetServerSessionContext()) | ||
| 458 | .get(mesg.sessionId.getId()); | ||
| 459 | // | ||
| 460 | // Check if we can use the fast path, resuming a session. We | ||
| 461 | // can do so iff we have a valid record for that session, and | ||
| 462 | // the cipher suite for that session was on the list which the | ||
| 463 | // client requested, and if we're not forgetting any needed | ||
| 464 | // authentication on the part of the client. | ||
| 465 | // | ||
| 466 | if (previous != null) { | ||
| 467 | resumingSession = previous.isRejoinable(); | ||
| 468 | |||
| 469 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 470 | ProtocolVersion oldVersion = previous.getProtocolVersion(); | ||
| 471 | // cannot resume session with different version | ||
| 472 | if (oldVersion != protocolVersion) { | ||
| 473 | resumingSession = false; | ||
| 474 | } | ||
| 475 | } | ||
| 476 | |||
| 477 | if (resumingSession && | ||
| 478 | (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required)) { | ||
| 479 | try { | ||
| 480 | previous.getPeerPrincipal(); | ||
| 481 | } catch (SSLPeerUnverifiedException e) { | ||
| 482 | resumingSession = false; | ||
| 483 | } | ||
| 484 | } | ||
| 485 | |||
| 486 | // validate subject identity | ||
| 487 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 488 | CipherSuite suite = previous.getSuite(); | ||
| 489 | if (suite.keyExchange == K_KRB5 || | ||
| 490 | suite.keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) { | ||
| 491 | Principal localPrincipal = previous.getLocalPrincipal(); | ||
| 492 | |||
| 493 | Subject subject = null; | ||
| 494 | try { | ||
| 495 | subject = AccessController.doPrivileged( | ||
| 496 | new PrivilegedExceptionAction<Subject>() { | ||
| 497 | public Subject run() throws Exception { | ||
| 498 | return | ||
| 499 | Krb5Helper.getServerSubject(getAccSE()); | ||
| 500 | }}); | ||
| 501 | } catch (PrivilegedActionException e) { | ||
| 502 | subject = null; | ||
| 503 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { | ||
| 504 | System.out.println("Attempt to obtain" + | ||
| 505 | " subject failed!"); | ||
| 506 | } | ||
| 507 | } | ||
| 508 | |||
| 509 | if (subject != null) { | ||
| 510 | // Eliminate dependency on KerberosPrincipal | ||
| 511 | Set<Principal> principals = | ||
| 512 | subject.getPrincipals(Principal.class); | ||
| 513 | if (!principals.contains(localPrincipal)) { | ||
| 514 | resumingSession = false; | ||
| 515 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { | ||
| 516 | System.out.println("Subject identity" + | ||
| 517 | " is not the same"); | ||
| 518 | } | ||
| 519 | } else { | ||
| 520 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) | ||
| 521 | System.out.println("Subject identity" + | ||
| 522 | " is same"); | ||
| 523 | } | ||
| 524 | } else { | ||
| 525 | resumingSession = false; | ||
| 526 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) | ||
| 527 | System.out.println("Kerberos credentials are" + | ||
| 528 | " not present in the current Subject;" + | ||
| 529 | " check if " + | ||
| 530 | " javax.security.auth.useSubjectAsCreds" + | ||
| 531 | " system property has been set to false"); | ||
| 532 | } | ||
| 533 | } | ||
| 534 | } | ||
| 535 | |||
| 536 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 537 | CipherSuite suite = previous.getSuite(); | ||
| 538 | // verify that the ciphersuite from the cached session | ||
| 539 | // is in the list of client requested ciphersuites and | ||
| 540 | // we have it enabled | ||
| 541 | if ((isNegotiable(suite) == false) || | ||
| 542 | (mesg.getCipherSuites().contains(suite) == false)) { | ||
| 543 | resumingSession = false; | ||
| 544 | } else { | ||
| 545 | // everything looks ok, set the ciphersuite | ||
| 546 | // this should be done last when we are sure we | ||
| 547 | // will resume | ||
| 548 | setCipherSuite(suite); | ||
| 549 | } | ||
| 550 | } | ||
| 551 | |||
| 552 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 553 | session = previous; | ||
| 554 | if (debug != null && | ||
| 555 | (Debug.isOn("handshake") || Debug.isOn("session"))) { | ||
| 556 | System.out.println("%% Resuming " + session); | ||
| 557 | } | ||
| 558 | } | ||
| 559 | } | ||
| 560 | } // else client did not try to resume | ||
| 561 | |||
| 562 | // | ||
| 563 | // If client hasn't specified a session we can resume, start a | ||
| 564 | // new one and choose its cipher suite and compression options. | ||
| 565 | // Unless new session creation is disabled for this connection! | ||
| 566 | // | ||
| 567 | if (session == null) { | ||
| 568 | if (!enableNewSession) { | ||
| 569 | throw new SSLException("Client did not resume a session"); | ||
| 570 | } | ||
| 571 | |||
| 572 | supportedCurves = (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension) | ||
| 573 | mesg.extensions.get(ExtensionType.EXT_ELLIPTIC_CURVES); | ||
| 574 | |||
| 575 | // We only need to handle the "signature_algorithm" extension | ||
| 576 | // for full handshakes and TLS 1.2 or later. | ||
| 577 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 578 | SignatureAlgorithmsExtension signAlgs = | ||
| 579 | (SignatureAlgorithmsExtension)mesg.extensions.get( | ||
| 580 | ExtensionType.EXT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); | ||
| 581 | if (signAlgs != null) { | ||
| 582 | Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> peerSignAlgs = | ||
| 583 | signAlgs.getSignAlgorithms(); | ||
| 584 | if (peerSignAlgs == null || peerSignAlgs.isEmpty()) { | ||
| 585 | throw new SSLHandshakeException( | ||
| 586 | "No peer supported signature algorithms"); | ||
| 587 | } | ||
| 588 | |||
| 589 | Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> | ||
| 590 | supportedPeerSignAlgs = | ||
| 591 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getSupportedAlgorithms( | ||
| 592 | peerSignAlgs); | ||
| 593 | if (supportedPeerSignAlgs.isEmpty()) { | ||
| 594 | throw new SSLHandshakeException( | ||
| 595 | "No supported signature and hash algorithm " + | ||
| 596 | "in common"); | ||
| 597 | } | ||
| 598 | |||
| 599 | setPeerSupportedSignAlgs(supportedPeerSignAlgs); | ||
| 600 | } // else, need to use peer implicit supported signature algs | ||
| 601 | } | ||
| 602 | |||
| 603 | session = new SSLSessionImpl(protocolVersion, CipherSuite.C_NULL, | ||
| 604 | getLocalSupportedSignAlgs(), | ||
| 605 | sslContext.getSecureRandom(), | ||
| 606 | getHostAddressSE(), getPortSE()); | ||
| 607 | |||
| 608 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 609 | if (peerSupportedSignAlgs != null) { | ||
| 610 | session.setPeerSupportedSignatureAlgorithms( | ||
| 611 | peerSupportedSignAlgs); | ||
| 612 | } // else, we will set the implicit peer supported signature | ||
| 613 | // algorithms in chooseCipherSuite() | ||
| 614 | } | ||
| 615 | |||
| 616 | // set the handshake session | ||
| 617 | setHandshakeSessionSE(session); | ||
| 618 | |||
| 619 | // choose cipher suite and corresponding private key | ||
| 620 | chooseCipherSuite(mesg); | ||
| 621 | |||
| 622 | session.setSuite(cipherSuite); | ||
| 623 | session.setLocalPrivateKey(privateKey); | ||
| 624 | |||
| 625 | // chooseCompression(mesg); | ||
| 626 | } else { | ||
| 627 | // set the handshake session | ||
| 628 | setHandshakeSessionSE(session); | ||
| 629 | } | ||
| 630 | |||
| 631 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 632 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 633 | handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(null); | ||
| 634 | } | ||
| 635 | handshakeHash.setFinishedAlg(cipherSuite.prfAlg.getPRFHashAlg()); | ||
| 636 | } | ||
| 637 | |||
| 638 | m1.cipherSuite = cipherSuite; | ||
| 639 | m1.sessionId = session.getSessionId(); | ||
| 640 | m1.compression_method = session.getCompression(); | ||
| 641 | |||
| 642 | if (secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 643 | // For ServerHellos that are initial handshakes, then the | ||
| 644 | // "renegotiated_connection" field in "renegotiation_info" | ||
| 645 | // extension is of zero length. | ||
| 646 | // | ||
| 647 | // For ServerHellos that are renegotiating, this field contains | ||
| 648 | // the concatenation of client_verify_data and server_verify_data. | ||
| 649 | // | ||
| 650 | // Note that for initial handshakes, both the clientVerifyData | ||
| 651 | // variable and serverVerifyData variable are of zero length. | ||
| 652 | HelloExtension serverHelloRI = new RenegotiationInfoExtension( | ||
| 653 | clientVerifyData, serverVerifyData); | ||
| 654 | m1.extensions.add(serverHelloRI); | ||
| 655 | } | ||
| 656 | |||
| 657 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 658 | m1.print(System.out); | ||
| 659 | System.out.println("Cipher suite: " + session.getSuite()); | ||
| 660 | } | ||
| 661 | m1.write(output); | ||
| 662 | |||
| 663 | // | ||
| 664 | // If we are resuming a session, we finish writing handshake | ||
| 665 | // messages right now and then finish. | ||
| 666 | // | ||
| 667 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 668 | calculateConnectionKeys(session.getMasterSecret()); | ||
| 669 | sendChangeCipherAndFinish(false); | ||
| 670 | return; | ||
| 671 | } | ||
| 672 | |||
| 673 | |||
| 674 | /* | ||
| 675 | * SECOND, write the server Certificate(s) if we need to. | ||
| 676 | * | ||
| 677 | * NOTE: while an "anonymous RSA" mode is explicitly allowed by | ||
| 678 | * the protocol, we can't support it since all of the SSL flavors | ||
| 679 | * defined in the protocol spec are explicitly stated to require | ||
| 680 | * using RSA certificates. | ||
| 681 | */ | ||
| 682 | if (keyExchange == K_KRB5 || keyExchange == K_KRB5_EXPORT) { | ||
| 683 | // Server certificates are omitted for Kerberos ciphers | ||
| 684 | |||
| 685 | } else if ((keyExchange != K_DH_ANON) && (keyExchange != K_ECDH_ANON)) { | ||
| 686 | if (certs == null) { | ||
| 687 | throw new RuntimeException("no certificates"); | ||
| 688 | } | ||
| 689 | |||
| 690 | CertificateMsg m2 = new CertificateMsg(certs); | ||
| 691 | |||
| 692 | /* | ||
| 693 | * Set local certs in the SSLSession, output | ||
| 694 | * debug info, and then actually write to the client. | ||
| 695 | */ | ||
| 696 | session.setLocalCertificates(certs); | ||
| 697 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 698 | m2.print(System.out); | ||
| 699 | } | ||
| 700 | m2.write(output); | ||
| 701 | |||
| 702 | // XXX has some side effects with OS TCP buffering, | ||
| 703 | // leave it out for now | ||
| 704 | |||
| 705 | // let client verify chain in the meantime... | ||
| 706 | // output.flush(); | ||
| 707 | } else { | ||
| 708 | if (certs != null) { | ||
| 709 | throw new RuntimeException("anonymous keyexchange with certs"); | ||
| 710 | } | ||
| 711 | } | ||
| 712 | |||
| 713 | /* | ||
| 714 | * THIRD, the ServerKeyExchange message ... iff it's needed. | ||
| 715 | * | ||
| 716 | * It's usually needed unless there's an encryption-capable | ||
| 717 | * RSA cert, or a D-H cert. The notable exception is that | ||
| 718 | * exportable ciphers used with big RSA keys need to downgrade | ||
| 719 | * to use short RSA keys, even when the key/cert encrypts OK. | ||
| 720 | */ | ||
| 721 | |||
| 722 | ServerKeyExchange m3; | ||
| 723 | switch (keyExchange) { | ||
| 724 | case K_RSA: | ||
| 725 | case K_KRB5: | ||
| 726 | case K_KRB5_EXPORT: | ||
| 727 | // no server key exchange for RSA or KRB5 ciphersuites | ||
| 728 | m3 = null; | ||
| 729 | break; | ||
| 730 | case K_RSA_EXPORT: | ||
| 731 | if (JsseJce.getRSAKeyLength(certs[0].getPublicKey()) > 512) { | ||
| 732 | try { | ||
| 733 | m3 = new RSA_ServerKeyExchange( | ||
| 734 | tempPublicKey, privateKey, | ||
| 735 | clnt_random, svr_random, | ||
| 736 | sslContext.getSecureRandom()); | ||
| 737 | privateKey = tempPrivateKey; | ||
| 738 | } catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { | ||
| 739 | throwSSLException | ||
| 740 | ("Error generating RSA server key exchange", e); | ||
| 741 | m3 = null; // make compiler happy | ||
| 742 | } | ||
| 743 | } else { | ||
| 744 | // RSA_EXPORT with short key, don't need ServerKeyExchange | ||
| 745 | m3 = null; | ||
| 746 | } | ||
| 747 | break; | ||
| 748 | case K_DHE_RSA: | ||
| 749 | case K_DHE_DSS: | ||
| 750 | try { | ||
| 751 | m3 = new DH_ServerKeyExchange(dh, | ||
| 752 | privateKey, | ||
| 753 | clnt_random.random_bytes, | ||
| 754 | svr_random.random_bytes, | ||
| 755 | sslContext.getSecureRandom(), | ||
| 756 | preferableSignatureAlgorithm, | ||
| 757 | protocolVersion); | ||
| 758 | } catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { | ||
| 759 | throwSSLException("Error generating DH server key exchange", e); | ||
| 760 | m3 = null; // make compiler happy | ||
| 761 | } | ||
| 762 | break; | ||
| 763 | case K_DH_ANON: | ||
| 764 | m3 = new DH_ServerKeyExchange(dh, protocolVersion); | ||
| 765 | break; | ||
| 766 | case K_ECDHE_RSA: | ||
| 767 | case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: | ||
| 768 | case K_ECDH_ANON: | ||
| 769 | try { | ||
| 770 | m3 = new ECDH_ServerKeyExchange(ecdh, | ||
| 771 | privateKey, | ||
| 772 | clnt_random.random_bytes, | ||
| 773 | svr_random.random_bytes, | ||
| 774 | sslContext.getSecureRandom(), | ||
| 775 | preferableSignatureAlgorithm, | ||
| 776 | protocolVersion); | ||
| 777 | } catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { | ||
| 778 | throwSSLException( | ||
| 779 | "Error generating ECDH server key exchange", e); | ||
| 780 | m3 = null; // make compiler happy | ||
| 781 | } | ||
| 782 | break; | ||
| 783 | case K_ECDH_RSA: | ||
| 784 | case K_ECDH_ECDSA: | ||
| 785 | // ServerKeyExchange not used for fixed ECDH | ||
| 786 | m3 = null; | ||
| 787 | break; | ||
| 788 | default: | ||
| 789 | throw new RuntimeException("internal error: " + keyExchange); | ||
| 790 | } | ||
| 791 | if (m3 != null) { | ||
| 792 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 793 | m3.print(System.out); | ||
| 794 | } | ||
| 795 | m3.write(output); | ||
| 796 | } | ||
| 797 | |||
| 798 | // | ||
| 799 | // FOURTH, the CertificateRequest message. The details of | ||
| 800 | // the message can be affected by the key exchange algorithm | ||
| 801 | // in use. For example, certs with fixed Diffie-Hellman keys | ||
| 802 | // are only useful with the DH_DSS and DH_RSA key exchange | ||
| 803 | // algorithms. | ||
| 804 | // | ||
| 805 | // Needed only if server requires client to authenticate self. | ||
| 806 | // Illegal for anonymous flavors, so we need to check that. | ||
| 807 | // | ||
| 808 | // CertificateRequest is omitted for Kerberos ciphers | ||
| 809 | if (doClientAuth != SSLEngineImpl.clauth_none && | ||
| 810 | keyExchange != K_DH_ANON && keyExchange != K_ECDH_ANON && | ||
| 811 | keyExchange != K_KRB5 && keyExchange != K_KRB5_EXPORT) { | ||
| 812 | |||
| 813 | CertificateRequest m4; | ||
| 814 | X509Certificate caCerts[]; | ||
| 815 | |||
| 816 | Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> localSignAlgs = null; | ||
| 817 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 818 | // We currently use all local upported signature and hash | ||
| 819 | // algorithms. However, to minimize the computation cost | ||
| 820 | // of requested hash algorithms, we may use a restricted | ||
| 821 | // set of signature algorithms in the future. | ||
| 822 | localSignAlgs = getLocalSupportedSignAlgs(); | ||
| 823 | if (localSignAlgs.isEmpty()) { | ||
| 824 | throw new SSLHandshakeException( | ||
| 825 | "No supported signature algorithm"); | ||
| 826 | } | ||
| 827 | |||
| 828 | Set<String> localHashAlgs = | ||
| 829 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getHashAlgorithmNames( | ||
| 830 | localSignAlgs); | ||
| 831 | if (localHashAlgs.isEmpty()) { | ||
| 832 | throw new SSLHandshakeException( | ||
| 833 | "No supported signature algorithm"); | ||
| 834 | } | ||
| 835 | handshakeHash.restrictCertificateVerifyAlgs(localHashAlgs); | ||
| 836 | } | ||
| 837 | |||
| 838 | caCerts = sslContext.getX509TrustManager().getAcceptedIssuers(); | ||
| 839 | m4 = new CertificateRequest(caCerts, keyExchange, | ||
| 840 | localSignAlgs, protocolVersion); | ||
| 841 | |||
| 842 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 843 | m4.print(System.out); | ||
| 844 | } | ||
| 845 | m4.write(output); | ||
| 846 | } else { | ||
| 847 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 848 | handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(null); | ||
| 849 | } | ||
| 850 | } | ||
| 851 | |||
| 852 | /* | ||
| 853 | * FIFTH, say ServerHelloDone. | ||
| 854 | */ | ||
| 855 | ServerHelloDone m5 = new ServerHelloDone(); | ||
| 856 | |||
| 857 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 858 | m5.print(System.out); | ||
| 859 | } | ||
| 860 | m5.write(output); | ||
| 861 | |||
| 862 | /* | ||
| 863 | * Flush any buffered messages so the client will see them. | ||
| 864 | * Ideally, all the messages above go in a single network level | ||
| 865 | * message to the client. Without big Certificate chains, it's | ||
| 866 | * going to be the common case. | ||
| 867 | */ | ||
| 868 | output.flush(); | ||
| 869 | } | ||
| 870 | |||
| 871 | /* | ||
| 872 | * Choose cipher suite from among those supported by client. Sets | ||
| 873 | * the cipherSuite and keyExchange variables. | ||
| 874 | */ | ||
| 875 | private void chooseCipherSuite(ClientHello mesg) throws IOException { | ||
| 876 | for (CipherSuite suite : mesg.getCipherSuites().collection()) { | ||
| 877 | if (isNegotiable(suite) == false) { | ||
| 878 | continue; | ||
| 879 | } | ||
| 880 | |||
| 881 | if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required) { | ||
| 882 | if ((suite.keyExchange == K_DH_ANON) || | ||
| 883 | (suite.keyExchange == K_ECDH_ANON)) { | ||
| 884 | continue; | ||
| 885 | } | ||
| 886 | } | ||
| 887 | if (trySetCipherSuite(suite) == false) { | ||
| 888 | continue; | ||
| 889 | } | ||
| 890 | return; | ||
| 891 | } | ||
| 892 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 893 | "no cipher suites in common"); | ||
| 894 | } | ||
| 895 | |||
| 896 | /** | ||
| 897 | * Set the given CipherSuite, if possible. Return the result. | ||
| 898 | * The call succeeds if the CipherSuite is available and we have | ||
| 899 | * the necessary certificates to complete the handshake. We don't | ||
| 900 | * check if the CipherSuite is actually enabled. | ||
| 901 | * | ||
| 902 | * If successful, this method also generates ephemeral keys if | ||
| 903 | * required for this ciphersuite. This may take some time, so this | ||
| 904 | * method should only be called if you really want to use the | ||
| 905 | * CipherSuite. | ||
| 906 | * | ||
| 907 | * This method is called from chooseCipherSuite() in this class. | ||
| 908 | */ | ||
| 909 | boolean trySetCipherSuite(CipherSuite suite) { | ||
| 910 | /* | ||
| 911 | * If we're resuming a session we know we can | ||
| 912 | * support this key exchange algorithm and in fact | ||
| 913 | * have already cached the result of it in | ||
| 914 | * the session state. | ||
| 915 | */ | ||
| 916 | if (resumingSession) { | ||
| 917 | return true; | ||
| 918 | } | ||
| 919 | |||
| 920 | if (suite.isNegotiable() == false) { | ||
| 921 | return false; | ||
| 922 | } | ||
| 923 | |||
| 924 | // must not negotiate the obsoleted weak cipher suites. | ||
| 925 | if (protocolVersion.v >= suite.obsoleted) { | ||
| 926 | return false; | ||
| 927 | } | ||
| 928 | |||
| 929 | // must not negotiate unsupported cipher suites. | ||
| 930 | if (protocolVersion.v < suite.supported) { | ||
| 931 | return false; | ||
| 932 | } | ||
| 933 | |||
| 934 | KeyExchange keyExchange = suite.keyExchange; | ||
| 935 | |||
| 936 | // null out any existing references | ||
| 937 | privateKey = null; | ||
| 938 | certs = null; | ||
| 939 | dh = null; | ||
| 940 | tempPrivateKey = null; | ||
| 941 | tempPublicKey = null; | ||
| 942 | |||
| 943 | Collection<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm> supportedSignAlgs = null; | ||
| 944 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 945 | if (peerSupportedSignAlgs != null) { | ||
| 946 | supportedSignAlgs = peerSupportedSignAlgs; | ||
| 947 | } else { | ||
| 948 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm = null; | ||
| 949 | |||
| 950 | // we may optimize the performance | ||
| 951 | switch (keyExchange) { | ||
| 952 | // If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of | ||
| 953 | // (RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), | ||
| 954 | // behave as if client had sent the value {sha1,rsa}. | ||
| 955 | case K_RSA: | ||
| 956 | case K_DHE_RSA: | ||
| 957 | case K_DH_RSA: | ||
| 958 | // case K_RSA_PSK: | ||
| 959 | case K_ECDH_RSA: | ||
| 960 | case K_ECDHE_RSA: | ||
| 961 | algorithm = SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.valueOf( | ||
| 962 | HashAlgorithm.SHA1.value, | ||
| 963 | SignatureAlgorithm.RSA.value, 0); | ||
| 964 | break; | ||
| 965 | // If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of | ||
| 966 | // (DHE_DSS, DH_DSS), behave as if the client had | ||
| 967 | // sent the value {sha1,dsa}. | ||
| 968 | case K_DHE_DSS: | ||
| 969 | case K_DH_DSS: | ||
| 970 | algorithm = SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.valueOf( | ||
| 971 | HashAlgorithm.SHA1.value, | ||
| 972 | SignatureAlgorithm.DSA.value, 0); | ||
| 973 | break; | ||
| 974 | // If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of | ||
| 975 | // (ECDH_ECDSA, ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client | ||
| 976 | // had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}. | ||
| 977 | case K_ECDH_ECDSA: | ||
| 978 | case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: | ||
| 979 | algorithm = SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.valueOf( | ||
| 980 | HashAlgorithm.SHA1.value, | ||
| 981 | SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA.value, 0); | ||
| 982 | break; | ||
| 983 | default: | ||
| 984 | // no peer supported signature algorithms | ||
| 985 | } | ||
| 986 | |||
| 987 | if (algorithm == null) { | ||
| 988 | supportedSignAlgs = | ||
| 989 | Collections.<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm>emptySet(); | ||
| 990 | } else { | ||
| 991 | supportedSignAlgs = | ||
| 992 | new ArrayList<SignatureAndHashAlgorithm>(1); | ||
| 993 | supportedSignAlgs.add(algorithm); | ||
| 994 | } | ||
| 995 | |||
| 996 | // Sets the peer supported signature algorithm to use in KM | ||
| 997 | // temporarily. | ||
| 998 | session.setPeerSupportedSignatureAlgorithms(supportedSignAlgs); | ||
| 999 | } | ||
| 1000 | } | ||
| 1001 | |||
| 1002 | switch (keyExchange) { | ||
| 1003 | case K_RSA: | ||
| 1004 | // need RSA certs for authentication | ||
| 1005 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { | ||
| 1006 | return false; | ||
| 1007 | } | ||
| 1008 | break; | ||
| 1009 | case K_RSA_EXPORT: | ||
| 1010 | // need RSA certs for authentication | ||
| 1011 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { | ||
| 1012 | return false; | ||
| 1013 | } | ||
| 1014 | |||
| 1015 | try { | ||
| 1016 | if (JsseJce.getRSAKeyLength(certs[0].getPublicKey()) > 512) { | ||
| 1017 | if (!setupEphemeralRSAKeys(suite.exportable)) { | ||
| 1018 | return false; | ||
| 1019 | } | ||
| 1020 | } | ||
| 1021 | } catch (RuntimeException e) { | ||
| 1022 | // could not determine keylength, ignore key | ||
| 1023 | return false; | ||
| 1024 | } | ||
| 1025 | break; | ||
| 1026 | case K_DHE_RSA: | ||
| 1027 | // get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange | ||
| 1028 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1029 | preferableSignatureAlgorithm = | ||
| 1030 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( | ||
| 1031 | supportedSignAlgs, "RSA"); | ||
| 1032 | if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { | ||
| 1033 | return false; | ||
| 1034 | } | ||
| 1035 | } | ||
| 1036 | |||
| 1037 | // need RSA certs for authentication | ||
| 1038 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { | ||
| 1039 | return false; | ||
| 1040 | } | ||
| 1041 | setupEphemeralDHKeys(suite.exportable); | ||
| 1042 | break; | ||
| 1043 | case K_ECDHE_RSA: | ||
| 1044 | // get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange | ||
| 1045 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1046 | preferableSignatureAlgorithm = | ||
| 1047 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( | ||
| 1048 | supportedSignAlgs, "RSA"); | ||
| 1049 | if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { | ||
| 1050 | return false; | ||
| 1051 | } | ||
| 1052 | } | ||
| 1053 | |||
| 1054 | // need RSA certs for authentication | ||
| 1055 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("RSA") == false) { | ||
| 1056 | return false; | ||
| 1057 | } | ||
| 1058 | if (setupEphemeralECDHKeys() == false) { | ||
| 1059 | return false; | ||
| 1060 | } | ||
| 1061 | break; | ||
| 1062 | case K_DHE_DSS: | ||
| 1063 | // get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange | ||
| 1064 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1065 | preferableSignatureAlgorithm = | ||
| 1066 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( | ||
| 1067 | supportedSignAlgs, "DSA"); | ||
| 1068 | if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { | ||
| 1069 | return false; | ||
| 1070 | } | ||
| 1071 | } | ||
| 1072 | |||
| 1073 | // need DSS certs for authentication | ||
| 1074 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("DSA") == false) { | ||
| 1075 | return false; | ||
| 1076 | } | ||
| 1077 | setupEphemeralDHKeys(suite.exportable); | ||
| 1078 | break; | ||
| 1079 | case K_ECDHE_ECDSA: | ||
| 1080 | // get preferable peer signature algorithm for server key exchange | ||
| 1081 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1082 | preferableSignatureAlgorithm = | ||
| 1083 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getPreferableAlgorithm( | ||
| 1084 | supportedSignAlgs, "ECDSA"); | ||
| 1085 | if (preferableSignatureAlgorithm == null) { | ||
| 1086 | return false; | ||
| 1087 | } | ||
| 1088 | } | ||
| 1089 | |||
| 1090 | // need EC cert signed using EC | ||
| 1091 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("EC_EC") == false) { | ||
| 1092 | return false; | ||
| 1093 | } | ||
| 1094 | if (setupEphemeralECDHKeys() == false) { | ||
| 1095 | return false; | ||
| 1096 | } | ||
| 1097 | break; | ||
| 1098 | case K_ECDH_RSA: | ||
| 1099 | // need EC cert signed using RSA | ||
| 1100 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("EC_RSA") == false) { | ||
| 1101 | return false; | ||
| 1102 | } | ||
| 1103 | setupStaticECDHKeys(); | ||
| 1104 | break; | ||
| 1105 | case K_ECDH_ECDSA: | ||
| 1106 | // need EC cert signed using EC | ||
| 1107 | if (setupPrivateKeyAndChain("EC_EC") == false) { | ||
| 1108 | return false; | ||
| 1109 | } | ||
| 1110 | setupStaticECDHKeys(); | ||
| 1111 | break; | ||
| 1112 | case K_KRB5: | ||
| 1113 | case K_KRB5_EXPORT: | ||
| 1114 | // need Kerberos Key | ||
| 1115 | if (!setupKerberosKeys()) { | ||
| 1116 | return false; | ||
| 1117 | } | ||
| 1118 | break; | ||
| 1119 | case K_DH_ANON: | ||
| 1120 | // no certs needed for anonymous | ||
| 1121 | setupEphemeralDHKeys(suite.exportable); | ||
| 1122 | break; | ||
| 1123 | case K_ECDH_ANON: | ||
| 1124 | // no certs needed for anonymous | ||
| 1125 | if (setupEphemeralECDHKeys() == false) { | ||
| 1126 | return false; | ||
| 1127 | } | ||
| 1128 | break; | ||
| 1129 | default: | ||
| 1130 | // internal error, unknown key exchange | ||
| 1131 | throw new RuntimeException("Unrecognized cipherSuite: " + suite); | ||
| 1132 | } | ||
| 1133 | setCipherSuite(suite); | ||
| 1134 | |||
| 1135 | // set the peer implicit supported signature algorithms | ||
| 1136 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1137 | if (peerSupportedSignAlgs == null) { | ||
| 1138 | setPeerSupportedSignAlgs(supportedSignAlgs); | ||
| 1139 | // we had alreay update the session | ||
| 1140 | } | ||
| 1141 | } | ||
| 1142 | return true; | ||
| 1143 | } | ||
| 1144 | |||
| 1145 | /* | ||
| 1146 | * Get some "ephemeral" RSA keys for this context. This means | ||
| 1147 | * generating them if it's not already been done. | ||
| 1148 | * | ||
| 1149 | * Note that we currently do not implement any ciphersuites that use | ||
| 1150 | * strong ephemeral RSA. (We do not support the EXPORT1024 ciphersuites | ||
| 1151 | * and standard RSA ciphersuites prohibit ephemeral mode for some reason) | ||
| 1152 | * This means that export is always true and 512 bit keys are generated. | ||
| 1153 | */ | ||
| 1154 | private boolean setupEphemeralRSAKeys(boolean export) { | ||
| 1155 | KeyPair kp = sslContext.getEphemeralKeyManager(). | ||
| 1156 | getRSAKeyPair(export, sslContext.getSecureRandom()); | ||
| 1157 | if (kp == null) { | ||
| 1158 | return false; | ||
| 1159 | } else { | ||
| 1160 | tempPublicKey = kp.getPublic(); | ||
| 1161 | tempPrivateKey = kp.getPrivate(); | ||
| 1162 | return true; | ||
| 1163 | } | ||
| 1164 | } | ||
| 1165 | |||
| 1166 | /* | ||
| 1167 | * Acquire some "ephemeral" Diffie-Hellman keys for this handshake. | ||
| 1168 | * We don't reuse these, for improved forward secrecy. | ||
| 1169 | */ | ||
| 1170 | private void setupEphemeralDHKeys(boolean export) { | ||
| 1171 | /* | ||
| 1172 | * Diffie-Hellman keys ... we use 768 bit private keys due | ||
| 1173 | * to the "use twice as many key bits as bits you want secret" | ||
| 1174 | * rule of thumb, assuming we want the same size premaster | ||
| 1175 | * secret with Diffie-Hellman and RSA key exchanges. Except | ||
| 1176 | * that exportable ciphers max out at 512 bits modulus values. | ||
| 1177 | */ | ||
| 1178 | dh = new DHCrypt((export ? 512 : 768), sslContext.getSecureRandom()); | ||
| 1179 | } | ||
| 1180 | |||
| 1181 | // Setup the ephemeral ECDH parameters. | ||
| 1182 | // If we cannot continue because we do not support any of the curves that | ||
| 1183 | // the client requested, return false. Otherwise (all is well), return true. | ||
| 1184 | private boolean setupEphemeralECDHKeys() { | ||
| 1185 | int index = -1; | ||
| 1186 | if (supportedCurves != null) { | ||
| 1187 | // if the client sent the supported curves extension, pick the | ||
| 1188 | // first one that we support; | ||
| 1189 | for (int curveId : supportedCurves.curveIds()) { | ||
| 1190 | if (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.isSupported(curveId)) { | ||
| 1191 | index = curveId; | ||
| 1192 | break; | ||
| 1193 | } | ||
| 1194 | } | ||
| 1195 | if (index < 0) { | ||
| 1196 | // no match found, cannot use this ciphersuite | ||
| 1197 | return false; | ||
| 1198 | } | ||
| 1199 | } else { | ||
| 1200 | // pick our preference | ||
| 1201 | index = SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.DEFAULT.curveIds()[0]; | ||
| 1202 | } | ||
| 1203 | String oid = SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.getCurveOid(index); | ||
| 1204 | ecdh = new ECDHCrypt(oid, sslContext.getSecureRandom()); | ||
| 1205 | return true; | ||
| 1206 | } | ||
| 1207 | |||
| 1208 | private void setupStaticECDHKeys() { | ||
| 1209 | // don't need to check whether the curve is supported, already done | ||
| 1210 | // in setupPrivateKeyAndChain(). | ||
| 1211 | ecdh = new ECDHCrypt(privateKey, certs[0].getPublicKey()); | ||
| 1212 | } | ||
| 1213 | |||
| 1214 | /** | ||
| 1215 | * Retrieve the server key and certificate for the specified algorithm | ||
| 1216 | * from the KeyManager and set the instance variables. | ||
| 1217 | * | ||
| 1218 | * @return true if successful, false if not available or invalid | ||
| 1219 | */ | ||
| 1220 | private boolean setupPrivateKeyAndChain(String algorithm) { | ||
| 1221 | X509ExtendedKeyManager km = sslContext.getX509KeyManager(); | ||
| 1222 | String alias; | ||
| 1223 | if (conn != null) { | ||
| 1224 | alias = km.chooseServerAlias(algorithm, null, conn); | ||
| 1225 | } else { | ||
| 1226 | alias = km.chooseEngineServerAlias(algorithm, null, engine); | ||
| 1227 | } | ||
| 1228 | if (alias == null) { | ||
| 1229 | return false; | ||
| 1230 | } | ||
| 1231 | PrivateKey tempPrivateKey = km.getPrivateKey(alias); | ||
| 1232 | if (tempPrivateKey == null) { | ||
| 1233 | return false; | ||
| 1234 | } | ||
| 1235 | X509Certificate[] tempCerts = km.getCertificateChain(alias); | ||
| 1236 | if ((tempCerts == null) || (tempCerts.length == 0)) { | ||
| 1237 | return false; | ||
| 1238 | } | ||
| 1239 | String keyAlgorithm = algorithm.split("_")[0]; | ||
| 1240 | PublicKey publicKey = tempCerts[0].getPublicKey(); | ||
| 1241 | if ((tempPrivateKey.getAlgorithm().equals(keyAlgorithm) == false) | ||
| 1242 | || (publicKey.getAlgorithm().equals(keyAlgorithm) == false)) { | ||
| 1243 | return false; | ||
| 1244 | } | ||
| 1245 | // For ECC certs, check whether we support the EC domain parameters. | ||
| 1246 | // If the client sent a SupportedEllipticCurves ClientHello extension, | ||
| 1247 | // check against that too. | ||
| 1248 | if (keyAlgorithm.equals("EC")) { | ||
| 1249 | if (publicKey instanceof ECPublicKey == false) { | ||
| 1250 | return false; | ||
| 1251 | } | ||
| 1252 | ECParameterSpec params = ((ECPublicKey)publicKey).getParams(); | ||
| 1253 | int index = SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.getCurveIndex(params); | ||
| 1254 | if (SupportedEllipticCurvesExtension.isSupported(index) == false) { | ||
| 1255 | return false; | ||
| 1256 | } | ||
| 1257 | if ((supportedCurves != null) && !supportedCurves.contains(index)) { | ||
| 1258 | return false; | ||
| 1259 | } | ||
| 1260 | } | ||
| 1261 | this.privateKey = tempPrivateKey; | ||
| 1262 | this.certs = tempCerts; | ||
| 1263 | return true; | ||
| 1264 | } | ||
| 1265 | |||
| 1266 | /** | ||
| 1267 | * Retrieve the Kerberos key for the specified server principal | ||
| 1268 | * from the JAAS configuration file. | ||
| 1269 | * | ||
| 1270 | * @return true if successful, false if not available or invalid | ||
| 1271 | */ | ||
| 1272 | private boolean setupKerberosKeys() { | ||
| 1273 | if (kerberosKeys != null) { | ||
| 1274 | return true; | ||
| 1275 | } | ||
| 1276 | try { | ||
| 1277 | final AccessControlContext acc = getAccSE(); | ||
| 1278 | kerberosKeys = AccessController.doPrivileged( | ||
| 1279 | // Eliminate dependency on KerberosKey | ||
| 1280 | new PrivilegedExceptionAction<SecretKey[]>() { | ||
| 1281 | public SecretKey[] run() throws Exception { | ||
| 1282 | // get kerberos key for the default principal | ||
| 1283 | return Krb5Helper.getServerKeys(acc); | ||
| 1284 | }}); | ||
| 1285 | |||
| 1286 | // check permission to access and use the secret key of the | ||
| 1287 | // Kerberized "host" service | ||
| 1288 | if (kerberosKeys != null && kerberosKeys.length > 0) { | ||
| 1289 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1290 | for (SecretKey k: kerberosKeys) { | ||
| 1291 | System.out.println("Using Kerberos key: " + | ||
| 1292 | k); | ||
| 1293 | } | ||
| 1294 | } | ||
| 1295 | |||
| 1296 | String serverPrincipal = | ||
| 1297 | Krb5Helper.getServerPrincipalName(kerberosKeys[0]); | ||
| 1298 | SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager(); | ||
| 1299 | try { | ||
| 1300 | if (sm != null) { | ||
| 1301 | // Eliminate dependency on ServicePermission | ||
| 1302 | sm.checkPermission(Krb5Helper.getServicePermission( | ||
| 1303 | serverPrincipal, "accept"), acc); | ||
| 1304 | } | ||
| 1305 | } catch (SecurityException se) { | ||
| 1306 | kerberosKeys = null; | ||
| 1307 | // %%% destroy keys? or will that affect Subject? | ||
| 1308 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) | ||
| 1309 | System.out.println("Permission to access Kerberos" | ||
| 1310 | + " secret key denied"); | ||
| 1311 | return false; | ||
| 1312 | } | ||
| 1313 | } | ||
| 1314 | return (kerberosKeys != null); | ||
| 1315 | } catch (PrivilegedActionException e) { | ||
| 1316 | // Likely exception here is LoginExceptin | ||
| 1317 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1318 | System.out.println("Attempt to obtain Kerberos key failed: " | ||
| 1319 | + e.toString()); | ||
| 1320 | } | ||
| 1321 | return false; | ||
| 1322 | } | ||
| 1323 | } | ||
| 1324 | |||
| 1325 | /* | ||
| 1326 | * For Kerberos ciphers, the premaster secret is encrypted using | ||
| 1327 | * the session key. See RFC 2712. | ||
| 1328 | */ | ||
| 1329 | private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(KerberosClientKeyExchange mesg) | ||
| 1330 | throws IOException { | ||
| 1331 | |||
| 1332 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1333 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1334 | } | ||
| 1335 | |||
| 1336 | // Record the principals involved in exchange | ||
| 1337 | session.setPeerPrincipal(mesg.getPeerPrincipal()); | ||
| 1338 | session.setLocalPrincipal(mesg.getLocalPrincipal()); | ||
| 1339 | |||
| 1340 | byte[] b = mesg.getUnencryptedPreMasterSecret(); | ||
| 1341 | return new SecretKeySpec(b, "TlsPremasterSecret"); | ||
| 1342 | } | ||
| 1343 | |||
| 1344 | /* | ||
| 1345 | * Diffie Hellman key exchange is used when the server presented | ||
| 1346 | * D-H parameters in its certificate (signed using RSA or DSS/DSA), | ||
| 1347 | * or else the server presented no certificate but sent D-H params | ||
| 1348 | * in a ServerKeyExchange message. Use of D-H is specified by the | ||
| 1349 | * cipher suite chosen. | ||
| 1350 | * | ||
| 1351 | * The message optionally contains the client's D-H public key (if | ||
| 1352 | * it wasn't not sent in a client certificate). As always with D-H, | ||
| 1353 | * if a client and a server have each other's D-H public keys and | ||
| 1354 | * they use common algorithm parameters, they have a shared key | ||
| 1355 | * that's derived via the D-H calculation. That key becomes the | ||
| 1356 | * pre-master secret. | ||
| 1357 | */ | ||
| 1358 | private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(DHClientKeyExchange mesg) | ||
| 1359 | throws IOException { | ||
| 1360 | |||
| 1361 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1362 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1363 | } | ||
| 1364 | return dh.getAgreedSecret(mesg.getClientPublicKey()); | ||
| 1365 | } | ||
| 1366 | |||
| 1367 | private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(ECDHClientKeyExchange mesg) | ||
| 1368 | throws IOException { | ||
| 1369 | |||
| 1370 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1371 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1372 | } | ||
| 1373 | return ecdh.getAgreedSecret(mesg.getEncodedPoint()); | ||
| 1374 | } | ||
| 1375 | |||
| 1376 | /* | ||
| 1377 | * Client wrote a message to verify the certificate it sent earlier. | ||
| 1378 | * | ||
| 1379 | * Note that this certificate isn't involved in key exchange. Client | ||
| 1380 | * authentication messages are included in the checksums used to | ||
| 1381 | * validate the handshake (e.g. Finished messages). Other than that, | ||
| 1382 | * the _exact_ identity of the client is less fundamental to protocol | ||
| 1383 | * security than its role in selecting keys via the pre-master secret. | ||
| 1384 | */ | ||
| 1385 | private void clientCertificateVerify(CertificateVerify mesg) | ||
| 1386 | throws IOException { | ||
| 1387 | |||
| 1388 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1389 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1390 | } | ||
| 1391 | |||
| 1392 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1393 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm signAlg = | ||
| 1394 | mesg.getPreferableSignatureAlgorithm(); | ||
| 1395 | if (signAlg == null) { | ||
| 1396 | throw new SSLHandshakeException( | ||
| 1397 | "Illegal CertificateVerify message"); | ||
| 1398 | } | ||
| 1399 | |||
| 1400 | String hashAlg = | ||
| 1401 | SignatureAndHashAlgorithm.getHashAlgorithmName(signAlg); | ||
| 1402 | if (hashAlg == null || hashAlg.length() == 0) { | ||
| 1403 | throw new SSLHandshakeException( | ||
| 1404 | "No supported hash algorithm"); | ||
| 1405 | } | ||
| 1406 | |||
| 1407 | handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(hashAlg); | ||
| 1408 | } | ||
| 1409 | |||
| 1410 | try { | ||
| 1411 | PublicKey publicKey = | ||
| 1412 | session.getPeerCertificates()[0].getPublicKey(); | ||
| 1413 | |||
| 1414 | boolean valid = mesg.verify(protocolVersion, handshakeHash, | ||
| 1415 | publicKey, session.getMasterSecret()); | ||
| 1416 | if (valid == false) { | ||
| 1417 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_bad_certificate, | ||
| 1418 | "certificate verify message signature error"); | ||
| 1419 | } | ||
| 1420 | } catch (GeneralSecurityException e) { | ||
| 1421 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_bad_certificate, | ||
| 1422 | "certificate verify format error", e); | ||
| 1423 | } | ||
| 1424 | |||
| 1425 | // reset the flag for clientCertificateVerify message | ||
| 1426 | needClientVerify = false; | ||
| 1427 | } | ||
| 1428 | |||
| 1429 | |||
| 1430 | /* | ||
| 1431 | * Client writes "finished" at the end of its handshake, after cipher | ||
| 1432 | * spec is changed. We verify it and then send ours. | ||
| 1433 | * | ||
| 1434 | * When we're resuming a session, we'll have already sent our own | ||
| 1435 | * Finished message so just the verification is needed. | ||
| 1436 | */ | ||
| 1437 | private void clientFinished(Finished mesg) throws IOException { | ||
| 1438 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1439 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1440 | } | ||
| 1441 | |||
| 1442 | /* | ||
| 1443 | * Verify if client did send the certificate when client | ||
| 1444 | * authentication was required, otherwise server should not proceed | ||
| 1445 | */ | ||
| 1446 | if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_required) { | ||
| 1447 | // get X500Principal of the end-entity certificate for X509-based | ||
| 1448 | // ciphersuites, or Kerberos principal for Kerberos ciphersuites | ||
| 1449 | session.getPeerPrincipal(); | ||
| 1450 | } | ||
| 1451 | |||
| 1452 | /* | ||
| 1453 | * Verify if client did send clientCertificateVerify message following | ||
| 1454 | * the client Certificate, otherwise server should not proceed | ||
| 1455 | */ | ||
| 1456 | if (needClientVerify) { | ||
| 1457 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 1458 | "client did not send certificate verify message"); | ||
| 1459 | } | ||
| 1460 | |||
| 1461 | /* | ||
| 1462 | * Verify the client's message with the "before" digest of messages, | ||
| 1463 | * and forget about continuing to use that digest. | ||
| 1464 | */ | ||
| 1465 | boolean verified = mesg.verify(handshakeHash, Finished.CLIENT, | ||
| 1466 | session.getMasterSecret()); | ||
| 1467 | |||
| 1468 | if (!verified) { | ||
| 1469 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_handshake_failure, | ||
| 1470 | "client 'finished' message doesn't verify"); | ||
| 1471 | // NOTREACHED | ||
| 1472 | } | ||
| 1473 | |||
| 1474 | /* | ||
| 1475 | * save client verify data for secure renegotiation | ||
| 1476 | */ | ||
| 1477 | if (secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 1478 | clientVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData(); | ||
| 1479 | } | ||
| 1480 | |||
| 1481 | /* | ||
| 1482 | * OK, it verified. If we're doing the full handshake, add that | ||
| 1483 | * "Finished" message to the hash of handshake messages, then send | ||
| 1484 | * the change_cipher_spec and Finished message. | ||
| 1485 | */ | ||
| 1486 | if (!resumingSession) { | ||
| 1487 | input.digestNow(); | ||
| 1488 | sendChangeCipherAndFinish(true); | ||
| 1489 | } | ||
| 1490 | |||
| 1491 | /* | ||
| 1492 | * Update the session cache only after the handshake completed, else | ||
| 1493 | * we're open to an attack against a partially completed handshake. | ||
| 1494 | */ | ||
| 1495 | session.setLastAccessedTime(System.currentTimeMillis()); | ||
| 1496 | if (!resumingSession && session.isRejoinable()) { | ||
| 1497 | ((SSLSessionContextImpl)sslContext.engineGetServerSessionContext()) | ||
| 1498 | .put(session); | ||
| 1499 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { | ||
| 1500 | System.out.println( | ||
| 1501 | "%% Cached server session: " + session); | ||
| 1502 | } | ||
| 1503 | } else if (!resumingSession && | ||
| 1504 | debug != null && Debug.isOn("session")) { | ||
| 1505 | System.out.println( | ||
| 1506 | "%% Didn't cache non-resumable server session: " | ||
| 1507 | + session); | ||
| 1508 | } | ||
| 1509 | } | ||
| 1510 | |||
| 1511 | /* | ||
| 1512 | * Compute finished message with the "server" digest (and then forget | ||
| 1513 | * about that digest, it can't be used again). | ||
| 1514 | */ | ||
| 1515 | private void sendChangeCipherAndFinish(boolean finishedTag) | ||
| 1516 | throws IOException { | ||
| 1517 | |||
| 1518 | output.flush(); | ||
| 1519 | |||
| 1520 | Finished mesg = new Finished(protocolVersion, handshakeHash, | ||
| 1521 | Finished.SERVER, session.getMasterSecret(), cipherSuite); | ||
| 1522 | |||
| 1523 | /* | ||
| 1524 | * Send the change_cipher_spec record; then our Finished handshake | ||
| 1525 | * message will be the last handshake message. Flush, and now we | ||
| 1526 | * are ready for application data!! | ||
| 1527 | */ | ||
| 1528 | sendChangeCipherSpec(mesg, finishedTag); | ||
| 1529 | |||
| 1530 | /* | ||
| 1531 | * save server verify data for secure renegotiation | ||
| 1532 | */ | ||
| 1533 | if (secureRenegotiation) { | ||
| 1534 | serverVerifyData = mesg.getVerifyData(); | ||
| 1535 | } | ||
| 1536 | |||
| 1537 | /* | ||
| 1538 | * Update state machine so client MUST send 'finished' next | ||
| 1539 | * The update should only take place if it is not in the fast | ||
| 1540 | * handshake mode since the server has to wait for a finished | ||
| 1541 | * message from the client. | ||
| 1542 | */ | ||
| 1543 | if (finishedTag) { | ||
| 1544 | state = HandshakeMessage.ht_finished; | ||
| 1545 | } | ||
| 1546 | } | ||
| 1547 | |||
| 1548 | |||
| 1549 | /* | ||
| 1550 | * Returns a HelloRequest message to kickstart renegotiations | ||
| 1551 | */ | ||
| 1552 | HandshakeMessage getKickstartMessage() { | ||
| 1553 | return new HelloRequest(); | ||
| 1554 | } | ||
| 1555 | |||
| 1556 | |||
| 1557 | /* | ||
| 1558 | * Fault detected during handshake. | ||
| 1559 | */ | ||
| 1560 | void handshakeAlert(byte description) throws SSLProtocolException { | ||
| 1561 | |||
| 1562 | String message = Alerts.alertDescription(description); | ||
| 1563 | |||
| 1564 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1565 | System.out.println("SSL -- handshake alert: " | ||
| 1566 | + message); | ||
| 1567 | } | ||
| 1568 | |||
| 1569 | /* | ||
| 1570 | * It's ok to get a no_certificate alert from a client of which | ||
| 1571 | * we *requested* authentication information. | ||
| 1572 | * However, if we *required* it, then this is not acceptable. | ||
| 1573 | * | ||
| 1574 | * Anyone calling getPeerCertificates() on the | ||
| 1575 | * session will get an SSLPeerUnverifiedException. | ||
| 1576 | */ | ||
| 1577 | if ((description == Alerts.alert_no_certificate) && | ||
| 1578 | (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_requested)) { | ||
| 1579 | return; | ||
| 1580 | } | ||
| 1581 | |||
| 1582 | throw new SSLProtocolException("handshake alert: " + message); | ||
| 1583 | } | ||
| 1584 | |||
| 1585 | /* | ||
| 1586 | * RSA key exchange is normally used. The client encrypts a "pre-master | ||
| 1587 | * secret" with the server's public key, from the Certificate (or else | ||
| 1588 | * ServerKeyExchange) message that was sent to it by the server. That's | ||
| 1589 | * decrypted using the private key before we get here. | ||
| 1590 | */ | ||
| 1591 | private SecretKey clientKeyExchange(RSAClientKeyExchange mesg) | ||
| 1592 | throws IOException { | ||
| 1593 | |||
| 1594 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1595 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1596 | } | ||
| 1597 | return mesg.preMaster; | ||
| 1598 | } | ||
| 1599 | |||
| 1600 | /* | ||
| 1601 | * Verify the certificate sent by the client. We'll only get one if we | ||
| 1602 | * sent a CertificateRequest to request client authentication. If we | ||
| 1603 | * are in TLS mode, the client may send a message with no certificates | ||
| 1604 | * to indicate it does not have an appropriate chain. (In SSLv3 mode, | ||
| 1605 | * it would send a no certificate alert). | ||
| 1606 | */ | ||
| 1607 | private void clientCertificate(CertificateMsg mesg) throws IOException { | ||
| 1608 | if (debug != null && Debug.isOn("handshake")) { | ||
| 1609 | mesg.print(System.out); | ||
| 1610 | } | ||
| 1611 | |||
| 1612 | X509Certificate[] peerCerts = mesg.getCertificateChain(); | ||
| 1613 | |||
| 1614 | if (peerCerts.length == 0) { | ||
| 1615 | /* | ||
| 1616 | * If the client authentication is only *REQUESTED* (e.g. | ||
| 1617 | * not *REQUIRED*, this is an acceptable condition.) | ||
| 1618 | */ | ||
| 1619 | if (doClientAuth == SSLEngineImpl.clauth_requested) { | ||
| 1620 | // Smart (aka stupid) to forecast that no CertificateVerify | ||
| 1621 | // message will be received. | ||
| 1622 | if (protocolVersion.v >= ProtocolVersion.TLS12.v) { | ||
| 1623 | handshakeHash.setCertificateVerifyAlg(null); | ||
| 1624 | } | ||
| 1625 | return; | ||
| 1626 | } else { | ||
| 1627 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_bad_certificate, | ||
| 1628 | "null cert chain"); | ||
| 1629 | } | ||
| 1630 | } | ||
| 1631 | |||
| 1632 | // ask the trust manager to verify the chain | ||
| 1633 | X509TrustManager tm = sslContext.getX509TrustManager(); | ||
| 1634 | |||
| 1635 | try { | ||
| 1636 | // find out the types of client authentication used | ||
| 1637 | PublicKey key = peerCerts[0].getPublicKey(); | ||
| 1638 | String keyAlgorithm = key.getAlgorithm(); | ||
| 1639 | String authType; | ||
| 1640 | if (keyAlgorithm.equals("RSA")) { | ||
| 1641 | authType = "RSA"; | ||
| 1642 | } else if (keyAlgorithm.equals("DSA")) { | ||
| 1643 | authType = "DSA"; | ||
| 1644 | } else if (keyAlgorithm.equals("EC")) { | ||
| 1645 | authType = "EC"; | ||
| 1646 | } else { | ||
| 1647 | // unknown public key type | ||
| 1648 | authType = "UNKNOWN"; | ||
| 1649 | } | ||
| 1650 | |||
| 1651 | if (tm instanceof X509ExtendedTrustManager) { | ||
| 1652 | if (conn != null) { | ||
| 1653 | ((X509ExtendedTrustManager)tm).checkClientTrusted( | ||
| 1654 | peerCerts.clone(), | ||
| 1655 | authType, | ||
| 1656 | conn); | ||
| 1657 | } else { | ||
| 1658 | ((X509ExtendedTrustManager)tm).checkClientTrusted( | ||
| 1659 | peerCerts.clone(), | ||
| 1660 | authType, | ||
| 1661 | engine); | ||
| 1662 | } | ||
| 1663 | } else { | ||
| 1664 | // Unlikely to happen, because we have wrapped the old | ||
| 1665 | // X509TrustManager with the new X509ExtendedTrustManager. | ||
| 1666 | throw new CertificateException( | ||
| 1667 | "Improper X509TrustManager implementation"); | ||
| 1668 | } | ||
| 1669 | } catch (CertificateException e) { | ||
| 1670 | // This will throw an exception, so include the original error. | ||
| 1671 | fatalSE(Alerts.alert_certificate_unknown, e); | ||
| 1672 | } | ||
| 1673 | // set the flag for clientCertificateVerify message | ||
| 1674 | needClientVerify = true; | ||
| 1675 | |||
| 1676 | session.setPeerCertificates(peerCerts); | ||
| 1677 | } | ||
| 1678 | } | ||