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| 1 | +/* | |
| 2 | + * Copyright (c) 2005, 2006, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. | |
| 3 | + * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. | |
| 4 | + * | |
| 5 | + * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
| 6 | + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as | |
| 7 | + * published by the Free Software Foundation. Oracle designates this | |
| 8 | + * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided | |
| 9 | + * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. | |
| 10 | + * | |
| 11 | + * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT | |
| 12 | + * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or | |
| 13 | + * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License | |
| 14 | + * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that | |
| 15 | + * accompanied this code). | |
| 16 | + * | |
| 17 | + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version | |
| 18 | + * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, | |
| 19 | + * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. | |
| 20 | + * | |
| 21 | + * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA | |
| 22 | + * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any | |
| 23 | + * questions. | |
| 24 | + */ | |
| 25 | + | |
| 26 | +package com.sun.script.javascript; | |
| 27 | + | |
| 28 | +import java.lang.reflect.*; | |
| 29 | +import static sun.security.util.SecurityConstants.*; | |
| 30 | +import sun.org.mozilla.javascript.internal.*; | |
| 31 | + | |
| 32 | +/** | |
| 33 | + * This wrap factory is used for security reasons. JSR 223 script | |
| 34 | + * engine interface and JavaScript engine classes are run as bootstrap | |
| 35 | + * classes. For example, java.lang.Class.forName method (when called without | |
| 36 | + * class loader) uses caller's class loader. This may be exploited by script | |
| 37 | + * authors to access classes otherwise not accessible. For example, | |
| 38 | + * classes in sun.* namespace are normally not accessible to untrusted | |
| 39 | + * code and hence should not be accessible to JavaScript run from | |
| 40 | + * untrusted code. | |
| 41 | + * | |
| 42 | + * @author A. Sundararajan | |
| 43 | + * @since 1.6 | |
| 44 | + */ | |
| 45 | +final class RhinoWrapFactory extends WrapFactory { | |
| 46 | + private RhinoWrapFactory() {} | |
| 47 | + private static RhinoWrapFactory theInstance; | |
| 48 | + | |
| 49 | + static synchronized WrapFactory getInstance() { | |
| 50 | + if (theInstance == null) { | |
| 51 | + theInstance = new RhinoWrapFactory(); | |
| 52 | + } | |
| 53 | + return theInstance; | |
| 54 | + } | |
| 55 | + | |
| 56 | + // We use instance of this class to wrap security sensitive | |
| 57 | + // Java object. Please refer below. | |
| 58 | + private static class RhinoJavaObject extends NativeJavaObject { | |
| 59 | + RhinoJavaObject(Scriptable scope, Object obj, Class type) { | |
| 60 | + // we pass 'null' to object. NativeJavaObject uses | |
| 61 | + // passed 'type' to reflect fields and methods when | |
| 62 | + // object is null. | |
| 63 | + super(scope, null, type); | |
| 64 | + | |
| 65 | + // Now, we set actual object. 'javaObject' is protected | |
| 66 | + // field of NativeJavaObject. | |
| 67 | + javaObject = obj; | |
| 68 | + } | |
| 69 | + } | |
| 70 | + | |
| 71 | + public Scriptable wrapAsJavaObject(Context cx, Scriptable scope, | |
| 72 | + Object javaObject, Class staticType) { | |
| 73 | + SecurityManager sm = System.getSecurityManager(); | |
| 74 | + ClassShutter classShutter = RhinoClassShutter.getInstance(); | |
| 75 | + if (javaObject instanceof ClassLoader) { | |
| 76 | + // Check with Security Manager whether we can expose a | |
| 77 | + // ClassLoader... | |
| 78 | + if (sm != null) { | |
| 79 | + sm.checkPermission(GET_CLASSLOADER_PERMISSION); | |
| 80 | + } | |
| 81 | + // if we fall through here, check permission succeeded. | |
| 82 | + return super.wrapAsJavaObject(cx, scope, javaObject, staticType); | |
| 83 | + } else { | |
| 84 | + String name = null; | |
| 85 | + if (javaObject instanceof Class) { | |
| 86 | + name = ((Class)javaObject).getName(); | |
| 87 | + } else if (javaObject instanceof Member) { | |
| 88 | + Member member = (Member) javaObject; | |
| 89 | + // Check member access. Don't allow reflective access to | |
| 90 | + // non-public members. Note that we can't call checkMemberAccess | |
| 91 | + // because that expects exact stack depth! | |
| 92 | + if (sm != null && !Modifier.isPublic(member.getModifiers())) { | |
| 93 | + return null; | |
| 94 | + } | |
| 95 | + name = member.getDeclaringClass().getName(); | |
| 96 | + } | |
| 97 | + // Now, make sure that no ClassShutter prevented Class or Member | |
| 98 | + // of it is accessed reflectively. Note that ClassShutter may | |
| 99 | + // prevent access to a class, even though SecurityManager permit. | |
| 100 | + if (name != null) { | |
| 101 | + if (!classShutter.visibleToScripts(name)) { | |
| 102 | + return null; | |
| 103 | + } else { | |
| 104 | + return super.wrapAsJavaObject(cx, scope, javaObject, staticType); | |
| 105 | + } | |
| 106 | + } | |
| 107 | + } | |
| 108 | + | |
| 109 | + // we have got some non-reflective object. | |
| 110 | + Class dynamicType = javaObject.getClass(); | |
| 111 | + String name = dynamicType.getName(); | |
| 112 | + if (!classShutter.visibleToScripts(name)) { | |
| 113 | + // Object of some sensitive class (such as sun.net.www.* | |
| 114 | + // objects returned from public method of java.net.URL class. | |
| 115 | + // We expose this object as though it is an object of some | |
| 116 | + // super class that is safe for access. | |
| 117 | + | |
| 118 | + Class type = null; | |
| 119 | + | |
| 120 | + // Whenever a Java Object is wrapped, we are passed with a | |
| 121 | + // staticType which is the type found from environment. For | |
| 122 | + // example, method return type known from signature. The dynamic | |
| 123 | + // type would be the actual Class of the actual returned object. | |
| 124 | + // If the staticType is an interface, we just use that type. | |
| 125 | + if (staticType != null && staticType.isInterface()) { | |
| 126 | + type = staticType; | |
| 127 | + } else { | |
| 128 | + // dynamicType is always a class type and never an interface. | |
| 129 | + // find an accessible super class of the dynamic type. | |
| 130 | + while (dynamicType != null) { | |
| 131 | + dynamicType = dynamicType.getSuperclass(); | |
| 132 | + name = dynamicType.getName(); | |
| 133 | + if (classShutter.visibleToScripts(name)) { | |
| 134 | + type = dynamicType; break; | |
| 135 | + } | |
| 136 | + } | |
| 137 | + // atleast java.lang.Object has to be accessible. So, when | |
| 138 | + // we reach here, type variable should not be null. | |
| 139 | + assert type != null: | |
| 140 | + "even java.lang.Object is not accessible?"; | |
| 141 | + } | |
| 142 | + // create custom wrapper with the 'safe' type. | |
| 143 | + return new RhinoJavaObject(scope, javaObject, type); | |
| 144 | + } else { | |
| 145 | + return super.wrapAsJavaObject(cx, scope, javaObject, staticType); | |
| 146 | + } | |
| 147 | + } | |
| 148 | +} | |