use super::tool_permissions::{ SensitiveSettingsKind, authorize_symlink_access, canonicalize_worktree_roots, detect_symlink_escape, sensitive_settings_kind,};use crate::{ AgentTool, ToolCallEventStream, ToolInput, ToolPermissionDecision, decide_permission_for_path,};use action_log::ActionLog;use agent_client_protocol::ToolKind;use agent_settings::AgentSettings;use futures::{FutureExt as _, SinkExt, StreamExt, channel::mpsc};use gpui::{App, AppContext, Entity, SharedString, Task};use project::{Project, ProjectPath};use schemars::JsonSchema;use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};use settings::Settings;use std::path::Path;use std::sync::Arc;use util::markdown::MarkdownInlineCode; /// Deletes the file or directory (and the directory's contents, recursively) at the specified path in the project, and returns confirmation of the deletion.#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]pub struct DeletePathToolInput { /// The path of the file or directory to delete. /// /// <example> /// If the project has the following files: /// /// - directory1/a/something.txt /// - directory2/a/things.txt /// - directory3/a/other.txt /// /// You can delete the first file by providing a path of "directory1/a/something.txt" /// </example> pub path: String,} pub struct DeletePathTool { project: Entity<Project>, action_log: Entity<ActionLog>,} impl DeletePathTool { pub fn new(project: Entity<Project>, action_log: Entity<ActionLog>) -> Self { Self { project, action_log, } }} impl AgentTool for DeletePathTool { type Input = DeletePathToolInput; type Output = String; const NAME: &'static str = "delete_path"; fn kind() -> ToolKind { ToolKind::Delete } fn initial_title( &self, input: Result<Self::Input, serde_json::Value>, _cx: &mut App, ) -> SharedString { if let Ok(input) = input { format!("Delete “`{}`”", input.path).into() } else { "Delete path".into() } } fn run( self: Arc<Self>, input: ToolInput<Self::Input>, event_stream: ToolCallEventStream, cx: &mut App, ) -> Task<Result<Self::Output, Self::Output>> { let project = self.project.clone(); let action_log = self.action_log.clone(); cx.spawn(async move |cx| { let input = input .recv() .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to receive tool input: {e}"))?; let path = input.path; let decision = cx.update(|cx| { decide_permission_for_path(Self::NAME, &path, AgentSettings::get_global(cx)) }); if let ToolPermissionDecision::Deny(reason) = decision { return Err(reason); } let fs = project.read_with(cx, |project, _cx| project.fs().clone()); let canonical_roots = canonicalize_worktree_roots(&project, &fs, cx).await; let symlink_escape_target = project.read_with(cx, |project, cx| { detect_symlink_escape(project, &path, &canonical_roots, cx) .map(|(_, target)| target) }); let settings_kind = sensitive_settings_kind(Path::new(&path), fs.as_ref()).await; let decision = if matches!(decision, ToolPermissionDecision::Allow) && settings_kind.is_some() { ToolPermissionDecision::Confirm } else { decision }; let authorize = if let Some(canonical_target) = symlink_escape_target { // Symlink escape authorization replaces (rather than supplements) // the normal tool-permission prompt. The symlink prompt already // requires explicit user approval with the canonical target shown, // which is strictly more security-relevant than a generic confirm. Some(cx.update(|cx| { authorize_symlink_access( Self::NAME, &path, &canonical_target, &event_stream, cx, ) })) } else { match decision { ToolPermissionDecision::Allow => None, ToolPermissionDecision::Confirm => Some(cx.update(|cx| { let context = crate::ToolPermissionContext::new(Self::NAME, vec![path.clone()]); let title = format!("Delete {}", MarkdownInlineCode(&path)); let title = match settings_kind { Some(SensitiveSettingsKind::Local) => { format!("{title} (local settings)") } Some(SensitiveSettingsKind::Global) => format!("{title} (settings)"), None => title, }; event_stream.authorize(title, context, cx) })), ToolPermissionDecision::Deny(_) => None, } }; if let Some(authorize) = authorize { authorize.await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; } let (project_path, worktree_snapshot) = project.read_with(cx, |project, cx| { let project_path = project.find_project_path(&path, cx).ok_or_else(|| { format!("Couldn't delete {path} because that path isn't in this project.") })?; let worktree = project .worktree_for_id(project_path.worktree_id, cx) .ok_or_else(|| { format!("Couldn't delete {path} because that path isn't in this project.") })?; let worktree_snapshot = worktree.read(cx).snapshot(); Result::<_, String>::Ok((project_path, worktree_snapshot)) })?; let (mut paths_tx, mut paths_rx) = mpsc::channel(256); cx.background_spawn({ let project_path = project_path.clone(); async move { for entry in worktree_snapshot.traverse_from_path(true, false, false, &project_path.path) { if !entry.path.starts_with(&project_path.path) { break; } paths_tx .send(ProjectPath { worktree_id: project_path.worktree_id, path: entry.path.clone(), }) .await?; } anyhow::Ok(()) } }) .detach(); loop { let path_result = futures::select! { path = paths_rx.next().fuse() => path, _ = event_stream.cancelled_by_user().fuse() => { return Err("Delete cancelled by user".to_string()); } }; let Some(path) = path_result else { break; }; if let Ok(buffer) = project .update(cx, |project, cx| project.open_buffer(path, cx)) .await { action_log.update(cx, |action_log, cx| { action_log.will_delete_buffer(buffer.clone(), cx) }); } } let deletion_task = project .update(cx, |project, cx| { project.delete_file(project_path, false, cx) }) .ok_or_else(|| { format!("Couldn't delete {path} because that path isn't in this project.") })?; futures::select! { result = deletion_task.fuse() => { result.map_err(|e| format!("Deleting {path}: {e}"))?; } _ = event_stream.cancelled_by_user().fuse() => { return Err("Delete cancelled by user".to_string()); } } Ok(format!("Deleted {path}")) }) }} #[cfg(test)]mod tests { use super::*; use agent_client_protocol as acp; use fs::Fs as _; use gpui::TestAppContext; use project::{FakeFs, Project}; use serde_json::json; use settings::SettingsStore; use std::path::PathBuf; use util::path; use crate::ToolCallEventStream; fn init_test(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { cx.update(|cx| { let settings_store = SettingsStore::test(cx); cx.set_global(settings_store); }); cx.update(|cx| { let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone(); settings.tool_permissions.default = settings::ToolPermissionMode::Allow; AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx); }); } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_requests_authorization(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { init_test(cx); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let task = cx.update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }), event_stream, cx, ) }); let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await; let title = auth.tool_call.fields.title.as_deref().unwrap_or(""); assert!( title.contains("points outside the project") || title.contains("symlink"), "Authorization title should mention symlink escape, got: {title}", ); auth.response .send(acp::PermissionOptionId::new("allow")) .unwrap(); let result = task.await; // FakeFs cannot delete symlink entries (they are neither Dir nor File // internally), so the deletion itself may fail. The important thing is // that the authorization was requested and accepted — any error must // come from the fs layer, not from a permission denial. if let Err(err) = &result { let msg = format!("{err:#}"); assert!( !msg.contains("denied") && !msg.contains("authorization"), "Error should not be a permission denial, got: {msg}", ); } } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_denied(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { init_test(cx); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let task = cx.update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }), event_stream, cx, ) }); let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await; drop(auth); let result = task.await; assert!( result.is_err(), "Tool should fail when authorization is denied" ); } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_confirm_requires_single_approval( cx: &mut TestAppContext, ) { init_test(cx); cx.update(|cx| { let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone(); settings.tool_permissions.default = settings::ToolPermissionMode::Confirm; AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx); }); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let task = cx.update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }), event_stream, cx, ) }); let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await; let title = auth.tool_call.fields.title.as_deref().unwrap_or(""); assert!( title.contains("points outside the project") || title.contains("symlink"), "Authorization title should mention symlink escape, got: {title}", ); auth.response .send(acp::PermissionOptionId::new("allow")) .unwrap(); assert!( !matches!( event_rx.try_next(), Ok(Some(Ok(crate::ThreadEvent::ToolCallAuthorization(_)))) ), "Expected a single authorization prompt", ); let result = task.await; if let Err(err) = &result { let message = format!("{err:#}"); assert!( !message.contains("denied") && !message.contains("authorization"), "Error should not be a permission denial, got: {message}", ); } } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_honors_deny_policy(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { init_test(cx); cx.update(|cx| { let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone(); settings.tool_permissions.tools.insert( "delete_path".into(), agent_settings::ToolRules { default: Some(settings::ToolPermissionMode::Deny), ..Default::default() }, ); AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx); }); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let result = cx .update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }),Lines 1–500 of 516. 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use super::tool_permissions::{ SensitiveSettingsKind, authorize_symlink_access, canonicalize_worktree_roots, detect_symlink_escape, sensitive_settings_kind, }; use crate::{ AgentTool, ToolCallEventStream, ToolInput, ToolPermissionDecision, decide_permission_for_path, }; use action_log::ActionLog; use agent_client_protocol::ToolKind; use agent_settings::AgentSettings; use futures::{FutureExt as _, SinkExt, StreamExt, channel::mpsc}; use gpui::{App, AppContext, Entity, SharedString, Task}; use project::{Project, ProjectPath}; use schemars::JsonSchema; use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize}; use settings::Settings; use std::path::Path; use std::sync::Arc; use util::markdown::MarkdownInlineCode; /// Deletes the file or directory (and the directory's contents, recursively) at the specified path in the project, and returns confirmation of the deletion. #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)] pub struct DeletePathToolInput { /// The path of the file or directory to delete. /// /// <example> /// If the project has the following files: /// /// - directory1/a/something.txt /// - directory2/a/things.txt /// - directory3/a/other.txt /// /// You can delete the first file by providing a path of "directory1/a/something.txt" /// </example> pub path: String, } pub struct DeletePathTool { project: Entity<Project>, action_log: Entity<ActionLog>, } impl DeletePathTool { pub fn new(project: Entity<Project>, action_log: Entity<ActionLog>) -> Self { Self { project, action_log, } } } impl AgentTool for DeletePathTool { type Input = DeletePathToolInput; type Output = String; const NAME: &'static str = "delete_path"; fn kind() -> ToolKind { ToolKind::Delete } fn initial_title( &self, input: Result<Self::Input, serde_json::Value>, _cx: &mut App, ) -> SharedString { if let Ok(input) = input { format!("Delete “`{}`”", input.path).into() } else { "Delete path".into() } } fn run( self: Arc<Self>, input: ToolInput<Self::Input>, event_stream: ToolCallEventStream, cx: &mut App, ) -> Task<Result<Self::Output, Self::Output>> { let project = self.project.clone(); let action_log = self.action_log.clone(); cx.spawn(async move |cx| { let input = input .recv() .await .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to receive tool input: {e}"))?; let path = input.path; let decision = cx.update(|cx| { decide_permission_for_path(Self::NAME, &path, AgentSettings::get_global(cx)) }); if let ToolPermissionDecision::Deny(reason) = decision { return Err(reason); } let fs = project.read_with(cx, |project, _cx| project.fs().clone()); let canonical_roots = canonicalize_worktree_roots(&project, &fs, cx).await; let symlink_escape_target = project.read_with(cx, |project, cx| { detect_symlink_escape(project, &path, &canonical_roots, cx) .map(|(_, target)| target) }); let settings_kind = sensitive_settings_kind(Path::new(&path), fs.as_ref()).await; let decision = if matches!(decision, ToolPermissionDecision::Allow) && settings_kind.is_some() { ToolPermissionDecision::Confirm } else { decision }; let authorize = if let Some(canonical_target) = symlink_escape_target { // Symlink escape authorization replaces (rather than supplements) // the normal tool-permission prompt. The symlink prompt already // requires explicit user approval with the canonical target shown, // which is strictly more security-relevant than a generic confirm. Some(cx.update(|cx| { authorize_symlink_access( Self::NAME, &path, &canonical_target, &event_stream, cx, ) })) } else { match decision { ToolPermissionDecision::Allow => None, ToolPermissionDecision::Confirm => Some(cx.update(|cx| { let context = crate::ToolPermissionContext::new(Self::NAME, vec![path.clone()]); let title = format!("Delete {}", MarkdownInlineCode(&path)); let title = match settings_kind { Some(SensitiveSettingsKind::Local) => { format!("{title} (local settings)") } Some(SensitiveSettingsKind::Global) => format!("{title} (settings)"), None => title, }; event_stream.authorize(title, context, cx) })), ToolPermissionDecision::Deny(_) => None, } }; if let Some(authorize) = authorize { authorize.await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?; } let (project_path, worktree_snapshot) = project.read_with(cx, |project, cx| { let project_path = project.find_project_path(&path, cx).ok_or_else(|| { format!("Couldn't delete {path} because that path isn't in this project.") })?; let worktree = project .worktree_for_id(project_path.worktree_id, cx) .ok_or_else(|| { format!("Couldn't delete {path} because that path isn't in this project.") })?; let worktree_snapshot = worktree.read(cx).snapshot(); Result::<_, String>::Ok((project_path, worktree_snapshot)) })?; let (mut paths_tx, mut paths_rx) = mpsc::channel(256); cx.background_spawn({ let project_path = project_path.clone(); async move { for entry in worktree_snapshot.traverse_from_path(true, false, false, &project_path.path) { if !entry.path.starts_with(&project_path.path) { break; } paths_tx .send(ProjectPath { worktree_id: project_path.worktree_id, path: entry.path.clone(), }) .await?; } anyhow::Ok(()) } }) .detach(); loop { let path_result = futures::select! { path = paths_rx.next().fuse() => path, _ = event_stream.cancelled_by_user().fuse() => { return Err("Delete cancelled by user".to_string()); } }; let Some(path) = path_result else { break; }; if let Ok(buffer) = project .update(cx, |project, cx| project.open_buffer(path, cx)) .await { action_log.update(cx, |action_log, cx| { action_log.will_delete_buffer(buffer.clone(), cx) }); } } let deletion_task = project .update(cx, |project, cx| { project.delete_file(project_path, false, cx) }) .ok_or_else(|| { format!("Couldn't delete {path} because that path isn't in this project.") })?; futures::select! { result = deletion_task.fuse() => { result.map_err(|e| format!("Deleting {path}: {e}"))?; } _ = event_stream.cancelled_by_user().fuse() => { return Err("Delete cancelled by user".to_string()); } } Ok(format!("Deleted {path}")) }) } } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; use agent_client_protocol as acp; use fs::Fs as _; use gpui::TestAppContext; use project::{FakeFs, Project}; use serde_json::json; use settings::SettingsStore; use std::path::PathBuf; use util::path; use crate::ToolCallEventStream; fn init_test(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { cx.update(|cx| { let settings_store = SettingsStore::test(cx); cx.set_global(settings_store); }); cx.update(|cx| { let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone(); settings.tool_permissions.default = settings::ToolPermissionMode::Allow; AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx); }); } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_requests_authorization(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { init_test(cx); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let task = cx.update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }), event_stream, cx, ) }); let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await; let title = auth.tool_call.fields.title.as_deref().unwrap_or(""); assert!( title.contains("points outside the project") || title.contains("symlink"), "Authorization title should mention symlink escape, got: {title}", ); auth.response .send(acp::PermissionOptionId::new("allow")) .unwrap(); let result = task.await; // FakeFs cannot delete symlink entries (they are neither Dir nor File // internally), so the deletion itself may fail. The important thing is // that the authorization was requested and accepted — any error must // come from the fs layer, not from a permission denial. if let Err(err) = &result { let msg = format!("{err:#}"); assert!( !msg.contains("denied") && !msg.contains("authorization"), "Error should not be a permission denial, got: {msg}", ); } } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_denied(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { init_test(cx); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let task = cx.update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }), event_stream, cx, ) }); let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await; drop(auth); let result = task.await; assert!( result.is_err(), "Tool should fail when authorization is denied" ); } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_confirm_requires_single_approval( cx: &mut TestAppContext, ) { init_test(cx); cx.update(|cx| { let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone(); settings.tool_permissions.default = settings::ToolPermissionMode::Confirm; AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx); }); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let task = cx.update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }), event_stream, cx, ) }); let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await; let title = auth.tool_call.fields.title.as_deref().unwrap_or(""); assert!( title.contains("points outside the project") || title.contains("symlink"), "Authorization title should mention symlink escape, got: {title}", ); auth.response .send(acp::PermissionOptionId::new("allow")) .unwrap(); assert!( !matches!( event_rx.try_next(), Ok(Some(Ok(crate::ThreadEvent::ToolCallAuthorization(_)))) ), "Expected a single authorization prompt", ); let result = task.await; if let Err(err) = &result { let message = format!("{err:#}"); assert!( !message.contains("denied") && !message.contains("authorization"), "Error should not be a permission denial, got: {message}", ); } } #[gpui::test] async fn test_delete_path_symlink_escape_honors_deny_policy(cx: &mut TestAppContext) { init_test(cx); cx.update(|cx| { let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone(); settings.tool_permissions.tools.insert( "delete_path".into(), agent_settings::ToolRules { default: Some(settings::ToolPermissionMode::Deny), ..Default::default() }, ); AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx); }); let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor()); fs.insert_tree( path!("/root"), json!({ "project": { "src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" } }, "external": { "data": { "file.txt": "content" } } }), ) .await; fs.create_symlink( path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(), PathBuf::from("../external"), ) .await .unwrap(); let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await; cx.executor().run_until_parked(); let action_log = cx.new(|_| ActionLog::new(project.clone())); let tool = Arc::new(DeletePathTool::new(project, action_log)); let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test(); let result = cx .update(|cx| { tool.run( ToolInput::resolved(DeletePathToolInput { path: "project/link_to_external".into(), }),