// Browser → Axiom OTLP ingress. The web client exports its spans to// same-origin /v1/traces (it can never hold AXIOM_TOKEN); this worker route// forwards the batch to Axiom with the server-held credentials. Locally and// in e2e the vite dev server proxies the same path to motel before the// worker ever sees it, so this route only serves deployed workers.//// Guards, not auth: the endpoint is write-only into a server-pinned dataset,// but it should not be an anonymous internet ingest — a session cookie must// at least be present, and bodies are capped. We deliberately do NOT verify// the session (that would put a WorkOS round-trip on every span batch).//// The batch is never forwarded opaquely. The page-side exporter scrubs its// own spans, but the page is not a trust boundary — anything with the cookie// can POST here — so the worker decodes the OTLP JSON payload, scrubs every// credential-bearing URL component server-side, and forwards the// re-serialized result. A batch that does not parse as JSON is refused: what// cannot be scrubbed is not forwarded.import { redactOtlpTraceExport } from "@executor-js/sdk";const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 2_000_000;export const BROWSER_TRACES_PATH = "/v1/traces";/** The batch re-serialized with every URL scrubbed, or `undefined` when it is * not valid JSON (or too deep to scrub) and must be refused. */const scrubbedBatch = (body: string): string | undefined => { // oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-try-catch-or-throw -- boundary: JSON.parse throws on malformed input; the refusal path (400) is the handled outcome try { // oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-json-parse -- boundary: the batch is deliberately unknown-shaped (the scrub walks arbitrary JSON); there is no schema to decode into return JSON.stringify(redactOtlpTraceExport(JSON.parse(body))); } catch { return undefined; }};export const browserTracesResponse = ( request: Request, env: Env, fetchImpl: typeof fetch = fetch,): Promise<Response> | null => { const url = new URL(request.url); if (url.pathname !== BROWSER_TRACES_PATH) return null; if (request.method !== "POST") { return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 405 })); } // Tracing not configured on this deployment — accept and drop so the // client exporter stays quiet (it would retry/log on errors). if (!env.AXIOM_TOKEN) { return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 204 })); } if (!(request.headers.get("cookie") ?? "").includes("wos-session=")) { return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 401 })); } const contentLength = Number(request.headers.get("content-length") ?? 0); if (contentLength > MAX_BODY_BYTES) { return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 413 })); } return request.text().then( (body) => { // The content-length guard above trusts a header; re-check the bytes // actually read. if (body.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES) { return new Response(null, { status: 413 }); } const scrubbed = scrubbedBatch(body); if (scrubbed === undefined) { return new Response(null, { status: 400 }); } return fetchImpl(env.AXIOM_TRACES_URL ?? "https://api.axiom.co/v1/traces", { method: "POST", headers: { // Always JSON: the batch was decoded, scrubbed, and re-serialized. "content-type": "application/json", authorization: `Bearer ${env.AXIOM_TOKEN}`, "x-axiom-dataset": env.AXIOM_DATASET ?? "executor-cloud", }, body: scrubbed, }).then( // The exporter only needs success/failure; never reflect Axiom's // response body (or its headers) back to an unauthenticated caller. (upstream) => new Response(null, { status: upstream.ok ? 204 : 502 }), () => new Response(null, { status: 502 }), ); }, // An unreadable body cannot be scrubbed, so it is refused, not forwarded. () => new Response(null, { status: 400 }), );};
// Browser → Axiom OTLP ingress. The web client exports its spans to
// same-origin /v1/traces (it can never hold AXIOM_TOKEN); this worker route
// forwards the batch to Axiom with the server-held credentials. Locally and
// in e2e the vite dev server proxies the same path to motel before the
// worker ever sees it, so this route only serves deployed workers.
//
// Guards, not auth: the endpoint is write-only into a server-pinned dataset,
// but it should not be an anonymous internet ingest — a session cookie must
// at least be present, and bodies are capped. We deliberately do NOT verify
// the session (that would put a WorkOS round-trip on every span batch).
//
// The batch is never forwarded opaquely. The page-side exporter scrubs its
// own spans, but the page is not a trust boundary — anything with the cookie
// can POST here — so the worker decodes the OTLP JSON payload, scrubs every
// credential-bearing URL component server-side, and forwards the
// re-serialized result. A batch that does not parse as JSON is refused: what
// cannot be scrubbed is not forwarded.
import { redactOtlpTraceExport } from "@executor-js/sdk";
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 2_000_000;
export const BROWSER_TRACES_PATH = "/v1/traces";
/** The batch re-serialized with every URL scrubbed, or `undefined` when it is
* not valid JSON (or too deep to scrub) and must be refused. */
const scrubbedBatch = (body: string): string | undefined => {
// oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-try-catch-or-throw -- boundary: JSON.parse throws on malformed input; the refusal path (400) is the handled outcome
try {
// oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-json-parse -- boundary: the batch is deliberately unknown-shaped (the scrub walks arbitrary JSON); there is no schema to decode into
return JSON.stringify(redactOtlpTraceExport(JSON.parse(body)));
} catch {
return undefined;
}
};
export const browserTracesResponse = (
request: Request,
env: Env,
fetchImpl: typeof fetch = fetch,
): Promise<Response> | null => {
const url = new URL(request.url);
if (url.pathname !== BROWSER_TRACES_PATH) return null;
if (request.method !== "POST") {
return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 405 }));
}
// Tracing not configured on this deployment — accept and drop so the
// client exporter stays quiet (it would retry/log on errors).
if (!env.AXIOM_TOKEN) {
return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 204 }));
}
if (!(request.headers.get("cookie") ?? "").includes("wos-session=")) {
return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 401 }));
}
const contentLength = Number(request.headers.get("content-length") ?? 0);
if (contentLength > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
return Promise.resolve(new Response(null, { status: 413 }));
}
return request.text().then(
(body) => {
// The content-length guard above trusts a header; re-check the bytes
// actually read.
if (body.length > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
return new Response(null, { status: 413 });
}
const scrubbed = scrubbedBatch(body);
if (scrubbed === undefined) {
return new Response(null, { status: 400 });
}
return fetchImpl(env.AXIOM_TRACES_URL ?? "https://api.axiom.co/v1/traces", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
// Always JSON: the batch was decoded, scrubbed, and re-serialized.
"content-type": "application/json",
authorization: `Bearer ${env.AXIOM_TOKEN}`,
"x-axiom-dataset": env.AXIOM_DATASET ?? "executor-cloud",
},
body: scrubbed,
}).then(
// The exporter only needs success/failure; never reflect Axiom's
// response body (or its headers) back to an unauthenticated caller.
(upstream) => new Response(null, { status: upstream.ok ? 204 : 502 }),
() => new Response(null, { status: 502 }),
);
},
// An unreadable body cannot be scrubbed, so it is refused, not forwarded.
() => new Response(null, { status: 400 }),
);
};