// Cloud-specific: the SSR auth gate's session handling BEYOND the basic// signed-out redirect (unauthenticated-skeleton.test.ts owns that): an// invalid cookie is actively cleared, /cloud (the marketing CTA path) routes// into the app, and — the nastiest path — a session whose access token no// longer verifies is refreshed in-flight, with the rotated sealed session// reaching the browser. WorkOS refresh tokens are single-use, so losing that// Set-Cookie silently logs the user out on next expiry; these scenarios pin// it against the real WorkOS emulator (real rotation, real revocation).import { expect } from "@effect/vitest";import { Effect } from "effect";import * as Iron from "iron-webcrypto"; import { scenario } from "../src/scenario";import { Api, Target } from "../src/services";import { E2E_COOKIE_PASSWORD } from "../targets/cloud"; /** A signed-out-style document request (what the gate keys on). */const documentRequest = (url: URL, cookie?: string) => Effect.promise(() => fetch(url, { redirect: "manual", headers: { accept: "text/html", ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}) }, }), ); const setCookieFor = (response: Response, name: string): string => { for (const header of response.headers.getSetCookie()) { if (header.startsWith(`${name}=`)) return header; } return "";}; scenario( "Session gate · an invalid session cookie is cleared on the way to /login", {}, Effect.gen(function* () { // Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target. yield* Api; const target = yield* Target; // A cookie that was never a sealed session. On executor.sh its mere // presence routes / past the marketing page, so the gate must not just // redirect — it must take the cookie (and the auth hint beside it) away. const response = yield* documentRequest( new URL("/", target.baseUrl), "wos-session=not-a-real-session; executor-auth-hint=stale", ); expect(response.status, "an unverifiable session is signed out").toBe(302); expect(response.headers.get("location"), "…to the login page").toBe("/login"); const clearedSession = setCookieFor(response, "wos-session"); expect(clearedSession, "the dead session cookie is dropped").toContain("Max-Age=0"); const clearedHint = setCookieFor(response, "executor-auth-hint"); expect(clearedHint, "the auth hint goes with it").toContain("Max-Age=0"); }),); scenario( "Session gate · /cloud (the marketing CTA path) routes into the app", {}, Effect.gen(function* () { // Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target. yield* Api; const target = yield* Target; // Marketing CTAs link to /cloud, which is not a route — it means "open // the app". Signed out, that lands on login (no returnTo: the deep link // IS the root)… const signedOut = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/cloud", target.baseUrl)); expect(signedOut.status, "signed-out /cloud is gated like any page").toBe(302); expect(signedOut.headers.get("location"), "…straight to login").toBe("/login"); // …and signed in, it opens the app at the root instead of 404ing. const identity = yield* target.newIdentity(); const signedIn = yield* documentRequest( new URL("/cloud", target.baseUrl), identity.headers!.cookie!, ); expect(signedIn.status, "signed-in /cloud is a redirect, not a 404").toBe(302); expect(signedIn.headers.get("location"), "…into the app").toBe("/"); }),); scenario( "Session gate · an org-less session is sent to onboarding before the app shell exists", {}, Effect.gen(function* () { // Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target. yield* Api; const target = yield* Target; // A verified user with no organization belongs in onboarding — the gate // decides that at the edge, so the app shell (whose every query needs an // org) is never even served. const orgless = yield* target.newIdentity({ org: false }); const gated = yield* documentRequest( new URL("/tools", target.baseUrl), orgless.headers!.cookie!, ); expect(gated.status, "the app page is not served org-less").toBe(302); expect(gated.headers.get("location"), "…onboarding owns this session").toBe("/create-org"); // The onboarding page itself is served (no redirect loop). const onboarding = yield* documentRequest( new URL("/create-org", target.baseUrl), orgless.headers!.cookie!, ); expect(onboarding.status, "/create-org renders for the org-less session").toBe(200); }),); // The sealed wos-session is iron-sealed JSON { accessToken, refreshToken, … }.// Corrupting the access token's signature makes the gate's verify fail the// same way an EXPIRED token does (invalid JWT → refresh path) — without// waiting out a real expiry. Same sealing library + password map the WorkOS// SDK uses, so the gate can't tell this seal from one the SDK minted.const withTamperedAccessToken = async (sessionCookie: string): Promise<string> => { const sealed = sessionCookie.slice("wos-session=".length).replace(/~\d$/, ""); const session = (await Iron.unseal(sealed, { "1": E2E_COOKIE_PASSWORD }, Iron.defaults)) as { accessToken: string; }; const [header, payload, signature] = session.accessToken.split("."); const tampered = { ...session, accessToken: `${header}.${payload}.${[...(signature ?? "")].reverse().join("")}`, }; const resealed = await Iron.seal( tampered, { id: "1", secret: E2E_COOKIE_PASSWORD }, Iron.defaults, ); return `wos-session=${resealed}~2`;}; scenario( "Session gate · a stale access token is refreshed in-flight and the rotated session reaches the browser", {}, Effect.gen(function* () { // Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target. yield* Api; const target = yield* Target; const identity = yield* target.newIdentity(); const staleCookie = yield* Effect.promise(() => withTamperedAccessToken(identity.headers!.cookie!), ); // 1. The page is served (no login detour) — the gate refreshed the // session against WorkOS mid-request — and the ROTATED sealed session // is set on the response. Refresh tokens are single-use: dropping // this Set-Cookie would log the user out at the next expiry. const refreshed = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/", target.baseUrl), staleCookie); expect(refreshed.status, "a refreshable session still gets the page").toBe(200); const rotated = setCookieFor(refreshed, "wos-session"); expect(rotated, "the rotated sealed session is persisted").toContain("Max-Age="); expect(rotated, "…as a fresh value, not the stale one").not.toContain( staleCookie.slice("wos-session=".length, 80), ); // 2. The rotation was real: the OLD session's refresh token is revoked // server-side, so replaying the stale cookie now signs out. const replayed = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/", target.baseUrl), staleCookie); expect(replayed.status, "the spent session is refused").toBe(302); expect(replayed.headers.get("location"), "…and signed out to login").toBe("/login"); expect( setCookieFor(replayed, "wos-session"), "the spent cookie is cleared, not left to retry forever", ).toContain("Max-Age=0"); // 3. And the rotated session the browser was handed actually works. const rotatedCookie = rotated.split(";")[0]!; const next = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/tools", target.baseUrl), rotatedCookie); expect(next.status, "the rotated session opens the app").toBe(200); }),);
// Cloud-specific: the SSR auth gate's session handling BEYOND the basic
// signed-out redirect (unauthenticated-skeleton.test.ts owns that): an
// invalid cookie is actively cleared, /cloud (the marketing CTA path) routes
// into the app, and — the nastiest path — a session whose access token no
// longer verifies is refreshed in-flight, with the rotated sealed session
// reaching the browser. WorkOS refresh tokens are single-use, so losing that
// Set-Cookie silently logs the user out on next expiry; these scenarios pin
// it against the real WorkOS emulator (real rotation, real revocation).
import { expect } from "@effect/vitest";
import { Effect } from "effect";
import * as Iron from "iron-webcrypto";
import { scenario } from "../src/scenario";
import { Api, Target } from "../src/services";
import { E2E_COOKIE_PASSWORD } from "../targets/cloud";
/** A signed-out-style document request (what the gate keys on). */
const documentRequest = (url: URL, cookie?: string) =>
Effect.promise(() =>
fetch(url, {
redirect: "manual",
headers: { accept: "text/html", ...(cookie ? { cookie } : {}) },
}),
);
const setCookieFor = (response: Response, name: string): string => {
for (const header of response.headers.getSetCookie()) {
if (header.startsWith(`${name}=`)) return header;
}
return "";
};
scenario(
"Session gate · an invalid session cookie is cleared on the way to /login",
{},
Effect.gen(function* () {
// Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target.
yield* Api;
const target = yield* Target;
// A cookie that was never a sealed session. On executor.sh its mere
// presence routes / past the marketing page, so the gate must not just
// redirect — it must take the cookie (and the auth hint beside it) away.
const response = yield* documentRequest(
new URL("/", target.baseUrl),
"wos-session=not-a-real-session; executor-auth-hint=stale",
);
expect(response.status, "an unverifiable session is signed out").toBe(302);
expect(response.headers.get("location"), "…to the login page").toBe("/login");
const clearedSession = setCookieFor(response, "wos-session");
expect(clearedSession, "the dead session cookie is dropped").toContain("Max-Age=0");
const clearedHint = setCookieFor(response, "executor-auth-hint");
expect(clearedHint, "the auth hint goes with it").toContain("Max-Age=0");
}),
);
scenario(
"Session gate · /cloud (the marketing CTA path) routes into the app",
{},
Effect.gen(function* () {
// Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target.
yield* Api;
const target = yield* Target;
// Marketing CTAs link to /cloud, which is not a route — it means "open
// the app". Signed out, that lands on login (no returnTo: the deep link
// IS the root)…
const signedOut = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/cloud", target.baseUrl));
expect(signedOut.status, "signed-out /cloud is gated like any page").toBe(302);
expect(signedOut.headers.get("location"), "…straight to login").toBe("/login");
// …and signed in, it opens the app at the root instead of 404ing.
const identity = yield* target.newIdentity();
const signedIn = yield* documentRequest(
new URL("/cloud", target.baseUrl),
identity.headers!.cookie!,
);
expect(signedIn.status, "signed-in /cloud is a redirect, not a 404").toBe(302);
expect(signedIn.headers.get("location"), "…into the app").toBe("/");
}),
);
scenario(
"Session gate · an org-less session is sent to onboarding before the app shell exists",
{},
Effect.gen(function* () {
// Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target.
yield* Api;
const target = yield* Target;
// A verified user with no organization belongs in onboarding — the gate
// decides that at the edge, so the app shell (whose every query needs an
// org) is never even served.
const orgless = yield* target.newIdentity({ org: false });
const gated = yield* documentRequest(
new URL("/tools", target.baseUrl),
orgless.headers!.cookie!,
);
expect(gated.status, "the app page is not served org-less").toBe(302);
expect(gated.headers.get("location"), "…onboarding owns this session").toBe("/create-org");
// The onboarding page itself is served (no redirect loop).
const onboarding = yield* documentRequest(
new URL("/create-org", target.baseUrl),
orgless.headers!.cookie!,
);
expect(onboarding.status, "/create-org renders for the org-less session").toBe(200);
}),
);
// The sealed wos-session is iron-sealed JSON { accessToken, refreshToken, … }.
// Corrupting the access token's signature makes the gate's verify fail the
// same way an EXPIRED token does (invalid JWT → refresh path) — without
// waiting out a real expiry. Same sealing library + password map the WorkOS
// SDK uses, so the gate can't tell this seal from one the SDK minted.
const withTamperedAccessToken = async (sessionCookie: string): Promise<string> => {
const sealed = sessionCookie.slice("wos-session=".length).replace(/~\d$/, "");
const session = (await Iron.unseal(sealed, { "1": E2E_COOKIE_PASSWORD }, Iron.defaults)) as {
accessToken: string;
};
const [header, payload, signature] = session.accessToken.split(".");
const tampered = {
...session,
accessToken: `${header}.${payload}.${[...(signature ?? "")].reverse().join("")}`,
};
const resealed = await Iron.seal(
tampered,
{ id: "1", secret: E2E_COOKIE_PASSWORD },
Iron.defaults,
);
return `wos-session=${resealed}~2`;
};
scenario(
"Session gate · a stale access token is refreshed in-flight and the rotated session reaches the browser",
{},
Effect.gen(function* () {
// Gate: the REST API plane is mounted on this target.
yield* Api;
const target = yield* Target;
const identity = yield* target.newIdentity();
const staleCookie = yield* Effect.promise(() =>
withTamperedAccessToken(identity.headers!.cookie!),
);
// 1. The page is served (no login detour) — the gate refreshed the
// session against WorkOS mid-request — and the ROTATED sealed session
// is set on the response. Refresh tokens are single-use: dropping
// this Set-Cookie would log the user out at the next expiry.
const refreshed = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/", target.baseUrl), staleCookie);
expect(refreshed.status, "a refreshable session still gets the page").toBe(200);
const rotated = setCookieFor(refreshed, "wos-session");
expect(rotated, "the rotated sealed session is persisted").toContain("Max-Age=");
expect(rotated, "…as a fresh value, not the stale one").not.toContain(
staleCookie.slice("wos-session=".length, 80),
);
// 2. The rotation was real: the OLD session's refresh token is revoked
// server-side, so replaying the stale cookie now signs out.
const replayed = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/", target.baseUrl), staleCookie);
expect(replayed.status, "the spent session is refused").toBe(302);
expect(replayed.headers.get("location"), "…and signed out to login").toBe("/login");
expect(
setCookieFor(replayed, "wos-session"),
"the spent cookie is cleared, not left to retry forever",
).toContain("Max-Age=0");
// 3. And the rotated session the browser was handed actually works.
const rotatedCookie = rotated.split(";")[0]!;
const next = yield* documentRequest(new URL("/tools", target.baseUrl), rotatedCookie);
expect(next.status, "the rotated session opens the app").toBe(200);
}),
);