import { Effect, Match, Predicate } from "effect";import { HttpRouter, HttpServerRequest, HttpServerResponse } from "effect/unstable/http"; import {  defaultMcpResource,  McpAuthProvider,  McpErrorReporter,  McpSessionStore,  type AuthOutcome,  type McpDispatchResult,  type McpResource,} from "./seams"; // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------// Provider-neutral MCP serving envelope.//// Routes://   GET <provider-declared discovery paths>  -> McpAuthProvider metadata//   *   /mcp                                  -> authenticate -> dispatch(default)//   *   /mcp/toolkits/:toolkitSlug            -> authenticate -> dispatch(toolkit)//// The provider DECLARES the discovery paths it owns (at least the protected-// resource metadata document) via `McpAuthProvider.discoveryRoutes`; the// envelope never hard-codes `/.well-known/oauth-*`. The OAuth endpoints// (/authorize, /token, /register) stay OUT of the envelope: they are served by// the provider's own handler (self-host: Better Auth at /api/auth; cloud:// WorkOS, external). The envelope only needs the provider's discovery routes,// resource-metadata URL, and authenticate.//// The envelope hard-codes ONLY the MCP serving paths and CORS. Everything else// — every `/.well-known/*` path, the resource-metadata URL, the authn/authz// semantics, and the entire session lifecycle (create + forward + ownership) —// comes from the two seams.//// Runtime-agnostic: built on `effect/unstable/http` (HttpRouter), NO// platform-bun. The `/mcp` flow is fully Effect; the streamable-HTTP transport// works on web `Request`/`Response`, so the envelope reconstructs the inbound// web request once, hands it to the store, and converts the store's `Response`// into an Effect response while preserving both streaming bodies and outer// metadata (the latter matters when the HTTP adapter strips a HEAD body).// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- const MCP_PATH = "/mcp";const TOOLKIT_MCP_PATH = "/mcp/toolkits/:toolkitSlug"; /** The methods the streamable-HTTP transport accepts on `/mcp`. */const ALLOWED_MCP_METHODS = new Set(["GET", "POST", "DELETE", "OPTIONS"]); /** * Preserve a WHATWG response's status and headers on the Effect wrapper. * * Passing only `response` to `HttpServerResponse.raw` works for ordinary * requests because `toWeb` returns the nested Response verbatim. For HEAD, * however, the adapter intentionally omits the nested body and serializes the * outer wrapper instead; without copied metadata that becomes an empty 200 * with no content type. */const fromWebResponse = (response: Response): HttpServerResponse.HttpServerResponse =>  HttpServerResponse.raw(response, {    status: response.status,    statusText: response.statusText,    headers: response.headers,  }); /** * The canonical CORS preflight `Response` (204) answered for an `OPTIONS` on * `/mcp` AND on every provider-declared discovery path. A browser issues a * preflight against the metadata docs too (RFC 9728 discovery from a 401), so * the envelope answers OPTIONS for those paths, not only `/mcp`. */const corsPreflightResponse = (): Response =>  new Response(null, {    status: 204,    headers: {      "access-control-allow-origin": "*",      "access-control-allow-methods": "GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS",      "access-control-allow-headers":        "content-type, authorization, mcp-session-id, accept, mcp-protocol-version",      "access-control-expose-headers": "mcp-session-id, WWW-Authenticate",    },  }); /** * The canonical JSON-RPC error `Response` builder for every MCP serving site. * * Emits the EXACT body every host renders — `{jsonrpc:"2.0",error:{code,message}, * id:null}` — with `content-type: application/json`. Two header policies: * *   - `cors: true` (default) adds `access-control-allow-origin: *`. This is the *     envelope's policy and the cloud edge worker's (`jsonRpcWebResponse`): *     errors cross the browser boundary, so they carry CORS. A `challenge` *     additionally emits the `WWW-Authenticate` header + exposes it via CORS *     (the 401 path). *   - `cors: false` omits CORS entirely — for INNER responses that never reach *     the browser directly (the cloud Durable Object and the self-host /local *     in-process stores, whose `Response` is post-processed / re-wrapped with *     CORS by the outer envelope before it leaves the origin). * * One renderer, byte-identical bodies across host-mcp + cloud + self-host + * local — the four hand-rolled copies are deleted in favor of this. */export const jsonRpcErrorBody = (  status: number,  code: number,  message: string,  opts?: {    readonly cors?: boolean;    readonly challenge?: string;    readonly retryAfterSeconds?: number;  },): Response => {  const cors = opts?.cors ?? true;  const challenge = opts?.challenge;  const retryAfterSeconds = opts?.retryAfterSeconds;  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ jsonrpc: "2.0", error: { code, message }, id: null }), {    status,    headers: {      "content-type": "application/json",      ...(cors ? { "access-control-allow-origin": "*" } : {}),      ...(challenge        ? {            "www-authenticate": challenge,            "access-control-expose-headers": "WWW-Authenticate",          }        : {}),      ...(retryAfterSeconds === undefined ? {} : { "retry-after": String(retryAfterSeconds) }),    },  });}; /** * Advertised on transient-auth 503s (`Unavailable` outcomes) so clients back * off before retrying. Short: upstream auth-infra blips (JWKS fetch, IdP * membership lookups) are typically sub-second. */export const UNAVAILABLE_RETRY_AFTER_SECONDS = 2; /** The envelope's own CORS-on JSON-RPC error `Response`, optionally carrying a challenge. */const jsonRpcResponse = (  status: number,  code: number,  message: string,  challenge?: string,): Response =>  challenge === undefined    ? jsonRpcErrorBody(status, code, message)    : jsonRpcErrorBody(status, code, message, { challenge }); /** * Reconstruct a WHATWG `Request` from the Effect HTTP request. Prefer the * underlying source `Request` (preserves the body stream the transport reads); * otherwise rebuild from parts. A failed body read is a defect here, not a * recoverable error. */const toWebRequest = (req: HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest): Effect.Effect<Request> =>  Effect.gen(function* () {    if (req.source instanceof Request) return req.source;    const headers = new Headers(req.headers as Record<string, string>);    const hasBody = req.method !== "GET" && req.method !== "HEAD";    // oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-effect-escape-hatch -- boundary: rebuilding a web Request from a non-web source; a failed body read is an unrecoverable infra defect, not a domain error    const body = hasBody ? yield* req.text.pipe(Effect.orDie) : undefined;    return new Request(req.url, { method: req.method, headers, body });  }); /** Serve a provider discovery document, wrapping its web `Response`. */const discoveryRoute = (handler: (request: Request) => Effect.Effect<Response>) =>  Effect.gen(function* () {    const httpRequest = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest;    const request = yield* toWebRequest(httpRequest);    const response = yield* handler(request);    return fromWebResponse(response);  }); /** * Render a non-`Authenticated` {@link AuthOutcome} to a web `Response`: *   Unauthorized -> 401 + RFC 9728 challenge (outcome's own, else a default *                   built from the provider's `resourceMetadataUrl`) *   Forbidden    -> 403 JSON-RPC (default code -32001) *   Unavailable  -> 503 JSON-RPC -32001 + Retry-After * * The transient 503 and the session-lifecycle 404 both use JSON-RPC code * -32001 (the shared "auth/session envelope error" code); clients discriminate * on the HTTP status, which is the contract — 503 means retry the SAME * session, 404 means the session id is dead and the client must reconnect. */const renderAuthError = (  auth: McpAuthProvider["Service"],  request: Request,  outcome: Exclude<AuthOutcome, { readonly _tag: "Authenticated" }>,): Response =>  Match.value(outcome).pipe(    Match.tag("Unauthorized", (u) =>      jsonRpcResponse(        401,        -32001,        "Unauthorized",        u.challenge ?? `Bearer resource_metadata="${auth.resourceMetadataUrl(request)}"`,      ),    ),    Match.tag("Forbidden", (f) => jsonRpcResponse(403, f.code ?? -32001, f.message)),    Match.tag("Unavailable", (u) =>      jsonRpcErrorBody(503, -32001, u.message, {        retryAfterSeconds: UNAVAILABLE_RETRY_AFTER_SECONDS,      }),    ),    Match.exhaustive,  ); /** * Render a non-`Response` {@link McpDispatchResult} discriminant. A dead * session answers by method: POST/DELETE keep the 404 that drives client * re-initialization; a standalone GET gets 405, which the v1 SDK reads as * "no SSE stream offered" and stops retrying — breaking pre-cutover * reconnect loops whose GET-404 path never re-initialized. */const renderDispatchError = (lookup: "not-found" | "forbidden", method: string): Response => {  if (lookup === "forbidden") {    return jsonRpcResponse(403, -32003, "MCP session does not belong to the current bearer");  }  if (method === "GET") {    return new Response(      JSON.stringify({        jsonrpc: "2.0",        error: { code: -32001, message: "Session not found" },        id: null,      }),      { status: 405, headers: { "content-type": "application/json", allow: "POST, DELETE" } },    );  }  return jsonRpcResponse(404, -32001, "Session not found");}; /** Dispatch an MCP request through authenticate -> store.dispatch -> transport. */const mcpDispatch = (resource: McpResource) =>  Effect.gen(function* () {    const httpRequest = yield* HttpServerRequest.HttpServerRequest;    const auth = yield* McpAuthProvider;    const store = yield* McpSessionStore;    const request = yield* toWebRequest(httpRequest);     // CORS preflight: answer before auth so unauthenticated clients can probe.    if (request.method === "OPTIONS") {      return fromWebResponse(corsPreflightResponse());    }     // Streamable-HTTP only defines GET/POST/DELETE on the endpoint. Any other    // method (PUT/PATCH/…) is rejected with a JSON-RPC 405 BEFORE auth/dispatch —    // otherwise it would fall through and spin up a session engine for a method    // the transport can't serve.    if (!ALLOWED_MCP_METHODS.has(request.method)) {      return fromWebResponse(jsonRpcResponse(405, -32001, "Method not allowed"));    }     const sessionId = request.headers.get("mcp-session-id");     // Authenticate (and, for session-aware providers, authorize) on EVERY    // request. Non-authenticated outcomes render directly. Session teardown is    // only safe after the store can validate the authenticated principal and MCP    // resource; an auth-level Forbidden may not carry either.    const outcome = yield* auth.authenticate(request);    if (!Predicate.isTagged(outcome, "Authenticated")) {      return fromWebResponse(renderAuthError(auth, request, outcome));    }    const principal = outcome.principal;     // No session id: per the streamable-HTTP transport contract, only POST opens    // a session. A GET needs an existing id (400); a DELETE on nothing is a    // no-op (204). Both short-circuit BEFORE dispatch so the store never spins up    // an engine for a bare GET/DELETE.    if (!sessionId) {      if (request.method === "GET") {        return fromWebResponse(          jsonRpcResponse(400, -32000, "mcp-session-id header required for SSE"),        );      }      if (request.method === "DELETE") {        return fromWebResponse(          new Response(null, { status: 204, headers: { "access-control-allow-origin": "*" } }),        );      }    }     const result: McpDispatchResult = yield* store.dispatch({      request,      principal,      resource,      sessionId,      method: request.method,    });    return fromWebResponse(      result instanceof Response ? result : renderDispatchError(result, request.method),    );  }); /** * The `/mcp` route. Wraps {@link mcpDispatch} in a top-level `catchCause`: a * request-orchestration defect (a rejected cross-isolate RPC, a body-tee * failure, …) is reported to the optional {@link McpErrorReporter} (Sentry / * `ErrorCapture` parity — the provider's capture pipeline would never see it * otherwise, since the envelope returns a `Response`) and rendered as a stable * JSON-RPC 500 -32603 + CORS, rather than a bare platform 500 with no body. */const mcpRoute = (resource: McpResource) =>  mcpDispatch(resource).pipe(    Effect.catchCause((cause) =>      Effect.gen(function* () {        const reporter = yield* McpErrorReporter;        yield* reporter.report(cause);        return fromWebResponse(jsonRpcResponse(500, -32603, "Internal server error"));      }),    ),  ); const toolkitMcpRoute = Effect.gen(function* () {  const params = yield* HttpRouter.params;  const slug = params.toolkitSlug;  return yield* mcpRoute(slug ? { kind: "toolkit", slug } : defaultMcpResource);}); /** * The shared MCP serving routes, as an `HttpRouter.use` Layer. A host merges * this with its other routes and provides the two seam Layers + the HTTP * platform services. Provider-neutral: cloud adopts the same Layer next. * * The discovery `GET` routes come from `McpAuthProvider.discoveryRoutes`, so * the provider — not the envelope — owns its `/.well-known/oauth-*` paths. An * `OPTIONS` on each discovery path answers the same CORS preflight as `/mcp` * (a browser preflights the metadata docs during RFC 9728 discovery). */export const McpServingRoutes = HttpRouter.use((router) =>  Effect.gen(function* () {    const auth = yield* McpAuthProvider;    for (const route of auth.discoveryRoutes) {      yield* router.add("GET", route.path, discoveryRoute(route.handler));      yield* router.add(        "OPTIONS",        route.path,        Effect.sync(() => fromWebResponse(corsPreflightResponse())),      );    }    yield* router.add("*", MCP_PATH, mcpRoute(defaultMcpResource));    yield* router.add("*", TOOLKIT_MCP_PATH, toolkitMcpRoute);  }),); /** * The discovery-only subset of {@link McpServingRoutes}: the provider-declared * `/.well-known/oauth-*` GET routes plus their CORS preflight, and NOTHING on * `/mcp`. Requires only the {@link McpAuthProvider} seam, not {@link McpSessionStore}. * * For a host whose `/mcp` transport is served outside this envelope (the * Cloudflare Agent bridge intercepts `/mcp` before the app handler) but that * still needs to publish its OAuth metadata docs. Such a host wires the `auth` * seam without a `sessions` seam. */export const McpDiscoveryRoutes = HttpRouter.use((router) =>  Effect.gen(function* () {    const auth = yield* McpAuthProvider;    for (const route of auth.discoveryRoutes) {      yield* router.add("GET", route.path, discoveryRoute(route.handler));      yield* router.add(        "OPTIONS",        route.path,        Effect.sync(() => fromWebResponse(corsPreflightResponse())),      );    }  }),);