// MCP plugin tagged errors. API-facing errors carry `HttpApiSchema`// annotations so they can be `.addError(...)` directly on the API group. import { Data, Schema } from "effect"; export class McpConnectionError extends Schema.TaggedErrorClass<McpConnectionError>()(  "McpConnectionError",  {    transport: Schema.String,    message: Schema.String,    /** HTTP status the handshake observed (e.g. 401 on an auth wall), when the     *  transport surfaced one. Structural, so the liveness classifier and the     *  auto-transport fallback never string-match the message. */    httpStatus: Schema.optional(Schema.Number),    /** The 403 carried an RFC 6750 insufficient_scope challenge (set by the     *  connection layer when the fetch adapter intercepted one during the     *  handshake). */    insufficientScope: Schema.optional(Schema.Boolean),  },  { httpApiStatus: 400 },) {} export class McpToolDiscoveryError extends Schema.TaggedErrorClass<McpToolDiscoveryError>()(  "McpToolDiscoveryError",  {    stage: Schema.Literals(["connect", "list_tools"]),    message: Schema.String,    /** HTTP status from the underlying connect failure, when known. */    httpStatus: Schema.optional(Schema.Number),  },  { httpApiStatus: 400 },) {} // Internal only: core wraps non-auth failures as ToolInvocationError.cause, so// this must carry only sanitized invocation metadata. Raw SDK causes can contain// upstream bodies/challenges and should not leave the invoke catch block.export class McpInvocationError extends Data.TaggedError("McpInvocationError")<{  readonly toolName: string;  readonly message: string;  readonly status?: number;  /** The SDK failure came from the HTTP/SSE transport rather than a JSON-RPC   *  protocol response. Used only to decide whether a leased session is safe   *  to return to the idle pool. */  readonly transportFailure?: boolean;  /** The server rejected the call as an unknown tool (protocol error), which   *  means the persisted catalog has drifted from the server's live tool set. */  readonly unknownTool?: boolean;  /** A 403 whose body named a scope shortfall (RFC 6750 insufficient_scope /   *  Google's ACCESS_TOKEN_SCOPE_INSUFFICIENT): re-authenticating the same   *  grant cannot fix it, so the failure must not be labelled   *  connection_rejected. */  readonly insufficientScope?: boolean;}> {} export class McpOAuthReauthorizationRequired extends Data.TaggedError(  "McpOAuthReauthorizationRequired",)<{  readonly message: string;}> {} /** Thrown by the fetch adapter when a 403 carries an RFC 6750 *  `error="insufficient_scope"` challenge. Raised BELOW the MCP SDK on *  purpose: with an authProvider present the SDK would otherwise consume the *  challenge and re-run auth ("upscoping"), which our static-token provider *  can only answer by demanding reauthorization — the exact loop the *  oauth_scope_insufficient classification exists to break. */export class McpInsufficientScopeError extends Data.TaggedError("McpInsufficientScopeError")<{  readonly message: string;}> {} export class McpOAuthError extends Schema.TaggedErrorClass<McpOAuthError>()(  "McpOAuthError",  {    message: Schema.String,  },  { httpApiStatus: 400 },) {}