import { HttpApiBuilder } from "effect/unstable/httpapi";import { HttpRouter, HttpServer } from "effect/unstable/http";import { describe, expect, it } from "@effect/vitest";import { Context, Data, Effect, Layer, type Scope } from "effect"; import {  Subject,  Tenant,  collectTables,  createExecutor,  type AdminSubject,  type Executor,  type ExecutorAdmin,} from "@executor-js/sdk";import { createSqliteTestFumaDb, type SqliteTestFumaDb } from "@executor-js/sdk/testing";import { resetSubjectTouchCache, touchSubject } from "@executor-js/sdk/host-internal"; import { AdminUsersHttpApi, AdminUsersForbidden, AdminUsersUnauthorized } from "./api";import { AdminUsersHandlers } from "./handlers";import { AdminUsersProvider, type AdminUsersHeaders } from "./service";import {  getUser,  listUserConnections,  listUsers,  listUsersWithConnections,  platformViewOf,  type AdminIdentityDirectory,  type AdminUserDirectory,} from "./reads"; // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------// The admin users HTTP surface, over a real SQLite-backed platform view.//// The reads themselves (tenant reach, the bigint `last_seen_at` round-trip, the// field allowlist) are proven in the SDK's `platform-view.test.ts`. What this// file proves is the HTTP EDGE on top of them://   - the public vocabulary + wire shapes the contract promises,//   - the authorization outcomes (401 vs 403) a host's provider produces,//   - that a tenant's admin plane cannot see another tenant's rows,//   - that no credential-bearing field survives the projection.//// The provider seam is stubbed the way each host's real one behaves, so the// authz assertions are about the CONTRACT (which status a refusal renders),// not about WorkOS or Better Auth.// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- const TENANT_A = "org_a";const TENANT_B = "org_b";const USER_A1 = "user_a1";const USER_A2 = "user_a2";const USER_B1 = "user_b1"; /** Every field that could resolve, or help resolve, a credential. NONE may *  appear anywhere in an admin HTTP response — enumerated so a future column *  addition has to be argued with this list. Mirrors the SDK's own list. */const FORBIDDEN_FIELDS = [  "item_ids",  "itemIds",  "refresh_item_id",  "refreshItemId",  "provider",  "provider_state",  "providerState",  "oauth_token_url",  "oauthTokenUrl",  "template",  "client_secret",  "clientSecret",  "secret",  "token",  // The internal partition keys: the public vocabulary is users/owners, so  // neither the raw column name nor the tenant may leak onto the wire.  "subject",  "tenant",  // The upstream-derived halves of a stored health verdict. These are not  // CREDENTIALS — they are the provider's own response content: the account  // identity extracted from `identityField` (another user's email at the  // provider), a raw diagnostic that can quote an upstream error body, and a  // sample of the real response body. `lastHealth` is an allowed COLUMN, which  // is exactly why these need naming: the per-column allowlist passed while the  // whole nested object rode along inside it. `AdminConnectionHealth` narrows  // it to status + checkedAt; this list is what keeps it narrow.  "identity",  "detail",  "responseSample",  "httpStatus",] as const; // The bodies below acquire a scoped web handler, so `R` carries `Scope` rather// than being erased; `Effect.scoped` closes it when the body finishes.const withDb = <A, E>(  body: (db: SqliteTestFumaDb) => Effect.Effect<A, E, Scope.Scope>,): Effect.Effect<A, E> =>  Effect.scoped(    Effect.acquireUseRelease(      Effect.promise(() => createSqliteTestFumaDb({ tables: collectTables() })),      body,      (db) => Effect.promise(() => db.close()),    ),  ); const insertConnection = (  db: SqliteTestFumaDb,  row: {    readonly rowId: string;    readonly tenant: string;    readonly owner: string;    readonly subject: string;    readonly integration: string;    readonly name: string;    readonly oauthScope?: string | null;  },): Effect.Effect<void> =>  Effect.promise(async () => {    await db.client.execute({      sql: `INSERT INTO connection (          row_id, tenant, owner, subject, integration, name, template, provider,          item_ids, refresh_item_id, oauth_scope, last_health, created_at, updated_at        ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,      args: [        row.rowId,        row.tenant,        row.owner,        row.subject,        row.integration,        row.name,        "oauth2",        "memory",        // Deliberately secret-bearing: the assertions below prove these never        // reach an HTTP response.        JSON.stringify({ token: `SECRET-item-${row.rowId}` }),        `SECRET-refresh-${row.rowId}`,        row.oauthScope ?? null,        // A REAL stored health verdict, including the parts that come from the        // upstream provider's own response. `identity` is the value pulled from        // the configured `identityField` (typically the account's email AT the        // provider), `detail` is a raw diagnostic that can quote an upstream        // body, and `responseSample` is a bounded sample of the actual response        // body's scalar leaves. All three are legitimate on the product plane,        // where the caller owns the credential — and none may cross onto the        // ADMIN plane, which reports on other people's connections. Seeded here        // so the assertions below have ground truth to catch rather than        // asserting the absence of something that was never present.        JSON.stringify({          status: "healthy",          checkedAt: 1_700_000_000_000,          httpStatus: 200,          identity: `UPSTREAM-identity-${row.rowId}@provider.test`,          detail: `UPSTREAM-detail-${row.rowId}`,          responseSample: [            { path: "user.email", value: `UPSTREAM-sample-${row.rowId}@provider.test` },            { path: "user.login", value: `UPSTREAM-login-${row.rowId}` },          ],        }),        Date.now(),        Date.now(),      ],    });  }); /** Two users with connections under tenant A, plus a whole separate tenant B *  that A's admin plane must never see. */const seed = (db: SqliteTestFumaDb): Effect.Effect<void> =>  Effect.gen(function* () {    // `touchSubject` keeps a process-local memory of principals it already    // filed, so a second seed against a FRESH database would be skipped as a    // repeat sighting and leave the table empty. Each seed is a new world.    resetSubjectTouchCache();     yield* touchSubject(db.db, { tenant: TENANT_A, externalId: USER_A1 });    yield* touchSubject(db.db, { tenant: TENANT_A, externalId: USER_A2 });    yield* touchSubject(db.db, { tenant: TENANT_B, externalId: USER_B1 });     yield* insertConnection(db, {      rowId: "c-a1-gh",      tenant: TENANT_A,      owner: "user",      subject: USER_A1,      integration: "github",      name: "personal",      oauthScope: "repo read:user",    });    yield* insertConnection(db, {      rowId: "c-a2-linear",      tenant: TENANT_A,      owner: "user",      subject: USER_A2,      integration: "linear",      name: "work",    });    yield* insertConnection(db, {      rowId: "c-b1-gh",      tenant: TENANT_B,      owner: "user",      subject: USER_B1,      integration: "github",      name: "b-secret",      oauthScope: "admin:org",    });  }); const platformExecutorFor = (db: SqliteTestFumaDb, tenant: string): Effect.Effect<Executor> =>  createExecutor({    tenant: Tenant.make(tenant),    db: db.db,    onElicitation: "accept-all",    platformView: true,  }).pipe(Effect.orDie); /** A product-view executor: bound to one subject, no platform view at all. */const productExecutorFor = (db: SqliteTestFumaDb, tenant: string): Effect.Effect<Executor> =>  createExecutor({    tenant: Tenant.make(tenant),    subject: Subject.make(USER_A1),    db: db.db,    onElicitation: "accept-all",  }).pipe(Effect.orDie); /** * A stub `AdminUsersProvider` shaped like a host's real one: it authorizes off * the request headers, then delegates to the shared reads. `authorize` returns * the tenant an authorized caller may read, or a refusal — exactly the decision * cloud makes from an org key / admin session and self-host from a Better Auth * member. */const stubProvider = (  executorFor: (tenant: string) => Effect.Effect<Executor>,  authorize: (    headers: AdminUsersHeaders,  ) => Effect.Effect<string, AdminUsersUnauthorized | AdminUsersForbidden>,  directory?: AdminIdentityDirectory | AdminUserDirectory,) =>  Layer.succeed(AdminUsersProvider)({    listUsers: (headers, options) =>      authorize(headers).pipe(        Effect.flatMap(executorFor),        Effect.flatMap((executor) =>          platformViewOf(executor).pipe(            Effect.flatMap((admin) => listUsers(admin, options, directory)),          ),        ),      ),    listUsersWithConnections: (headers, options) =>      authorize(headers).pipe(        Effect.flatMap(executorFor),        Effect.flatMap((executor) =>          platformViewOf(executor).pipe(            Effect.flatMap((admin) => listUsersWithConnections(admin, options, directory)),          ),        ),      ),    listUserConnections: (headers, externalId) =>      authorize(headers).pipe(        Effect.flatMap(executorFor),        Effect.flatMap((executor) =>          platformViewOf(executor).pipe(            Effect.flatMap((admin) => listUserConnections(admin, externalId)),          ),        ),      ),    getUser: (headers, identifier) =>      authorize(headers).pipe(        Effect.flatMap(executorFor),        Effect.flatMap((executor) =>          platformViewOf(executor).pipe(            Effect.flatMap((admin) => getUser(admin, identifier, directory)),          ),        ),      ),  }); /** * The authorization the hosts implement, reduced to its decision table: * an org-scoped key (or admin session) names its tenant; a plain member or a * user-scoped key is forbidden; no credential at all is unauthorized. */const headerAuthorize = (headers: AdminUsersHeaders) => {  const credential = headers["authorization"];  if (!credential) return Effect.fail(new AdminUsersUnauthorized());  if (credential === "Bearer org_a_key") return Effect.succeed(TENANT_A);  if (credential === "Bearer org_b_key") return Effect.succeed(TENANT_B);  // A valid user-scoped key / plain member session: authentic, but this plane  // serves the whole tenant and they name one member.  return Effect.fail(new AdminUsersForbidden());}; // `HttpRouter.provideRequest` (not a plain `Layer.provide`) is what clears the// handlers' per-request `AdminUsersProvider` marker — the same reason the real// hosts mount the provider through a router middleware.const webHandlerFor = (provider: Layer.Layer<AdminUsersProvider>) =>  Effect.acquireRelease(    Effect.sync(() =>      HttpRouter.toWebHandler(        HttpApiBuilder.layer(AdminUsersHttpApi).pipe(          Layer.provide(AdminUsersHandlers),          HttpRouter.provideRequest(provider),          Layer.provideMerge(HttpServer.layerServices),          Layer.provideMerge(Layer.succeed(HttpRouter.RouterConfig)({ maxParamLength: 1000 })),        ),        { disableLogger: true },      ),    ),    (web) => Effect.promise(() => web.dispose()),  ); const get = (  web: {    readonly handler: (request: Request, context: Context.Context<never>) => Promise<Response>;  },  path: string,  credential?: string,) =>  Effect.promise(() =>    web.handler(      new Request(`http://localhost${path}`, {        headers: credential ? { authorization: credential } : {},      }),      Context.empty(),    ),  ); const jsonOf = <A>(response: Response) => Effect.promise(() => response.json() as Promise<A>); type UsersBody = {  readonly users: ReadonlyArray<{    readonly externalId: string;    readonly email: string | null;    readonly displayName: string | null;  }>;};type ConnectionsBody = {  readonly connections: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly integration: string; readonly name: string }>;};type UserBody = {  readonly user: {    readonly externalId: string;    readonly email: string | null;    readonly displayName: string | null;    readonly lastSeenAt: number | null;    readonly status: string | null;    readonly connections: ReadonlyArray<{      readonly integration: string;      readonly oauthScope: string | null;      readonly lastHealth: { readonly status: string } | null;    }>;  };};type UsersWithConnectionsBody = {  readonly users: ReadonlyArray<{    readonly externalId: string;    readonly email: string | null;    readonly displayName: string | null;    readonly lastSeenAt: number | null;    readonly status: string | null;    readonly connections: ReadonlyArray<{      readonly integration: string;      readonly oauthScope: string | null;      readonly lastHealth: { readonly status: string } | null;    }>;  }>;};const ORG_A = "Bearer org_a_key"; /** * A host member directory that knows USER_A1 only. * * USER_A2 is deliberately absent — that is the real case of a member who left * the org while their connections remain, and the one an id-space mismatch would * also look like. `seen` records the ids the directory was asked for, so a test * can prove the join is ONE batched read of the returned page rather than a * lookup per user. */const stubDirectory =  (seen: string[][]): AdminIdentityDirectory =>  (externalIds) => {    seen.push([...externalIds]);    return Effect.succeed(new Map([[USER_A1, { email: "a1@users.test", displayName: "User A1" }]]));  }; /** The email the stub directory knows USER_A1 by. Stored MIXED-CASE on *  purpose: WorkOS preserves whatever casing a user was created with, so the *  case-insensitivity rule has to hold against a non-normalized directory *  value, not just a non-normalized query. */const A1_EMAIL_STORED = "A1@Users.Test";const A1_EMAIL = "a1@users.test"; /** * The two-way directory: the same USER_A1-only knowledge as `stubDirectory`, * plus the reverse resolver. * * USER_A2 stays absent in BOTH directions, so it doubles as the "member the * directory cannot name" case. `resolved` records every email the resolver was * asked for, so a test can prove the lookup normalizes before comparing. */const stubUserDirectory = (options: {  readonly seen?: string[][];  readonly resolved?: string[];}): AdminUserDirectory => ({  identities: (externalIds) => {    options.seen?.push([...externalIds]);    return Effect.succeed(new Map([[USER_A1, { email: A1_EMAIL_STORED, displayName: "User A1" }]]));  },  resolveEmail: (email) => {    options.resolved?.push(email);    // Compares a NORMALIZED stored value, the rule both real hosts follow.    return Effect.succeed(A1_EMAIL_STORED.toLowerCase() === email ? USER_A1 : null);  },}); /** The failure a host's directory raises — WorkOS or Better Auth being *  unreachable. Typed rather than a bare `Error`, since the directory seam's *  `unknown` error channel exists to carry each host's OWN error type. */class DirectoryUnavailable extends Data.TaggedError("DirectoryUnavailable")<{  readonly message: string;}> {} /** A directory whose read fails, standing in for a WorkOS/Better Auth outage. */const failingDirectory: AdminIdentityDirectory = () =>  Effect.fail(new DirectoryUnavailable({ message: "member directory unavailable" })); describe("admin users API", () => {  it.effect("lists every user of the tenant for an authorized org caller", () =>    withDb((db) =>      Effect.gen(function* () {        yield* seed(db);        const web = yield* webHandlerFor(          stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize),        );         const response = yield* get(web, "/admin/users", ORG_A);        expect(response.status).toBe(200);        const body = yield* jsonOf<UsersBody>(response);         expect(          body.users.map((user) => user.externalId),          "both of the tenant's users are reported",        ).toEqual([USER_A1, USER_A2]);      }),    ),  );   it.effect("reports a user's connections with access summary but no credential", () =>    withDb((db) =>      Effect.gen(function* () {        yield* seed(db);        const web = yield* webHandlerFor(          stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize),        );         const response = yield* get(web, `/admin/users/${USER_A1}/connections`, ORG_A);        expect(response.status).toBe(200);        const body = yield* jsonOf<ConnectionsBody>(response);         expect(          body.connections.map((connection) => connection.integration),          "the user's own connection is reported",        ).toEqual(["github"]);        expect(body.connections[0]?.name).toBe("personal");      }),    ),  );   it.effect("joins users with their connections for the dashboard view", () =>    withDb((db) =>      Effect.gen(function* () {        yield* seed(db);        const web = yield* webHandlerFor(          stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize),        );         const response = yield* get(web, "/admin/users/with-connections", ORG_A);        expect(response.status).toBe(200);        const body = yield* jsonOf<UsersWithConnectionsBody>(response);         expect(          body.users.map((user) => [user.externalId, user.connections.map((c) => c.integration)]),          "each user carries their own connections",        ).toEqual([          [USER_A1, ["github"]],          [USER_A2, ["linear"]],        ]);        // The access summary and health travel; `lastSeenAt` is a number the        // dashboard can render (a raw SQL read would hand back a blob).        expect(body.users[0]?.connections[0]?.oauthScope).toBe("repo read:user");        expect(body.users[0]?.connections[0]?.lastHealth?.status).toBe("healthy");        expect(typeof body.users[0]?.lastSeenAt).toBe("number");        expect(body.users[0]?.status, "no lifecycle state is recorded yet").toBeNull();      }),    ),  );   it.effect("never serves credential material on any admin response", () =>    withDb((db) =>      Effect.gen(function* () {        yield* seed(db);        const web = yield* webHandlerFor(          stubProvider((tenant) => platformExecutorFor(db, tenant), headerAuthorize),        );         for (const path of [

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