import type { D1Database, DurableObjectNamespace, R2Bucket } from "@cloudflare/workers-types";import { isValidOrgSlug } from "@executor-js/api";import { missingPublicOriginWarning, resolvePublicOrigin } from "@executor-js/sdk/public-origin";let warnedNoCloudflareOrigin = false;// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------// Cloudflare host config. Unlike self-host (process.env + a data dir), a Worker// receives its bindings + vars per request as `env`, so config is derived from// that object — there is no process.env, no filesystem, no boot-time secret// generation. Identity comes entirely from Cloudflare Access in front of the// Worker; the only real secret is the at-rest secret-encryption key.// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------export const CLOUDFLARE_NAMESPACE = "executor_cloudflare";export const CLOUDFLARE_SCHEMA_VERSION = "1.0.0";export interface CloudflareEnv { /** D1 database binding — the app's SQLite store. */ readonly DB: D1Database; /** R2 bucket binding — holds values too large for a D1 row (~1-2MB cap). */ readonly BLOBS?: R2Bucket; /** MCP session Durable Object namespace — one addressable isolate per MCP * session (the DO id IS the session id), so a session survives across the * Worker's stateless isolates. */ readonly MCP_SESSION: DurableObjectNamespace; /** Zero Trust team domain, e.g. `your-team.cloudflareaccess.com`. */ readonly ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN: string; /** The Access application's AUD tag (the JWT audience to verify). */ readonly ACCESS_AUD: string; /** Claim holding the display name (default `name`). */ readonly ACCESS_NAME_CLAIM?: string; /** Claim holding the user's groups (default `groups`). */ readonly ACCESS_GROUPS_CLAIM?: string; /** Comma-separated emails granted the admin role. */ readonly ADMIN_EMAILS?: string; /** The single organization id/name every authenticated user belongs to. */ readonly SELF_HOSTED_ORG_ID?: string; readonly SELF_HOSTED_ORG_NAME?: string; /** URL slug for org-prefixed console paths (`/<slug>/policies`). */ readonly SELF_HOSTED_ORG_SLUG?: string; /** At-rest secret-encryption key (a `wrangler secret`, NOT a var). */ readonly EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY?: string; readonly ALLOW_LOCAL_NETWORK?: string; readonly VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL?: string; /** * Dev/single-user escape hatch: when "true", skip Cloudflare Access entirely * and treat every request as a fixed admin. For local `wrangler dev` and * unattended validation only — NEVER set on a deployment that isn't already * behind Access, or the instance is wide open. */ readonly ENABLE_DEV_AUTH?: string;}export interface CloudflareConfig { readonly accessTeamDomain: string; readonly accessAud: string; readonly accessNameClaim: string; readonly accessGroupsClaim: string; readonly adminEmails: readonly string[]; readonly organizationId: string; readonly organizationName: string; /** URL slug for org-prefixed console paths (`/<slug>/policies`). */ readonly organizationSlug: string; readonly secretKey: string; readonly allowLocalNetwork: boolean; /** Explicit web base URL (`VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL`). Unset on a Worker with no * static URL — the per-request origin is used instead (see RequestWebOrigin). */ readonly webBaseUrl?: string; readonly enableDevAuth: boolean;}const splitLower = (value: string | undefined): readonly string[] => (value ?? "") .split(",") .map((part) => part.trim().toLowerCase()) .filter((part) => part.length > 0);// The org slug doubles as a URL segment (`/<slug>/policies`), so an// operator-set value must fit the shared grammar and avoid reserved root// segments — a colliding slug would shadow real routes (notably /api, /mcp,// and Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi).const resolveOrgSlug = (value: string | undefined): string => { if (!value) return "default"; if (!isValidOrgSlug(value) && value !== "default") { // oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-try-catch-or-throw, executor/no-error-constructor -- boundary: a colliding org slug would shadow app routes; refuse to boot throw new Error( `SELF_HOSTED_ORG_SLUG ${JSON.stringify(value)} is not usable as a URL slug (2-48 chars of [a-z0-9-], not a reserved path segment like "api" or "mcp")`, ); } return value;};export const loadConfig = (env: CloudflareEnv): CloudflareConfig => { const secretKey = env.EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY?.trim(); if (!secretKey || secretKey.length < 16) { // oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-try-catch-or-throw, executor/no-error-constructor -- boundary: the Worker must not boot without the at-rest secret key throw new Error( "EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY must be set (wrangler secret put EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY) — it encrypts stored secrets at rest in D1", ); } const enableDevAuth = env.ENABLE_DEV_AUTH === "true"; const webBaseUrl = resolvePublicOrigin({ explicit: env.VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL, env: {} }); if (!webBaseUrl && !enableDevAuth && !warnedNoCloudflareOrigin) { warnedNoCloudflareOrigin = true; console.warn( missingPublicOriginWarning({ varName: "VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL", fallback: "the per-request origin", }), ); } return { accessTeamDomain: env.ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN.replace(/^https?:\/\//, "").replace(/\/+$/, ""), accessAud: env.ACCESS_AUD, accessNameClaim: env.ACCESS_NAME_CLAIM ?? "name", accessGroupsClaim: env.ACCESS_GROUPS_CLAIM ?? "groups", adminEmails: splitLower(env.ADMIN_EMAILS), organizationId: env.SELF_HOSTED_ORG_ID ?? "default", organizationName: env.SELF_HOSTED_ORG_NAME ?? "Default", organizationSlug: resolveOrgSlug(env.SELF_HOSTED_ORG_SLUG), secretKey, allowLocalNetwork: env.ALLOW_LOCAL_NETWORK === "true", // Pinned origin via the shared resolver. A Worker receives no PaaS platform // vars (env: {} — there is nothing to detect), so only the explicit // VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL applies; when it's unset we leave webBaseUrl undefined // and let the per-request origin drive it (request.url — Cloudflare-set, not // spoofable via Host). Warn once on a real deployment so the operator pins it, // mirroring self-host (gated on enableDevAuth = local `wrangler dev`). webBaseUrl, enableDevAuth, };};
import type { D1Database, DurableObjectNamespace, R2Bucket } from "@cloudflare/workers-types";
import { isValidOrgSlug } from "@executor-js/api";
import { missingPublicOriginWarning, resolvePublicOrigin } from "@executor-js/sdk/public-origin";
let warnedNoCloudflareOrigin = false;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Cloudflare host config. Unlike self-host (process.env + a data dir), a Worker
// receives its bindings + vars per request as `env`, so config is derived from
// that object — there is no process.env, no filesystem, no boot-time secret
// generation. Identity comes entirely from Cloudflare Access in front of the
// Worker; the only real secret is the at-rest secret-encryption key.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const CLOUDFLARE_NAMESPACE = "executor_cloudflare";
export const CLOUDFLARE_SCHEMA_VERSION = "1.0.0";
export interface CloudflareEnv {
/** D1 database binding — the app's SQLite store. */
readonly DB: D1Database;
/** R2 bucket binding — holds values too large for a D1 row (~1-2MB cap). */
readonly BLOBS?: R2Bucket;
/** MCP session Durable Object namespace — one addressable isolate per MCP
* session (the DO id IS the session id), so a session survives across the
* Worker's stateless isolates. */
readonly MCP_SESSION: DurableObjectNamespace;
/** Zero Trust team domain, e.g. `your-team.cloudflareaccess.com`. */
readonly ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN: string;
/** The Access application's AUD tag (the JWT audience to verify). */
readonly ACCESS_AUD: string;
/** Claim holding the display name (default `name`). */
readonly ACCESS_NAME_CLAIM?: string;
/** Claim holding the user's groups (default `groups`). */
readonly ACCESS_GROUPS_CLAIM?: string;
/** Comma-separated emails granted the admin role. */
readonly ADMIN_EMAILS?: string;
/** The single organization id/name every authenticated user belongs to. */
readonly SELF_HOSTED_ORG_ID?: string;
readonly SELF_HOSTED_ORG_NAME?: string;
/** URL slug for org-prefixed console paths (`/<slug>/policies`). */
readonly SELF_HOSTED_ORG_SLUG?: string;
/** At-rest secret-encryption key (a `wrangler secret`, NOT a var). */
readonly EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY?: string;
readonly ALLOW_LOCAL_NETWORK?: string;
readonly VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL?: string;
/**
* Dev/single-user escape hatch: when "true", skip Cloudflare Access entirely
* and treat every request as a fixed admin. For local `wrangler dev` and
* unattended validation only — NEVER set on a deployment that isn't already
* behind Access, or the instance is wide open.
*/
readonly ENABLE_DEV_AUTH?: string;
}
export interface CloudflareConfig {
readonly accessTeamDomain: string;
readonly accessAud: string;
readonly accessNameClaim: string;
readonly accessGroupsClaim: string;
readonly adminEmails: readonly string[];
readonly organizationId: string;
readonly organizationName: string;
/** URL slug for org-prefixed console paths (`/<slug>/policies`). */
readonly organizationSlug: string;
readonly secretKey: string;
readonly allowLocalNetwork: boolean;
/** Explicit web base URL (`VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL`). Unset on a Worker with no
* static URL — the per-request origin is used instead (see RequestWebOrigin). */
readonly webBaseUrl?: string;
readonly enableDevAuth: boolean;
}
const splitLower = (value: string | undefined): readonly string[] =>
(value ?? "")
.split(",")
.map((part) => part.trim().toLowerCase())
.filter((part) => part.length > 0);
// The org slug doubles as a URL segment (`/<slug>/policies`), so an
// operator-set value must fit the shared grammar and avoid reserved root
// segments — a colliding slug would shadow real routes (notably /api, /mcp,
// and Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi).
const resolveOrgSlug = (value: string | undefined): string => {
if (!value) return "default";
if (!isValidOrgSlug(value) && value !== "default") {
// oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-try-catch-or-throw, executor/no-error-constructor -- boundary: a colliding org slug would shadow app routes; refuse to boot
throw new Error(
`SELF_HOSTED_ORG_SLUG ${JSON.stringify(value)} is not usable as a URL slug (2-48 chars of [a-z0-9-], not a reserved path segment like "api" or "mcp")`,
);
}
return value;
};
export const loadConfig = (env: CloudflareEnv): CloudflareConfig => {
const secretKey = env.EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY?.trim();
if (!secretKey || secretKey.length < 16) {
// oxlint-disable-next-line executor/no-try-catch-or-throw, executor/no-error-constructor -- boundary: the Worker must not boot without the at-rest secret key
throw new Error(
"EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY must be set (wrangler secret put EXECUTOR_SECRET_KEY) — it encrypts stored secrets at rest in D1",
);
}
const enableDevAuth = env.ENABLE_DEV_AUTH === "true";
const webBaseUrl = resolvePublicOrigin({ explicit: env.VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL, env: {} });
if (!webBaseUrl && !enableDevAuth && !warnedNoCloudflareOrigin) {
warnedNoCloudflareOrigin = true;
console.warn(
missingPublicOriginWarning({
varName: "VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL",
fallback: "the per-request origin",
}),
);
}
return {
accessTeamDomain: env.ACCESS_TEAM_DOMAIN.replace(/^https?:\/\//, "").replace(/\/+$/, ""),
accessAud: env.ACCESS_AUD,
accessNameClaim: env.ACCESS_NAME_CLAIM ?? "name",
accessGroupsClaim: env.ACCESS_GROUPS_CLAIM ?? "groups",
adminEmails: splitLower(env.ADMIN_EMAILS),
organizationId: env.SELF_HOSTED_ORG_ID ?? "default",
organizationName: env.SELF_HOSTED_ORG_NAME ?? "Default",
organizationSlug: resolveOrgSlug(env.SELF_HOSTED_ORG_SLUG),
secretKey,
allowLocalNetwork: env.ALLOW_LOCAL_NETWORK === "true",
// Pinned origin via the shared resolver. A Worker receives no PaaS platform
// vars (env: {} — there is nothing to detect), so only the explicit
// VITE_PUBLIC_SITE_URL applies; when it's unset we leave webBaseUrl undefined
// and let the per-request origin drive it (request.url — Cloudflare-set, not
// spoofable via Host). Warn once on a real deployment so the operator pins it,
// mirroring self-host (gated on enableDevAuth = local `wrangler dev`).
webBaseUrl,
enableDevAuth,
};
};