## Security configuration# menu "Security options" config KEYS	bool "Enable access key retention support"	help	  This option provides support for retaining authentication tokens and	  access keys in the kernel. 	  It also includes provision of methods by which such keys might be	  associated with a process so that network filesystems, encryption	  support and the like can find them. 	  Furthermore, a special type of key is available that acts as keyring:	  a searchable sequence of keys. Each process is equipped with access	  to five standard keyrings: UID-specific, GID-specific, session,	  process and thread. 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config TRUSTED_KEYS	tristate "TRUSTED KEYS"	depends on KEYS && TCG_TPM	select CRYPTO	select CRYPTO_HMAC	select CRYPTO_SHA1	help	  This option provides support for creating, sealing, and unsealing	  keys in the kernel. Trusted keys are random number symmetric keys,	  generated and RSA-sealed by the TPM. The TPM only unseals the keys,	  if the boot PCRs and other criteria match.  Userspace will only ever	  see encrypted blobs. 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config ENCRYPTED_KEYS	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"	depends on KEYS	select CRYPTO	select CRYPTO_HMAC	select CRYPTO_AES	select CRYPTO_CBC	select CRYPTO_SHA256	select CRYPTO_RNG	help	  This option provides support for create/encrypting/decrypting keys	  in the kernel.  Encrypted keys are kernel generated random numbers,	  which are encrypted/decrypted with a 'master' symmetric key. The	  'master' key can be either a trusted-key or user-key type.	  Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS	bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed"	depends on KEYS	help	  This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which	  can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the	  reading process. 	  The only keys included in the list are those that grant View	  permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them.	  Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further	  filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. 	  Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in	  the resulting table. 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"	default n	help	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel	  syslog via dmesg(8). 	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY	bool "Enable different security models"	depends on SYSFS	help	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be	  configured into your kernel. 	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security	  model will be used. 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITYFS	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"	help	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by	  the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider.  It is	  not used by SELinux or SMACK. 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_NETWORK	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"	depends on SECURITY	help	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement socket and networking access controls.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK	help	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using	  IPSec.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_PATH	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"	depends on SECURITY	help	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement pathname based access controls.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config INTEL_TXT	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT	help	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this	  will have no effect. 	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside	  of the kernel itself. 	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. 	  See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information	  about Intel(R) TXT.	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.	  See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX	default 32768 if ARM	default 65536	help	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. 	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the	  systems running LSM. source security/selinux/Kconfigsource security/smack/Kconfigsource security/tomoyo/Kconfigsource security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig choice	prompt "Default security module"	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC 	help	  Select the security module that will be used by default if the	  kernel parameter security= is not specified. 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" endchoice config DEFAULT_SECURITY	string	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC endmenu