/* * AppArmor security module * * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation * * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the * License. */ #include <linux/gfp.h>#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include "include/audit.h"#include "include/capability.h"#include "include/context.h"#include "include/policy.h"#include "include/ipc.h" /** * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) * @mask: permission mask to convert */static void audit_ptrace_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask){	switch (mask) {	case MAY_READ:		audit_log_string(ab, "read");		break;	case MAY_WRITE:		audit_log_string(ab, "trace");		break;	case AA_MAY_BE_READ:		audit_log_string(ab, "readby");		break;	case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:		audit_log_string(ab, "tracedby");		break;	}} /* call back to audit ptrace fields */static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va){	struct common_audit_data *sa = va; 	if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {		audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");		audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request); 		if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {			audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");			audit_ptrace_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied);		}	}	audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");	aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,			FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);} /* TODO: conditionals */static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,			       struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request,			       struct common_audit_data *sa){	struct aa_perms perms = { }; 	/* need because of peer in cross check */	if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||	    !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))		return 0; 	aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label;	aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,			       &perms);	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);} static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,			     struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request,			     struct common_audit_data *sa){	if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))		return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa),			      profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer,						  request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT,						  sa));	/* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */	if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee)		return 0; 	aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;	aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label;	aad(sa)->request = 0;	aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); 	return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);} /** * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL) * @tracee: task label to be traced * @request: permission request * * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error */int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,		  u32 request){	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); 	return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm,				      request, &sa);}