# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-onlypreferred-plugin-hostcc := $(if-success,[ $(gcc-version) -ge 40800 ],$(HOSTCXX),$(HOSTCC)) config PLUGIN_HOSTCC	string	default "$(shell,$(srctree)/scripts/gcc-plugin.sh "$(preferred-plugin-hostcc)" "$(HOSTCXX)" "$(CC)")" if CC_IS_GCC	help	  Host compiler used to build GCC plugins.  This can be $(HOSTCXX),	  $(HOSTCC), or a null string if GCC plugin is unsupported. config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS	bool	help	  An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with	  GCC plugins. config GCC_PLUGINS	bool	depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS	depends on PLUGIN_HOSTCC != ""	default y	help	  GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the	  compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis. 	  See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details. menu "GCC plugins"	depends on GCC_PLUGINS config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY	bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# too noisy	help	  The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:	   M = E - N + 2P	  where 	  E = the number of edges	  N = the number of nodes	  P = the number of connected components (exit nodes). 	  Enabling this plugin reports the complexity to stderr during the	  build. It mainly serves as a simple example of how to create a	  gcc plugin for the kernel. config GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV	bool	help	  This plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call at the start of	  basic blocks. It supports all gcc versions with plugin support (from	  gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the commit "Add fuzzing coverage support"	  by Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>. config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY	bool "Generate some entropy during boot and runtime"	help	  By saying Y here the kernel will instrument some kernel code to	  extract some entropy from both original and artificially created	  program state.  This will help especially embedded systems where	  there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally.  The cost	  is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and	  irq processing. 	  Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically	  secure! 	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:	   * https://grsecurity.net/	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT	bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"	select MODVERSIONS if MODULES	help	  If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely	  function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with	  __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly	  marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.	  This can introduce the requirement of an additional information	  exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure	  types. 	  Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,	  slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation). 	  The seed used for compilation is located at	  scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h.  It remains after	  a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with	  the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or	  make distclean. 	  Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer. 	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:	   * https://grsecurity.net/	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE	bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT	depends on !COMPILE_TEST	# do not reduce test coverage	help	  If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a	  best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized	  groups of elements.  It will further not randomize bitfields	  in structures.  This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT	  at the cost of weakened randomization. config GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK	bool	depends on GCC_PLUGINS && ARM endmenu