// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o. */ #include <linux/capability.h>#include <linux/audit.h>#include <linux/init.h>#include <linux/kernel.h>#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>#include <linux/file.h>#include <linux/mm.h>#include <linux/mman.h>#include <linux/pagemap.h>#include <linux/swap.h>#include <linux/skbuff.h>#include <linux/netlink.h>#include <linux/ptrace.h>#include <linux/xattr.h>#include <linux/hugetlb.h>#include <linux/mount.h>#include <linux/sched.h>#include <linux/prctl.h>#include <linux/securebits.h>#include <linux/user_namespace.h>#include <linux/binfmts.h>#include <linux/personality.h>#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities. * * Warn if that happens, once per boot. */static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname){ static int warned; if (!warned) { printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and" " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all" " capabilities.\n", fname); warned = 1; }} /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @cred: The credentials to use * @targ_ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h * * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. * * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics: * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts){ struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target * user namespace's parents. */ for (;;) { /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ if (ns == cred->user_ns) return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; /* * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, * we're done searching. */ if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) return -EPERM; /* * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the * user namespace has all caps. */ if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) return 0; /* * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have * it over all children user namespaces as well. */ ns = ns->parent; } /* We never get here */} /** * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock * @ts: The time to set * @tz: The timezone to set * * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied. */int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz){ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) return -EPERM; return 0;} /** * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access * another * @child: The process to be accessed * @mode: The mode of attachment. * * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace * access is allowed. * Else denied. * * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission * granted, -ve if denied. */int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode){ int ret = 0; const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps; rcu_read_lock(); cred = current_cred(); child_cred = __task_cred(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective; else caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted; if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps)) goto out; if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM;out: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret;} /** * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer * * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace * access is allowed. * Else denied. * * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. */int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent){ int ret = 0; const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(parent); child_cred = current_cred(); if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) goto out; if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM;out: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret;} /** * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets * @effective: The place to record the effective set * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set * * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns * them to the caller. */int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted){ const struct cred *cred; /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(target); *effective = cred->cap_effective; *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; rcu_read_unlock(); return 0;} /* * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not. */static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void){ /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return 0; return 1;} /** * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here * @old: The current task's current credentials * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set * * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM. */int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted){ if (cap_inh_is_capped() && !cap_issubset(*inheritable, cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted))) /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ return -EPERM; if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_bset))) /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ return -EPERM; /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted)) return -EPERM; /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted)) return -EPERM; new->cap_effective = *effective; new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; new->cap_permitted = *permitted; /* * Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and * inheritable. */ new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient, cap_intersect(*permitted, *inheritable)); if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) return -EINVAL; return 0;} /** * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected. * * Return: 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required. */int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry){ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); int error; error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); return error > 0;} /** * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode * * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter * * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode. * * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns. * * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error. */int cap_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry){ int error; error = __vfs_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP) error = 0; return error;} static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot){ struct user_namespace *ns; if (!uid_valid(kroot)) return false; for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) { if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0) return true; if (ns == &init_user_ns) break; } return false;} static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m){ return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;} static bool is_v2header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap){ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) return false; return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;} static bool is_v3header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap){ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3) return false; return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;} /* * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the * xattr from the inode itself. * * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler. * * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values - * so that's good. */int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc){ int size, ret; kuid_t kroot; u32 nsmagic, magic; uid_t root, mappedroot; char *tmpbuf = NULL; struct vfs_cap_data *cap; struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL; struct dentry *dentry; struct user_namespace *fs_ns; if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) return -EOPNOTSUPP; dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); if (!dentry) return -EINVAL; size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(mnt_userns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS); dput(dentry); if (ret < 0 || !tmpbuf) { size = ret; goto out_free; } fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf; if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) { root = 0; } else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) { nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf; root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid); } else { size = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root); /* If this is an idmapped mount shift the kuid. */ kroot = mapped_kuid_fs(mnt_userns, fs_ns, kroot); /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return * this as a nscap. */ mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot); if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) { size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); if (alloc) { if (!nscap) { /* v2 -> v3 conversion */ nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!nscap) { size = -ENOMEM; goto out_free; } nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc); if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic); } else { /* use allocated v3 buffer */ tmpbuf = NULL; } nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot); *buffer = nscap; } goto out_free; } if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) { size = -EOVERFLOW; goto out_free; } /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */ size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data); if (alloc) { if (nscap) { /* v3 -> v2 conversion */ cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!cap) { size = -ENOMEM; goto out_free; } magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc); if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic); } else { /* use unconverted v2 */ tmpbuf = NULL; } *buffer = cap; }out_free: kfree(tmpbuf); return size;} /** * rootid_from_xattr - translate root uid of vfs caps * * @value: vfs caps value which may be modified by this function * @size: size of @ivalue * @task_ns: user namespace of the caller * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @fs_userns: user namespace of the filesystem * * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.Lines 1–500 of 1485. Load more
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o. */ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/swap.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h> /* * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities. * * Warn if that happens, once per boot. */ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) { static int warned; if (!warned) { printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and" " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all" " capabilities.\n", fname); warned = 1; } } /** * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability * @cred: The credentials to use * @targ_ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h * * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. * * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics: * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target * user namespace's parents. */ for (;;) { /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ if (ns == cred->user_ns) return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; /* * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for, * we're done searching. */ if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level) return -EPERM; /* * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the * user namespace has all caps. */ if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid)) return 0; /* * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have * it over all children user namespaces as well. */ ns = ns->parent; } /* We never get here */ } /** * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock * @ts: The time to set * @tz: The timezone to set * * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) return -EPERM; return 0; } /** * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access * another * @child: The process to be accessed * @mode: The mode of attachment. * * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace * access is allowed. * Else denied. * * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission * granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { int ret = 0; const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps; rcu_read_lock(); cred = current_cred(); child_cred = __task_cred(child); if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective; else caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted; if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps)) goto out; if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } /** * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer * * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace * access is allowed. * Else denied. * * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. */ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { int ret = 0; const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(parent); child_cred = current_cred(); if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) goto out; if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; ret = -EPERM; out: rcu_read_unlock(); return ret; } /** * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets * @effective: The place to record the effective set * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set * * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns * them to the caller. */ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) { const struct cred *cred; /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(target); *effective = cred->cap_effective; *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; rcu_read_unlock(); return 0; } /* * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not. */ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return 0; return 1; } /** * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here * @old: The current task's current credentials * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set * * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM. */ int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { if (cap_inh_is_capped() && !cap_issubset(*inheritable, cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted))) /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ return -EPERM; if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_bset))) /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ return -EPERM; /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted)) return -EPERM; /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted)) return -EPERM; new->cap_effective = *effective; new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; new->cap_permitted = *permitted; /* * Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and * inheritable. */ new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient, cap_intersect(*permitted, *inheritable)); if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) return -EINVAL; return 0; } /** * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected. * * Return: 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required. */ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); int error; error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); return error > 0; } /** * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode * * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter * * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode. * * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns. * * Return: 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry) { int error; error = __vfs_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP) error = 0; return error; } static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot) { struct user_namespace *ns; if (!uid_valid(kroot)) return false; for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) { if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0) return true; if (ns == &init_user_ns) break; } return false; } static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m) { return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; } static bool is_v2header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) return false; return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; } static bool is_v3header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3) return false; return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; } /* * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the * xattr from the inode itself. * * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler. * * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values - * so that's good. */ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) { int size, ret; kuid_t kroot; u32 nsmagic, magic; uid_t root, mappedroot; char *tmpbuf = NULL; struct vfs_cap_data *cap; struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL; struct dentry *dentry; struct user_namespace *fs_ns; if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0) return -EOPNOTSUPP; dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode); if (!dentry) return -EINVAL; size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(mnt_userns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS); dput(dentry); if (ret < 0 || !tmpbuf) { size = ret; goto out_free; } fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf; if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) { root = 0; } else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) { nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf; root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid); } else { size = -EINVAL; goto out_free; } kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root); /* If this is an idmapped mount shift the kuid. */ kroot = mapped_kuid_fs(mnt_userns, fs_ns, kroot); /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return * this as a nscap. */ mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot); if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) { size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data); if (alloc) { if (!nscap) { /* v2 -> v3 conversion */ nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!nscap) { size = -ENOMEM; goto out_free; } nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc); if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic); } else { /* use allocated v3 buffer */ tmpbuf = NULL; } nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot); *buffer = nscap; } goto out_free; } if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) { size = -EOVERFLOW; goto out_free; } /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */ size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data); if (alloc) { if (nscap) { /* v3 -> v2 conversion */ cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC); if (!cap) { size = -ENOMEM; goto out_free; } magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc); if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic); } else { /* use unconverted v2 */ tmpbuf = NULL; } *buffer = cap; } out_free: kfree(tmpbuf); return size; } /** * rootid_from_xattr - translate root uid of vfs caps * * @value: vfs caps value which may be modified by this function * @size: size of @ivalue * @task_ns: user namespace of the caller * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from * @fs_userns: user namespace of the filesystem * * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then * take care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking * permissions. On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be * performed on the raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.