# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only## Security configuration# menu "Security options" source "security/keys/Kconfig" config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"	default n	help	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel	  syslog via dmesg(8). 	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. choice	prompt "Allow /proc/pid/mem access override"	default PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE	help	  Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory	  permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace	  capability. 	  This allows people to limit that - either never override, or	  require actual active ptrace attachment. 	  Defaults to the traditional behavior (for now) config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE	bool "Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior"	help	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping	  permissions if you have ptrace access rights. config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE	bool "Require active ptrace() use for access override"	help	  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping	  permissions for active ptracers like gdb. config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE	bool "Never"	help	  Never override memory mapping permissions endchoice config SECURITY	bool "Enable different security models"	depends on SYSFS	depends on MULTIUSER	help	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be	  configured into your kernel. 	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security	  model will be used. 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITYFS	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"	help	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by	  various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM). 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_NETWORK	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"	depends on SECURITY	help	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement socket and networking access controls.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_INFINIBAND	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND	help	  This enables the Infiniband security hooks.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement Infiniband access controls.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK	help	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using	  IPSec.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_PATH	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"	depends on SECURITY	help	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to	  implement pathname based access controls.	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config INTEL_TXT	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT	help	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this	  will have no effect. 	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside	  of the kernel itself. 	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. 	  See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information	  about Intel(R) TXT.	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.	  See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. 	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)	default 65536	help	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. 	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the	  systems running LSM. config HARDENED_USERCOPY	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"	imply STRICT_DEVMEM	help	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,	  or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. config FORTIFY_SOURCE	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32	help	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"	help	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name	  changed. 	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick	  and choose what real programs are called. 	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be	  disabled, choose this option and then set	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"	help	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command	  line. 	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,	  specify an empty string here (i.e. ""). source "security/selinux/Kconfig"source "security/smack/Kconfig"source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"source "security/yama/Kconfig"source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"source "security/landlock/Kconfig"source "security/ipe/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" choice	prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC 	help	  This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY	  in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't	  change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,	  for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set. 	  Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be	  initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM. 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y 	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" endchoice config LSM	string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC	default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf"	help	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.	  Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order	  LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled	  if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.	  This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter. 	  If unsure, leave this as the default. source "security/Kconfig.hardening" endmenu