// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later/* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc. * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/kernel.h>#include <linux/audit.h>#include <linux/kthread.h>#include <linux/mutex.h>#include <linux/fs.h>#include <linux/namei.h>#include <linux/netlink.h>#include <linux/sched.h>#include <linux/slab.h>#include <linux/security.h>#include <net/net_namespace.h>#include <net/sock.h>#include "audit.h" /* * Locking model: * * audit_filter_mutex: * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. */ /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[7]),#if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 8#error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser#endif};static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[7]),}; DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex); static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f){ switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: kfree(f->lsm_str); security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); }} static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e){ int i; struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule; /* some rules don't have associated watches */ if (erule->watch) audit_put_watch(erule->watch); if (erule->fields) for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]); kfree(erule->fields); kfree(erule->filterkey); kfree(e);} void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head){ struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); audit_free_rule(e);} /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count){ struct audit_entry *entry; struct audit_field *fields; entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!entry)) return NULL; fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!fields)) { kfree(entry); return NULL; } entry->rule.fields = fields; return entry;} /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space * buffer. */char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len){ char *str; if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX * defines the longest valid length. */ if (len > PATH_MAX) return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!str)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); memcpy(str, *bufp, len); str[len] = 0; *bufp += len; *remain -= len; return str;} /* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule, struct audit_field *f){ if ((krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT && krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) || krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree || (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal)) return -EINVAL; krule->inode_f = f; return 0;} static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES]; int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list){ __u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; while (*list != ~0U) { unsigned n = *list++; if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) { kfree(p); return -EINVAL; } p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n); } if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) { kfree(p); return -EINVAL; } classes[class] = p; return 0;} int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall){ if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32)) return 0; if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class])) return 0; return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall);} #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALLstatic inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask){ int i; if (classes[class]) { for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) if (mask[i] & classes[class][i]) return 0; } return 1;} static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry){ struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f; if (!arch) { /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, entry->rule.mask) && audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, entry->rule.mask)); } switch (audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { case 0: /* native */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, entry->rule.mask)); case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, entry->rule.mask)); default: return 1; }}#endif /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule){ unsigned listnr; struct audit_entry *entry; int i, err; err = -EINVAL; listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; switch (listnr) { default: goto exit_err;#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: pr_err("AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY is deprecated\n"); goto exit_err; case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: case AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT: case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK:#endif case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: ; } if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) { pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n"); goto exit_err; } if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) goto exit_err; if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) goto exit_err; err = -ENOMEM; entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count); if (!entry) goto exit_err; entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; entry->rule.listnr = listnr; entry->rule.action = rule->action; entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count; for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i]; for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) { int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1; __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)]; __u32 *class; if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit))) continue; *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit); class = classes[i]; if (class) { int j; for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++) entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j]; } } return entry; exit_err: return ERR_PTR(err);} static u32 audit_ops[] ={ [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL, [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL, [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK, [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST, [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN, [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN, [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL, [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL,}; static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op){ u32 n; for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++) ; return n;} /* check if an audit field is valid */static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f){ switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE && entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_FSTYPE: if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_PERM: if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) return -EINVAL; break; } switch (entry->rule.listnr) { case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_FSTYPE: case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: break; default: return -EINVAL; } } /* Check for valid field type and op */ switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: case AUDIT_PERS: /* <uapi/linux/personality.h> */ case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: /* all ops are valid */ break; case AUDIT_UID: case AUDIT_EUID: case AUDIT_SUID: case AUDIT_FSUID: case AUDIT_LOGINUID: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: case AUDIT_GID: case AUDIT_EGID: case AUDIT_SGID: case AUDIT_FSGID: case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: case AUDIT_PID: case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: case AUDIT_PPID: case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: case AUDIT_EXIT: case AUDIT_SUCCESS: case AUDIT_INODE: case AUDIT_SESSIONID: case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */ if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_WATCH: case AUDIT_DIR: case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: case AUDIT_ARCH: case AUDIT_FSTYPE: case AUDIT_PERM: case AUDIT_FILETYPE: case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: case AUDIT_EXE: /* only equal and not equal valid ops */ if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal) return -EINVAL; break; default: /* field not recognized */ return -EINVAL; } /* Check for select valid field values */ switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_PERM: if (f->val & ~15) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_FILETYPE: if (f->val & ~S_IFMT) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: if (f->val >= AF_MAX) return -EINVAL; break; default: break; } return 0;} /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, size_t datasz){ int err = 0; struct audit_entry *entry; void *bufp; size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); int i; char *str; struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark; entry = audit_to_entry_common(data); if (IS_ERR(entry)) goto exit_nofree; bufp = data->buf; for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; u32 f_val; err = -EINVAL; f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]); if (f->op == Audit_bad) goto exit_free; f->type = data->fields[i]; f_val = data->values[i]; /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f_val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) { f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; f_val = 0; entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY; } err = audit_field_valid(entry, f); if (err) goto exit_free; err = -EINVAL; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_LOGINUID: case AUDIT_UID: case AUDIT_EUID: case AUDIT_SUID: case AUDIT_FSUID: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f_val); if (!uid_valid(f->uid)) goto exit_free; break;Lines 1–500 of 1464. 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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events * * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc. * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include "audit.h" /* * Locking model: * * audit_filter_mutex: * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. */ /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[6]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[7]), #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 8 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser #endif }; static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[6]), LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[7]), }; DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex); static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f) { switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: kfree(f->lsm_str); security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); } } static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) { int i; struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule; /* some rules don't have associated watches */ if (erule->watch) audit_put_watch(erule->watch); if (erule->fields) for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]); kfree(erule->fields); kfree(erule->filterkey); kfree(e); } void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) { struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); audit_free_rule(e); } /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count) { struct audit_entry *entry; struct audit_field *fields; entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!entry)) return NULL; fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!fields)) { kfree(entry); return NULL; } entry->rule.fields = fields; return entry; } /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space * buffer. */ char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len) { char *str; if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX * defines the longest valid length. */ if (len > PATH_MAX) return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (unlikely(!str)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); memcpy(str, *bufp, len); str[len] = 0; *bufp += len; *remain -= len; return str; } /* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */ static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule, struct audit_field *f) { if ((krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT && krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) || krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree || (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal)) return -EINVAL; krule->inode_f = f; return 0; } static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES]; int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list) { __u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; while (*list != ~0U) { unsigned n = *list++; if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) { kfree(p); return -EINVAL; } p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n); } if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) { kfree(p); return -EINVAL; } classes[class] = p; return 0; } int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall) { if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32)) return 0; if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class])) return 0; return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall); } #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask) { int i; if (classes[class]) { for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) if (mask[i] & classes[class][i]) return 0; } return 1; } static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry) { struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f; if (!arch) { /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, entry->rule.mask) && audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, entry->rule.mask)); } switch (audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { case 0: /* native */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, entry->rule.mask)); case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, entry->rule.mask)); default: return 1; } } #endif /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule) { unsigned listnr; struct audit_entry *entry; int i, err; err = -EINVAL; listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; switch (listnr) { default: goto exit_err; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: pr_err("AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY is deprecated\n"); goto exit_err; case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: case AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT: case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: #endif case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: case AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE: case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: ; } if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) { pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n"); goto exit_err; } if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) goto exit_err; if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) goto exit_err; err = -ENOMEM; entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count); if (!entry) goto exit_err; entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; entry->rule.listnr = listnr; entry->rule.action = rule->action; entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count; for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i]; for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) { int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1; __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)]; __u32 *class; if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit))) continue; *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit); class = classes[i]; if (class) { int j; for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++) entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j]; } } return entry; exit_err: return ERR_PTR(err); } static u32 audit_ops[] = { [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL, [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL, [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK, [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST, [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN, [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN, [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL, [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL, }; static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op) { u32 n; for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++) ; return n; } /* check if an audit field is valid */ static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) { switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE && entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_FSTYPE: if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_FS) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_PERM: if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT) return -EINVAL; break; } switch (entry->rule.listnr) { case AUDIT_FILTER_FS: switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_FSTYPE: case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: break; default: return -EINVAL; } } /* Check for valid field type and op */ switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: case AUDIT_ARG3: case AUDIT_PERS: /* <uapi/linux/personality.h> */ case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: /* all ops are valid */ break; case AUDIT_UID: case AUDIT_EUID: case AUDIT_SUID: case AUDIT_FSUID: case AUDIT_LOGINUID: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: case AUDIT_GID: case AUDIT_EGID: case AUDIT_SGID: case AUDIT_FSGID: case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: case AUDIT_PID: case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: case AUDIT_PPID: case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: case AUDIT_EXIT: case AUDIT_SUCCESS: case AUDIT_INODE: case AUDIT_SESSIONID: case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */ if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_WATCH: case AUDIT_DIR: case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: case AUDIT_ARCH: case AUDIT_FSTYPE: case AUDIT_PERM: case AUDIT_FILETYPE: case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: case AUDIT_EXE: /* only equal and not equal valid ops */ if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal) return -EINVAL; break; default: /* field not recognized */ return -EINVAL; } /* Check for select valid field values */ switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_PERM: if (f->val & ~15) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_FILETYPE: if (f->val & ~S_IFMT) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE) return -EINVAL; break; case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM: if (f->val >= AF_MAX) return -EINVAL; break; default: break; } return 0; } /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, size_t datasz) { int err = 0; struct audit_entry *entry; void *bufp; size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); int i; char *str; struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark; entry = audit_to_entry_common(data); if (IS_ERR(entry)) goto exit_nofree; bufp = data->buf; for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; u32 f_val; err = -EINVAL; f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]); if (f->op == Audit_bad) goto exit_free; f->type = data->fields[i]; f_val = data->values[i]; /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f_val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) { f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; f_val = 0; entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY; } err = audit_field_valid(entry, f); if (err) goto exit_free; err = -EINVAL; switch (f->type) { case AUDIT_LOGINUID: case AUDIT_UID: case AUDIT_EUID: case AUDIT_SUID: case AUDIT_FSUID: case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f_val); if (!uid_valid(f->uid)) goto exit_free; break;