// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only/* * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc. * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc. * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> * Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH * Copyright 2018-2020, 2022-2026 Intel Corporation */ #include <crypto/utils.h>#include <linux/if_ether.h>#include <linux/etherdevice.h>#include <linux/list.h>#include <linux/rcupdate.h>#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>#include <linux/slab.h>#include <linux/export.h>#include <net/mac80211.h>#include <linux/unaligned.h>#include "ieee80211_i.h"#include "driver-ops.h"#include "debugfs_key.h"#include "aes_ccm.h"#include "aes_cmac.h"#include "aes_gmac.h"#include "aes_gcm.h" /** * DOC: Key handling basics * * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data) * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface, * each station key also belongs to that interface. * * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm * that isn't implemented in software). * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW * or HW except by looking into debugfs. * * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period. */ static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; static voidupdate_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta){ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) return; /* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */ lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta; rcu_read_unlock();} static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata){ /* * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one: * * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off. * * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks * off. * * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c) * * Solution has been explained at * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net */ lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) { /* * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1. */ synchronize_net(); }} static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta){ lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta); update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta); sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta;} static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key){ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; struct sta_info *sta; int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; might_sleep(); lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) { /* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more. * However, its flags may still indicate that it was * programmed into the device (since we're in resume) * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove * it again later. */ if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE && !(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; return -EINVAL; } if (!key->local->ops->set_key) goto out_unsupported; sta = key->sta; /* * Allow installation of a per-STA GTK if per-STA GTK is supported * by the driver or the interface is a NAN Data interface (as * per-station GTKs are required to be supported if secure NAN is * supported). */ if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) && !(ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK) || sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_NAN_DATA)) goto out_unsupported; if (sta && !sta->uploaded) goto out_unsupported; if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { /* * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces. * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver. */ if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { ret = 1; goto out_unsupported; } } if (key->conf.link_id >= 0 && sdata->vif.active_links && !(sdata->vif.active_links & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) return 0; ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); if (!ret) { key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)); WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) && (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)); return 0; } if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1) sdata_err(sdata, "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n", key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); out_unsupported: switch (key->conf.cipher) { case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: /* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */ if (ret == 1) return 0; if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL)) return -EINVAL; return 0; default: return -EINVAL; }} static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key){ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; struct sta_info *sta; int ret; might_sleep(); if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key) return; if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) return; sta = key->sta; sdata = key->sdata; lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); if (key->conf.link_id >= 0 && sdata->vif.active_links && !(sdata->vif.active_links & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) return; if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata, sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); if (ret) sdata_err(sdata, "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n", key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);} static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force){ struct sta_info *sta = key->sta; struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION); sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); return 0;} int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key){ return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false);} static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old, struct ieee80211_key *new){ struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local; struct sta_info *sta = new->sta; int i; lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) { /* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */ if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX && !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) { /* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU. * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the * job done for the few ms we need it.) */ set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) __ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i, AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); } } else if (old) { /* Rekey without Extended Key ID. * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto. * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW * crypto, though. */ if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) return; /* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */ old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED; ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta); if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) { set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta, AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); } if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy, NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) { pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.", sta->sta.addr); /* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent * the clear text leaks and freezes. */ ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false); } }} static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx, bool uni, bool multi){ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) { key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, sdata->keys[idx]); if (!key) key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, link->gtk[idx]); } if (uni) { rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key); ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata); if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx); } if (multi) rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_multicast_key, key); ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);} void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx, bool uni, bool multi){ lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); __ieee80211_set_default_key(link, idx, uni, multi);} static void__ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx){ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, link->gtk[idx]); rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_mgmt_key, key); ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);} void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx){ lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(link, idx);} static void__ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx){ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, link->gtk[idx]); rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_beacon_key, key); ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);} void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx){ lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(link, idx);} static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct ieee80211_link_data *link, struct sta_info *sta, bool pairwise, struct ieee80211_key *old, struct ieee80211_key *new){ struct link_sta_info *link_sta = sta ? &sta->deflink : NULL; int link_id; int idx; int ret = 0; bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey; bool is_wep; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); /* caller must provide at least one old/new */ if (WARN_ON(!new && !old)) return 0; if (new) { idx = new->conf.keyidx; is_wep = new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 || new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104; link_id = new->conf.link_id; } else { idx = old->conf.keyidx; is_wep = old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 || old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104; link_id = old->conf.link_id; } if (WARN(old && old->conf.link_id != link_id, "old link ID %d doesn't match new link ID %d\n", old->conf.link_id, link_id)) return -EINVAL; if (link_id >= 0) { if (!link) { link = sdata_dereference(sdata->link[link_id], sdata); if (!link) return -ENOLINK; } if (sta) { link_sta = rcu_dereference_protected(sta->link[link_id], lockdep_is_held(&sta->local->hw.wiphy->mtx)); if (!link_sta) return -ENOLINK; } } else { link = &sdata->deflink; } if ((is_wep || pairwise) && idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) return -EINVAL; WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx); if (new && sta && pairwise) { /* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key IDLines 1–500 of 1518. Load more
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc. * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc. * Copyright 2006-2007 Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> * Copyright 2007-2008 Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH * Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH * Copyright 2018-2020, 2022-2026 Intel Corporation */ #include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/if_ether.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/rtnetlink.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <net/mac80211.h> #include <linux/unaligned.h> #include "ieee80211_i.h" #include "driver-ops.h" #include "debugfs_key.h" #include "aes_ccm.h" #include "aes_cmac.h" #include "aes_gmac.h" #include "aes_gcm.h" /** * DOC: Key handling basics * * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data) * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface, * each station key also belongs to that interface. * * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm * that isn't implemented in software). * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW * or HW except by looking into debugfs. * * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period. */ static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }; static void update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan; if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) return; /* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */ lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta; rcu_read_unlock(); } static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata) { /* * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one: * * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off. * * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks * off. * * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c) * * Solution has been explained at * http://mid.gmane.org/1308590980.4322.19.camel@jlt3.sipsolutions.net */ lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) { /* * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1. */ synchronize_net(); } } static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta) { lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta); update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta); sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta; } static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata; struct sta_info *sta; int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; might_sleep(); lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) { /* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more. * However, its flags may still indicate that it was * programmed into the device (since we're in resume) * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove * it again later. */ if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE && !(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; return -EINVAL; } if (!key->local->ops->set_key) goto out_unsupported; sta = key->sta; /* * Allow installation of a per-STA GTK if per-STA GTK is supported * by the driver or the interface is a NAN Data interface (as * per-station GTKs are required to be supported if secure NAN is * supported). */ if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) && !(ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK) || sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_NAN_DATA)) goto out_unsupported; if (sta && !sta->uploaded) goto out_unsupported; if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) { /* * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces. * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver. */ if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) { ret = 1; goto out_unsupported; } } if (key->conf.link_id >= 0 && sdata->vif.active_links && !(sdata->vif.active_links & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) return 0; ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata, sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); if (!ret) { key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1); WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) && (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV)); WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) && (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)); return 0; } if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1) sdata_err(sdata, "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n", key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); out_unsupported: switch (key->conf.cipher) { case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128: case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256: /* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */ if (ret == 1) return 0; if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL)) return -EINVAL; return 0; default: return -EINVAL; } } static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata; struct sta_info *sta; int ret; might_sleep(); if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key) return; if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) return; sta = key->sta; sdata = key->sdata; lockdep_assert_wiphy(key->local->hw.wiphy); if (key->conf.link_id >= 0 && sdata->vif.active_links && !(sdata->vif.active_links & BIT(key->conf.link_id))) return; if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE | IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM))) increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata); key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE; ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata, sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf); if (ret) sdata_err(sdata, "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n", key->conf.keyidx, sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret); } static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force) { struct sta_info *sta = key->sta; struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local; lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION); sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx; if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta); return 0; } int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key) { return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false); } static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old, struct ieee80211_key *new) { struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local; struct sta_info *sta = new->sta; int i; lockdep_assert_wiphy(local->hw.wiphy); if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) { /* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */ if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX && !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) { /* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU. * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the * job done for the few ms we need it.) */ set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) __ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i, AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); } } else if (old) { /* Rekey without Extended Key ID. * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto. * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW * crypto, though. */ if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE)) return; /* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */ old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED; ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta); if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) { set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA); ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta, AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST); } if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy, NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) { pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.", sta->sta.addr); /* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent * the clear text leaks and freezes. */ ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false); } } } static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx, bool uni, bool multi) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) { key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, sdata->keys[idx]); if (!key) key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, link->gtk[idx]); } if (uni) { rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key); ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata); if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx); } if (multi) rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_multicast_key, key); ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); } void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx, bool uni, bool multi) { lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); __ieee80211_set_default_key(link, idx, uni, multi); } static void __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, link->gtk[idx]); rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_mgmt_key, key); ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); } void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx) { lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(link, idx); } static void __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx) { struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = link->sdata; struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS) key = wiphy_dereference(sdata->local->hw.wiphy, link->gtk[idx]); rcu_assign_pointer(link->default_beacon_key, key); ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata); } void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_link_data *link, int idx) { lockdep_assert_wiphy(link->sdata->local->hw.wiphy); __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(link, idx); } static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct ieee80211_link_data *link, struct sta_info *sta, bool pairwise, struct ieee80211_key *old, struct ieee80211_key *new) { struct link_sta_info *link_sta = sta ? &sta->deflink : NULL; int link_id; int idx; int ret = 0; bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey; bool is_wep; lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy); /* caller must provide at least one old/new */ if (WARN_ON(!new && !old)) return 0; if (new) { idx = new->conf.keyidx; is_wep = new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 || new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104; link_id = new->conf.link_id; } else { idx = old->conf.keyidx; is_wep = old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 || old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104; link_id = old->conf.link_id; } if (WARN(old && old->conf.link_id != link_id, "old link ID %d doesn't match new link ID %d\n", old->conf.link_id, link_id)) return -EINVAL; if (link_id >= 0) { if (!link) { link = sdata_dereference(sdata->link[link_id], sdata); if (!link) return -ENOLINK; } if (sta) { link_sta = rcu_dereference_protected(sta->link[link_id], lockdep_is_held(&sta->local->hw.wiphy->mtx)); if (!link_sta) return -ENOLINK; } } else { link = &sdata->deflink; } if ((is_wep || pairwise) && idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) return -EINVAL; WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx); if (new && sta && pairwise) { /* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID