/* * Copyright (c) 1997, 2009, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. * DO NOT ALTER OR REMOVE COPYRIGHT NOTICES OR THIS FILE HEADER. * * This code is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it * under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 only, as * published by the Free Software Foundation.  Oracle designates this * particular file as subject to the "Classpath" exception as provided * by Oracle in the LICENSE file that accompanied this code. * * This code is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License * version 2 for more details (a copy is included in the LICENSE file that * accompanied this code). * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License version * 2 along with this work; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, * Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. * * Please contact Oracle, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065 USA * or visit www.oracle.com if you need additional information or have any * questions. */ package java.awt; import java.security.BasicPermission; /** * This class is for AWT permissions. * An <code>AWTPermission</code> contains a target name but * no actions list; you either have the named permission * or you don't. * * <P> * The target name is the name of the AWT permission (see below). The naming * convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention. * Also, an asterisk could be used to represent all AWT permissions. * * <P> * The following table lists all the possible <code>AWTPermission</code> * target names, and for each provides a description of what the * permission allows and a discussion of the risks of granting code * the permission. * <P> * * <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="AWTPermission target names, descriptions, and associated risks."> * <tr> * <th>Permission Target Name</th> * <th>What the Permission Allows</th> * <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>accessClipboard</td> *   <td>Posting and retrieval of information to and from the AWT clipboard</td> *   <td>This would allow malfeasant code to share * potentially sensitive or confidential information.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>accessEventQueue</td> *   <td>Access to the AWT event queue</td> *   <td>After retrieving the AWT event queue, * malicious code may peek at and even remove existing events * from its event queue, as well as post bogus events which may purposefully * cause the application or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>accessSystemTray</td> *   <td>Access to the AWT SystemTray instance</td> *   <td>This would allow malicious code to add tray icons to the system tray. * First, such an icon may look like the icon of some known application * (such as a firewall or anti-virus) and order a user to do something unsafe * (with help of balloon messages). Second, the system tray may be glutted with * tray icons so that no one could add a tray icon anymore.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>createRobot</td> *   <td>Create java.awt.Robot objects</td> *   <td>The java.awt.Robot object allows code to generate native-level * mouse and keyboard events as well as read the screen. It could allow * malicious code to control the system, run other programs, read the * display, and deny mouse and keyboard access to the user.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>fullScreenExclusive</td> *   <td>Enter full-screen exclusive mode</td> *   <td>Entering full-screen exclusive mode allows direct access to * low-level graphics card memory.  This could be used to spoof the * system, since the program is in direct control of rendering. Depending on * the implementation, the security warning may not be shown for the windows * used to enter the full-screen exclusive mode (assuming that the {@code * fullScreenExclusive} permission has been granted to this application). Note * that this behavior does not mean that the {@code * showWindowWithoutWarningBanner} permission will be automatically granted to * the application which has the {@code fullScreenExclusive} permission: * non-full-screen windows will continue to be shown with the security * warning.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>listenToAllAWTEvents</td> *   <td>Listen to all AWT events, system-wide</td> *   <td>After adding an AWT event listener, * malicious code may scan all AWT events dispatched in the system, * allowing it to read all user input (such as passwords).  Each * AWT event listener is called from within the context of that * event queue's EventDispatchThread, so if the accessEventQueue * permission is also enabled, malicious code could modify the * contents of AWT event queues system-wide, causing the application * or applet to misbehave in an insecure manner.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>readDisplayPixels</td> *   <td>Readback of pixels from the display screen</td> *   <td>Interfaces such as the java.awt.Composite interface or the * java.awt.Robot class allow arbitrary code to examine pixels on the * display enable malicious code to snoop on the activities of the user.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>replaceKeyboardFocusManager</td> *   <td>Sets the <code>KeyboardFocusManager</code> for *       a particular thread. *   <td>When <code>SecurityManager</code> is installed, the invoking *       thread must be granted this permission in order to replace *       the current <code>KeyboardFocusManager</code>.  If permission *       is not granted, a <code>SecurityException</code> will be thrown. * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>setAppletStub</td> *   <td>Setting the stub which implements Applet container services</td> *   <td>Malicious code could set an applet's stub and result in unexpected * behavior or denial of service to an applet.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>setWindowAlwaysOnTop</td> *   <td>Setting always-on-top property of the window: {@link Window#setAlwaysOnTop}</td> *   <td>The malicious window might make itself look and behave like a real full desktop, so that * information entered by the unsuspecting user is captured and subsequently misused </td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>showWindowWithoutWarningBanner</td> *   <td>Display of a window without also displaying a banner warning * that the window was created by an applet</td> *   <td>Without this warning, * an applet may pop up windows without the user knowing that they * belong to an applet.  Since users may make security-sensitive * decisions based on whether or not the window belongs to an applet * (entering a username and password into a dialog box, for example), * disabling this warning banner may allow applets to trick the user * into entering such information.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>toolkitModality</td> *   <td>Creating {@link Dialog.ModalityType#TOOLKIT_MODAL TOOLKIT_MODAL} dialogs *       and setting the {@link Dialog.ModalExclusionType#TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE *       TOOLKIT_EXCLUDE} window property.</td> *   <td>When a toolkit-modal dialog is shown from an applet, it blocks all other * applets in the browser. When launching applications from Java Web Start, * its windows (such as the security dialog) may also be blocked by toolkit-modal * dialogs, shown from these applications.</td> * </tr> * * <tr> *   <td>watchMousePointer</td> *   <td>Getting the information about the mouse pointer position at any * time</td> *   <td>Constantly watching the mouse pointer, * an applet can make guesses about what the user is doing, i.e. moving * the mouse to the lower left corner of the screen most likely means that * the user is about to launch an application. If a virtual keypad is used * so that keyboard is emulated using the mouse, an applet may guess what * is being typed.</td> * </tr> * </table> * * @see java.security.BasicPermission * @see java.security.Permission * @see java.security.Permissions * @see java.security.PermissionCollection * @see java.lang.SecurityManager * * * @author Marianne Mueller * @author Roland Schemers */ public final class AWTPermission extends BasicPermission {     /** use serialVersionUID from the Java 2 platform for interoperability */    private static final long serialVersionUID = 8890392402588814465L;     /**     * Creates a new <code>AWTPermission</code> with the specified name.     * The name is the symbolic name of the <code>AWTPermission</code>,     * such as "topLevelWindow", "systemClipboard", etc. An asterisk     * may be used to indicate all AWT permissions.     *     * @param name the name of the AWTPermission     *     * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.     */     public AWTPermission(String name)    {        super(name);    }     /**     * Creates a new <code>AWTPermission</code> object with the specified name.     * The name is the symbolic name of the <code>AWTPermission</code>, and the     * actions string is currently unused and should be <code>null</code>.     *     * @param name the name of the <code>AWTPermission</code>     * @param actions should be <code>null</code>     *     * @throws NullPointerException if <code>name</code> is <code>null</code>.     * @throws IllegalArgumentException if <code>name</code> is empty.     */     public AWTPermission(String name, String actions)    {        super(name, actions);    }}